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INTRODUCTION
International relations and international law scholars
have moved beyond the question of whether international
law matters and have turned their attention to questions of
why and how international law leads to international
cooperation.' In doing so, many scholars employ game
1. See Richard Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based
Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT'L ORG. 339, 339 (2002)
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theory (often in the broader context of rational choice
theory) to frame their analysis and explain the need for
international institutions designed to increase the
likelihood of cooperation.2 In recent years, scholars have
theorized about the optimal design of institutions and have
examined and evaluated existing institutions to determine
whether the institutions are rationally designed.3 Despite
the significant advancements made in the study of
international cooperation, there remains a gap between the
types of institutions that traditional game theory predicts
should exist and the types of institutions found in reality.4
The traditional game theory model suggests that States will
create institutions that reduce the risk of opportunism, for
example, by monitoring State behavior and adjusting
payoffs either by rewarding cooperators or punishing
defectors. Such institutions exist in a variety of forms and
("Analysis of international institutions and law is shifting from earlier concerns
of whether institutions matter to questions of which aspects matter, how, and in
what contexts.") (footnote omitted). In the past two decades, many scholars have
devoted attention to integrating international relations and international law
theories. See infra note 59. As Pierre-Hugues Verdier recently put it, "[t]he most
significant recent development in international legal studies has undoubtedly
been the collapse of the intellectual barrier between the disciplines of
international law and international relations." Pierre-Hugues Verdier,
Cooperative States: International Relations, State Responsibility and The
Problem of Custom, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 839, 840 (2002).
2. See Duncan Snidal, Rational Choice and International Relations, in THE
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 73, 77 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds.,
2002) (observing that "[nion-cooperative game-theoretic models are the
predominant approach" to modeling rational choice). For a discussion on
rational choice theory, see generally id. There is a rich literature on the
application of game theory to international cooperation. See infra note 59
(listing sources). Game theory encompasses both cooperative games, in which
promises are assumed to be binding, and noncooperative games, in which
promises are not necessarily binding. Given the absence of a supranational
governance regime, international games are analyzed as noncooperative games.
See, e.g., ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME
THEORY 16-19 (2d ed. 1994); Moshe Hirsch, Game Theory, International Law
and Future Environmental Cooperation in the Middle East, 27 DENV. J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 75, 80 (1998). Accordingly, the article will address noncooperative game
theory hereinafter.
3. See generally Special Issue, The Rational Design of International
Institutions, 55 INT'L ORG. 761 (2001). See infra Part II.D.
4. See Snidal, supra note 2, at 85 ("More dramatically, states make rational
plans to join international institutions like the EU, WTO or international legal
agreements with the understanding ... that those institutions will significantly
shape their own future course. Rational choice has a largely unfulfilled role to
play in analyzing this sort of deliberate preference change.").
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are the predominant focus of legal and institutional
analyses. Yet such institutions arguably are not the
predominant (institutional) feature of international
cooperation.5 There are a host of institutions created by
parties to international agreements that are unrelated to
monitoring and enforcement and cannot be explained by the
traditional game theory model.
This article advances the body of interdisciplinary
scholarship addressing the questions of why and how
international law leads to international cooperation by
developing a dynamic institutional theory of international
law. The theory extends the iterated game theory model (for
example, the iterated prisoners' dilemma), which is often
used by rational choice theorists in the international
relations and international law disciplines to study
international cooperation,6 by recognizing first that iterated
games actually evolve7 and second that States create
5. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995) (arguing
that management-oriented compliance institutions are more important than
enforcement-oriented compliance institutions); James Fearon, Bargaining,
Enforcement, and International Cooperation, 52 INT'L ORG. 269 (1998) (arguing
that institutions focused on facilitating bargaining are as important to
international cooperation as those focused on monitoring and enforcement).
6. See Snidal, supra note 2, at 77.
7. The theory decidedly focuses on international legal regimes as evolving
games. The concept of an evolving game developed in this article is a step
beyond an iterated game, such as the iterated Prisoners' Dilemma, because the
game evolves dynamically as it iterates. Dynamic evolution is different from
iteration, although the two concepts are related. Iteration involves repeated
interactions over time and is important because repeated interactions increase
the likelihood of cooperation over time, particularly when the number of
iterations is unknown. See, e.g., John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on
Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and International Law,
37 HARv. INT'L L.J. 139 (1996) [hereinafter Setear, An Iterative Perspective on
Treaties] (analyzing treaties from an "iterative perspective"); John K. Setear,
Responses to Breach of a Treaty and Rationalist International Relations Theory:
The Rules of Release and Remediation in the Law of Treaties and the Law of
State Responsibility, 83 VA. L. REV. 1 (1997) (using iterated prisoners' dilemma
to analyze international law). Essentially, payoffs expected in the future (from
future iterations) become relevant to decisions made in the present (in the
current iteration).
Dynamic evolution goes a step further. In an evolving game, the game structure
evolves as it iterates due to internal changes resulting from the operation of
institutions responding to external events, such as new scientific or
technological findings, that cause the underlying game structure to change. As
demonstrated below, the function of international institutions need not be (and
in reality is not) limited to making modifications in response to parties'
2003] A DYNAMIC INSTITUTIONAL THEORY
institutions to cope with this evolution and sustain
cooperation in the face of dynamic change.8  States
understand when entering into an international agreement
not only that they face noncompliance risks as traditionally
conceived (defection based on incentives presented in
iterated game context, for example), but also that dynamic
change may threaten the stability of the game (unforeseen
events may cause payoffs to change in magnitude or become
more or less certain, for example). Accordingly, ex ante,
States design institutions to monitor State behavior and
adjust payoffs either by rewarding cooperators or punishing
defectors-as predicted by traditional game theory-but
also to maintain cooperation in the face of dynamic change.
States create institutions to reduce uncertainty and
transaction costs associated with dynamic change and to
adjust commitments in future iterations. Such institutions
facilitate internal change and maintain cooperation by
relieving parties of the need to return to the bargaining
table every time the game structure changes. This new
theory provides a powerful framework for analyzing
international legal commitments, institutional mechanisms
created by parties to an international agreement to
encourage and facilitate cooperation over time ("compliance
institutions"), and the dynamic process by which
international legal regimes evolve.
Scholars concerned with understanding why States
bother to negotiate international agreements and why
States normally comply with their commitments should
benefit from a more nuanced understanding of
international law and compliance institutions. Legal
scholars tend to view the international compliance dilemma
(i.e., the perceived risk that States will not comply with
commitments) as an inevitable and inherent weakness of
decisions not to cooperate (e.g., to breach obligations). See infra Part II.D-F. See
also John K. Setear, Ozone, Iteration, and International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L.
193, 201 (1999) (describing the role of institutions in facilitating cooperation);
id. at 227-282 (discussing the evolution of the Ozone regime). For an interesting
and comprehensive model of dynamic evolution of global regulatory regimes, see
JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000).
8. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 225-27 (discussing institutions
designed for treaty adaptation). In his overview of rational choice theory and
international relations, Duncan Snidal describes the issue of dynamic change as
an important challenge for rational choice theory. Snidal, supra note 2, at 82-
86.
9. See Snidal, supra note 2, at 85.
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international law for which politically dependent, negative
repercussions, such as reputational harm, exclusion from
participation in other "linked" arrangements, or direct
sanctions, are the only real cure, although a cure that is not
always available or effective." As noted above, this view
fails, however, to consider the wide-range of innovative
institutions that States can and do employ to increase the
likelihood of compliance and continued cooperation. Simply
put, States are aware of various risks while negotiating
commitments, and accordingly, States negotiate over the
10. See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International
Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823 (2002) (suggesting that most international law
scholars believe sanctions are the only real cure); Joel P. Trachtman, The
Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 333, 338, 338 & n.26
(1999) (asking "what would be the purpose of entering into an unenforceable
agreement?" and explaining further that "[bly 'enforceable,' I mean not just
enforceability in a court of law but also enforceability through reputation or
other informal sanctions. Of course, one can find many examples of
unenforceable agreements that nonetheless serve a useful purpose. If they are
neither formally nor informally enforceable though, they have no direct effect on
the parties and may rather be designed for political theater, that is, to impress
domestic constituencies or other onlookers."); TSEMING YANG, A THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL TREATY ENFORCEMENT AS A PUBLIC GOOD: THE ROLE OF
INSTITUTIONAL DETERRENT SANCTIONS IN ASSURING COMPLIANCE WITH
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 3 (Sept. 2002) (working paper on file
with the author) ("The lack or ineffectiveness of deterrent sanctions in the
international legal system is at the root of the debate about whether
international law is really "law" instead of a set of ethical or moral
obligations."); cf. David J. Bederman, Counterintuiting Countermeasures, 96
AM. J. INT'L L. 817, 818 (2002) ("There is no world policeman to command or
coerce obedience to international law rules; instead, states and other actors rely
on a combination of other mechanisms such as countermeasures to win respect
and compliance for these duties."); John Norton Moore, Enhancing Compliance
With International Law: A Neglected Remedy, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 881, 884-85
(1999) ("I believe that the greatest challenge for the future of the rule of law
internationally is to enhance rates of compliance .... The need for enhanced
compliance with international norms today, as well as the more effective
promotion of liberal democracy (a subject for another day), far outweighs the
need for further development of general normative systems, or further
refinements in the existing international rules. Yet we continue to focus more
attention on refinement of such systems rather than on enhanced compliance
with them.") (footnotes omitted). Of course, not all legal scholars take this view;
many argue for a management-oriented approach, see, e.g., CHAYES & CHAYES,
supra note 5 (championing the management-oriented approach and attacking
the enforcement-oriented approach), for a more nuanced approach. See also
ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds.,
1998) (framework and conclusion) [hereinafter ENGAGING COUNTRIES].
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content of the law, the level of commitments, and the
creation of compliance institutions.11
Legal scholarship has only recently begun to address
the importance of compliance institutions in international
law. 2 Professor Andrew T. Guzman has recently proposed a
compliance-based theory of international law that focuses
primarily on the roles of reputation and direct sanctions as
11. See, e.g., CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 110; Kenneth W. Abbott,
Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers,
14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335, 337-38 (1989); see also Laurence R. Helfer,
Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the
Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1841 (2002) ("States consciously design human rights
agreements in response to specific problems, choosing the degrees of obligation,
precision, and delegation required to solve those problems. But legalization is
not costless. To the contrary, greater legalization necessarily requires a more
far-reaching diminution of sovereignty, raising the important question of what
motivates states to create legalized human rights agreements in the first
place.") (footnote omitted); cf Warren F. Schwartz & Alan 0. Sykes, The
Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade
Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 179, 180-82 (2002) (analyzing WTO
Agreements as "contracts among the political actors who negotiated and signed
them" and suggesting that like parties to private contracts, the relevant
political actors "employ [mechanisms specified in the contract] to encourage
efficient performance of commitments while facilitating efficient breach of
commitments"). While Schwartz and Sykes begin to address the importance of
compliance mechanisms woven into international agreements themselves, the
comparison with private contracts sidesteps the underlying compliance
dilemma associated with international law.
12. On compliance generally, see Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter,
International Law, International Relations and Compliance, in THE HANDBOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 538; Guzman, supra note 10; Kal
Raustiala, Compliance & Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation,
32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L. L. 387, 392-99 (2000); YANG, supra note 10. On
compliance in specific issue-areas, see Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights
Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002); John H. Knox, A New
Approach to Compliance with International Environmental Law: The
Submissions Procedure of the NAFTA Environmental Commission, 28 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 1 (2001); Moore, supra note 10, at 884-85; Edith Brown Weiss,
Understanding Compliance with International Environmental Agreements: The
Baker's Dozen Myths, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 1555 (1999); Christopher C. Joyner,
Recommended Measures Under the Antarctic Treaty: Hardening Compliance
with Soft International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 401 (1998). There have been a
few major empirical studies of compliance with international environmental
law. See ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 10; Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor,
Conclusions, in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 681-84 (David G. Victor
et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS]. See also
Hathaway, supra (advancing a quantitative analysis of compliance with human
rights treaties).
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influences on State behavior. 3 In a similar vein, this article
develops a compliance-based theory of international law
and uses a model of rational, self-interested States based in
part on theories in the fields of international relations(especially, institutionalism) and economics (especially,
game theory). However, the theoretical framework
developed in this article views international cooperation as
a dynamic process and focuses more carefully on the legal
institutions created by States to address noncompliance
13. See Guzman, supra note 10. Responding to inadequacies in existing legal
scholarship concerning international law and compliance theory, Professor
Guzman develops a model of rational, self-interested States, which he
summarized as follows:
The model of international law presented ... is an infinitely repeated
game that operates as follows. Any given international obligation is
modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage, states negotiate over
the content of the law and the level of commitment. In the second
stage, states decide whether or not to comply with their international
obligations. International law affects a state's self-interest, and thus its
compliance decision, in two ways. First, it can lead to the imposition of
direct sanctions such as trade, military, or diplomatic sanctions.
Second, it can lead to a loss of reputational capital in the international
arena. If the direct and reputational costs of violating international law
are outweighed by the benefits thereof, a state will violate that law.
Id. at 1846 (footnotes omitted). Professor Guzman applies this model to
demonstrate how international law affects the behavior of States and concludes
that international law scholars should devote more attention to compliance
theory. While I generally agree with Professor Guzman's assertions that
international law matters and that compliance issues deserve considerably
more attention, I find his model adopts an oversimplified view of States'
decision making processes, the manner in which international legal regimes
evolve, and, perhaps most importantly from the perspective of compliance
theory, the role of compliance institutions themselves.
14. The article focuses in large part on the institutions that States create
and utilize to maintain cooperation over time as the regime evolves. A "regime"
is the "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making
procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of
international relations." Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime
Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1,
2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983). According to Krasner: "Principles are beliefs
of fact, causation and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in
terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions
for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and
implementing collective choice." Id.; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational
Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REv. 181, 200 (1996) (arguing that a regime is a set of
governing arrangements developed by governmental and private parties in a
given issue-area). For a useful analysis of the components of a regime, see
Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics
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risks, including but not limited to the incentive-based
institutions discussed by Professor Guzman. 5 Analysis of
compliance institutions reveals important differences in the
manner in which States address perceived risks of strategic
defection and dynamic change.
The article specifically contends that States pursue
three types of compliance strategies: Type I strategies
focused on adjusting States' incentives to comply by
altering payoff structures (the expected costs and benefits of
(non)compliance); Type If strategies focused on facilitating
cooperation by reducing transaction costs and uncertainty
as the legal regime evolves; and Type III strategies focused
on maintaining cooperation and improving regime
effectiveness by dynamically adjusting commitments over
time. 6 Comparative analysis of compliance institutions
illustrates that these strategies may be implemented
through different types of institutions 7 and that the
optimal choice of strategy and institutions may vary
considerably across issue-areas. 8 Thus, after developing a
of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE INT'L L.J.
(forthcoming 2004).
15. While it is true, as Professor Guzman demonstrates, that the possibility
of reputational and direct sanctions affects the incentives of States considering
whether or not to comply, these two examples are simply a subset of incentive-
based compliance institutions.
16. See infra Part II.F.
17. For example, incentive-based strategies may be implemented through
adjudicative processes with the possibility of sanctions, contingent funding
mechanisms, and a wide-range of other options. See infra Parts II.F.1.
(explaining incentive-based strategies), III.A.2.a.i & c.i (analyzing dispute
settlement process in GATT and WTO), and III.B.2.a (analyzing contingent
funding mechanisms and other options in Ozone regime).
18. See Kenneth W. Abbott, "Trust But Verify": The Production of
Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agreements, 26
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 1 (1993) ("In situations of interdependence, [rationalist
international relations] theory suggests, states will, and should, tend to design
their international agreements and institutions to address the particular
strategic situations in which they find themselves.") (footnotes omitted); id.
(examining different kinds of informational arrangements); Duncan Snidal,
Coordination versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International
Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 923 (1985) (considering
different institutional arrangements that should be expected for different
games). There are two competing institutional approaches to promoting
compliance that are considered by international law and relations scholars, an
enforcement-oriented approach based essentially on the threat and/or use of
deterrent sanctions and a management-oriented approach based essentially on
making compliance possible by reducing ambiguity regarding obligations
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theory of international law that accounts for compliance
strategies and the influence of compliance institutions, this
article applies the theory to examine and compare the
strategic institutional approaches taken to address
compliance issues in international trade and international
environmental agreements."
The emergence of effective international regimes built
on robust, powerful institutional structures has been seen
as an important, although to some frightening, step
towards effective international governance. For example,
the World Trade Organization ("WTO") currently acts as an
umbrella forum for a variety of issue-areas beyond trade
liberalization, such as intellectual property harmonization.2"
Increasingly, it is also seen as the likely forum for
addressing other issue-areas perceived to be in need of
international cooperation,22  such as antitrust law
harmonization23 and some aspects of environmental law.24
themselves and creating positive incentives to comply prior to an incidence of
noncompliance. See infra Part II.D.
19. Specifically, Part III.A applies the dynamic institutional theory
developed in Part II to the international trade regime that evolved from the
GATT into the WTO ("GATT/WTO regime"), and Part III.B applies the theory to
the international environmental regime that regulates ozone depleting
substances ("Ozone regime"). See infra.
20. See John 0. McGinnis and Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade
Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 512-13 (2000).
21. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
("TRIPs"), Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments-
Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994); see also Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last
revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 25 Stat. 1372, 828 U.N.T.S. 305; Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as
last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
On international intellectual property harmonization, see, e.g., John H. Barton,
The Economics of TRIPs: International Trade in Information-Intensive
Products, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 473 (2001); J. H. Reichman, From Free
Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPs Agreement, 29
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 11, 12 (1996-97). See also infra Conclusion.
22. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The WTO in Transition: Of Constituents,
Competence and Coherence, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 979 (2001); David W.
Leebron, Linkages, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 5 (2002); McGinnis & Movsesian, supra
note 20, at 550-52; see also id. at 550 (suggesting that the "possibility of covert
protectionism necessarily forces the WTO to address environmental, health,
and safety issues"). On the "boundaries" of the WTO, see generally Symposium:
The Boundaries of the WTO, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 5 (2002).
23. The recent Doha meeting of the WTO calls for putting antitrust
harmonization on the agenda for the next round of trade negotiations. See
Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, available at
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Although this article does not evaluate these developments
directly from a normative standpoint, comparative analysis
of compliance strategies and institutions utilized in the
GATT/WTO regime and the Ozone regime suggests that a
uniform compliance approach does not "fit" all issues-areas.
The article proceeds as follows: Part I introduces the
international compliance dilemma and the critical role that
compliance institutions play in the creation and evolution of
international legal regimes. Part II then develops a
dynamic institutional theory of international law in six
sections. The first four sections discuss background
principles derived primarily from the game theory and
international relations disciplines. The final two sections
develop a model of international cooperation that (1)
extends beyond the concept of an iterated game to that of
an evolving game, and (2) helps explain the disconnect
between the role of institutions predicted by theory and the
role of institutions seen in the real world. The fifth section
develops a model of the dynamic, three-staged process by
http://docsonline.wto.org (Adopted Nov. 20, 2001 at the WTO Doha Ministerial
Conference, 9-14 Nov. 2001). On international antitrust harmonization, see,
e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1501 (1998); Spencer Weber Waller, The Internationalization of Antitrust
Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. REV. 343 (1997); Diane P. Wood, The Impossible
Dream: Real International Antitrust, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 277; Diane P. Wood,
International Harmonization of Antitrust Law: The Tortoise or the Hare?, 3 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 391 (2002).
24. On the "trade and environment" debate, see DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING
THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE (1994); C. FORD RUNGE ET
AL., FREER TRADE, PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT: BALANCING TRADE LIBERALIZATION
AND ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS (1994); EDITH BROWN WEISS & JOHN H.
JACKSON, RECONCILING ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE (2001); Daniel C. Esty,
Economic Integration and the Environment, in THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT:
INSTITUTIONS, LAW, AND POLICY 190 (Norman J. Vig & Regina Axelrod eds.,
1999); Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the
Debate, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 459 (1994); David M. Driesen, What is Free
Trade?: The Real Issue Lurking Behind the Trade and Environment Debate, 41
VA. J. INT'L L. 279 (2000-01); Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-Environment
Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA, and WTO: Regional Trajectories of Rule
Development, 91 AM. J. INT'L. L. 231 (1997); Trachtman, supra note 10, at 355-
69. See also UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, ENVIRONMENT AND
TRADE: A HANDBOOK (2000); WTO Secretariat, Trade and Environment, SPECIAL
STUDIES 4 (1999), available at http//www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/envir-e/
environment.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2003); Trade, Global Policy, and the
Environment (World Bank, Discussion Paper No. 402) (Per G. Fredriksson ed.,
1999); GATT Secretariat, Industrial Pollution Control and International Trade,
in GATT STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE No. 1 (July 1971).
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which States identify and delineate interdependency
problems, devise cooperative solutions, and implement
those solutions. The sixth section focuses on the design of
compliance systems that institutionalize a suite of
compliance strategies to sustain cooperation over time. Part
III applies the theoretical framework in two sections. The
first section applies the framework to international trade,
focusing on the GATT/WTO regime and its compliance
institutions, and the second section applies the theoretical
framework to international environmental law, focusing on
the international regime that regulates ozone depleting
substances (the "Ozone regime") and its compliance
institutions. Attention is given to these regimes and
compliance institutions because they have been effective in
achieving treaty objectives, are often considered as models
for the development of institutions in related areas of
international law, and are increasingly the focal point of
interdisciplinary legal issues.
Applying the dynamic institutional theory developed in
this article to the GATT/WTO regime reveals that, while
international trade law has evolved into a relatively strong
version of public international law, the strength of the
current WTO regime does not derive from strict
enforcement-oriented institutions aimed at deterring
intentional noncompliance through the threat of sanctions,
a Type I strategy. Despite its adjudicative, rule-based
orientation, the WTO dispute settlement institution, which
is the cornerstone of the WTO regime, actually appears to
be management-oriented and facilitative in the sense that it
primarily implements Type II and Type III compliance
strategies and implements Type I strategies only on a
limited prospective basis." This important finding is
contrary to conventional wisdom and should inform debates
regarding reform of the WTO as well as the design of future
compliance systems." Overall, the WTO compliance system
is designed to maintain regime stability by internalizing
(within the structure of formal, legalistic institutions)
issues that otherwise might prompt parties to work outside
the system (in the realm of pure politics).27
25. See infra Part III.A.2.c.ii.
26. See infra Part III.A.2.c.ii (discussing conventional wisdom).
27. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON THE NATIONAL AND
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Applying the dynamic institutional theory developed in
this article to the Ozone regime reveals the complex,
multifaceted nature of the Ozone compliance system, which
implements all three strategies through a host of innovative
institutions. As a result of this system, the Ozone regime
has experienced very high rates of participation and
compliance while dynamically adjusting commitment levels
and adding newly identified ozone depleting substances to
the list of regulated substances. Notably, although the
system includes institutions empowered to implement Type
I strategies through both positive and negative means (side-
payments and penalties), no significant penalties have been
given. To date, the compliance system has operated
primarily in "managerial mode" with the threat of
enforcement lurking in the background.28
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMPLIANCE INSTITUTIONS
States create international agreements to deal with
problems that arise as a result of their economic, ecological,
technological, and social interdependence.29 To the extent
that the actions and decisions of one State (or its citizens)
may affect the welfare of another State (or its citizens),
negatively or positively, there is room for negotiation and
potential cooperation between the two States to minimize
joint costs or maximize joint benefits. If transaction costs
were zero, information was perfect, and States were of
equal bargaining power, we might expect effective
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (4th ed.
2002). Of course, power and politics are important influences on States, even
when operating within the system. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Liberal
International Relations Theory and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 717, 722 (1994-95) ("[Plower determines the outcomes of state
interactions .... [Sitates can be treated as if their dominant preference were for
power."); see also Stephen D. Krasner, State Power and the Structure of
International Trade, 28 WORLD POL. 317, 317 (1976) ("[Tlhe structure of
international trade is determined by the interests and power of states acting to
maximize national goals."). The compliance system reduces the risks of
destabilization through, inter alia, retaliatory trade wars or exit (or perhaps
credible threats to exit) followed by a return to bargaining with a clean slate.
28. See infra Part III.B.2.
29. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 1. For an interesting discussion
of interdependence and globalization theories (and a useful bibliography), see
Michael Zurn, From Interdependence to Globalization, in THE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 235.
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agreements to be reached frequently." In the real world,
however, there are impediments to cooperation, including:
* transaction costs associated with identifying
interdependencies and opportunities to cooperate,
communicating preferences, obtaining "approval" of
domestic constituents, negotiating and implementing a
workable agreement, identifying future contingencies,
and monitoring, facilitating, and enforcing compliance;
" uncertainty associated with payoffs, time horizons, and
information generally; and
" strategic considerations associated with static and
dynamic bargaining positions, asymmetric information,
asymmetric preferences, and opportunism through
actual or threatened intentional noncompliance."
In the absence of a supranational government, States
often find themselves in need of governance structures, or
"institutions," to facilitate cooperation, prevent and resolve
conflicts, and generally serve as a locus for coordination,
information sharing, and other important activities that
assist States in overcoming the impediments noted above. 2
States often cooperate by creating international law
and by complying with the commitments they have
undertaken. We do not live in a world dominated by
anarchy; rather, we live in a world in which international
rules, norms, and other products of cooperative decision-
making effectively constrain the behavior of States and
private actors in many areas." Even when States are not
perfectly constrained and find it necessary to breach or not
comply fully with an obligation, the existence of
international law influences the manner in which and the
degree to which States deviate from the rule. Moreover,
30. See generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1
(1960).
31. See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
AND ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE (1990).
32. See infra Part II.D.
33. As Louis Henkin famously put it, "almost all nations observe almost all
principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of
the time." Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAvE 47 (2d ed. 1979) (emphasis
omitted).
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beyond the rule of law itself, other institutions play a
significant role in discouraging a breach or encouraging
compliance and affecting the manner in and degree to
which States breach or comply with international
commitments."
Compliance is the degree to which a State behaves in a
manner that conforms to its legal obligations.35 Scholars
have drawn important distinctions between treaty
implementation, compliance, and effectiveness.36 Generally,
implementation refers to the (domestic) actions that States
take to give effect to international commitments, and
effectiveness refers to the degree to which the treaty
objectives are met.37 Although strict compliance with treaty
obligations alone does not ensure that the underlying
problem motivating international cooperation will be
effectively addressed," this article nonetheless focuses on
compliance, adopting "the widespread belief that an
agreement is likely to be more effective the greater the
degree to which its parties comply with its obligations."' 9
Moreover, as described below, "compliance institutions" are
broadly defined to encompass institutions designed (by
parties) to modify parties' incentives to comply with
obligations, including those institutions that modify parties'
obligations over time so as to sustain cooperation in the face
of dynamic change and improve the effectiveness of the
regime.40
34. See infra Part II.D-F.
35. See Harold K. Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss, A Framework for
Analysis, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 10, at 4; Raustiala & Slaughter,
supra note 12, at 539; David G. Victor et al., Introduction and Overview, in
IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 12, at 7.
36. See, e.g., Jacobson & Brown Weiss, A Framework for Analysis, in
ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 10, at 4-5 & Table 1.1; Raustiala & Slaughter,
supra note 12, at 539.
37. See Jacobson & Brown Weiss, A Framework for Analysis, in ENGAGING
COUNTRIES, supra note 10, at 4-5; Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 12, at 539.
38. See Raustiala, supra note 12, at 392-99 (distinguishing compliance with
rules and the effectiveness of those rules in addressing the underlying problem
justifying their creation).
39. Knox, supra note 12, at 4 n.1.
40. See Raustiala, supra note 12, at 415-16 (describing "[s]ystems for
implementation review" or "SIRs"); Jacobson & Brown Weiss, A Framework for
Analysis, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 10, at 4 & Table 1.1 (adopting a
broad definition of compliance that includes conformance with both procedural
and substantive obligations as well as with the "spirit of the treaty").
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States entering into an international agreement
perceive ex ante a compliance dilemma ex post. In simple
terms, given the lack of supranational adjudicative and
enforcement bodies to "guarantee" compliance,41 there is a
risk to State A (and other parties) that State B will sign on
but not comply with its obligations. Of course, State B faces
the risk that State A (and other parties) will do the same.
The perception of this dilemma prior to negotiations may
affect negotiations primarily in two ways. First, the
perceived dilemma may affect the substantive commitments
that States are willing to undertake, possibly leading to
overblown commitments that some parties do not intend to
honor fully or to minimal commitments that may easily be
met.42 On one hand, opportunistic States may attempt to
push the level of commitments higher (than would be the
41. Of course, even at the domestic level, where adjudicative and
enforcement bodies exist and arguably perform well, compliance is imperfect
and never guaranteed. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously:
Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 297 (1999); Roger Fisher, Bringing Law to Bear on National
Governments, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1130 (1961). Fisher stated:
No absolute guaranty can be given that a government will always
respect a rule. We have no guaranty that our Government will always
respect the Constitution or the decisions of the Supreme Court. But by
seeking to understand why governments so generally obey domestic
law, we shall be better able to undertake the task of securing respect
for international law. Current efforts to deal with pressing
international issues.., are being hamstrung by antiquated dogma
about what law is and by an insufficient realization of why
governments comply with it. No more in the international than in the
domestic sphere should the argument be heard that governments must
be lawless because they cannot be coerced.
Id. at 1140. See generally HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE
STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 263-98 (4th ed. 1967) (comparing the strength
of international and domestic law). Some "slippage" is unavoidable and
arguably desirable. On one hand, efficient slippage may be facilitated through a
liability rule. For example, domestic contract law scholars have argued that
legal institutions ought to allow a party to breach a contract and sustain
damages attributable to its breach under certain circumstances to promote
efficiency (the concept of the "efficient breach"). See RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 95-96 (4th ed. 1992). On the other hand,
efficient slippage may be facilitated through flexible interpretation,
modification or application of the rules. See Farber, supra, at 313-14 (discussing
how the courts have created "slack" for regulated parties under environmental
regulatory regimes). Both approaches, however, also open the door for
inefficient strategic behavior.
42. See George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News about Compliance Good
News about Cooperation?, 50 INT'L ORG. 379 (1996).
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case in the absence of the compliance dilemma) so as to free
ride on the actions of others or simply to experience relative
gains by not bearing the same costs as others." On the
other hand, non-opportunistic States may push the level of
commitments lower to counteract such pressures. The
degree to which strategic misrepresentations and attendant
reactions cause negotiations to diverge from the
commitment levels that would result in the absence of the
compliance dilemma depends on the information held by
the negotiators regarding each other's preferences,
intentions, and capabilities.
Second, in addition to affecting substantive commit-
ments, perception of the compliance dilemma may prompt
States to set forth dispute resolution45 and/or other
compliance procedures in international agreements.46 Some
such institutions dynamically alter both the incentives to
comply with existing commitments and the commitments
43. See Brett Frischmann, Using the Multi-Layered Nature of International
Emissions Trading and of International-Domestic Legal Systems to Escape a
Multi-State Compliance Dilemma, 13 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 463, 500 (2001)
("Opportunistic States may feign strict commitments, relying on a weak,
politicized enforcement process and weak sanctions, such as delayed reductions.
These States may wish to appease domestic constituencies on both sides of the
issue, or they may wish to exploit the system in order to gain economic
benefits-competitive advantages and cash inflow.").
44. See James D. Morrow, Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation:
Distribution Versus Information, 48 INT'L ORG. 387, 389 (1994).
45. In addition to being aware of the compliance dilemma, each "country will
also be aware, ex ante, that it may find, ex post, itself in a position where it
would [wish not to comply with its obligations]. This is the reciprocal-conflict
problem: Each country knows that it might turn out to be either the accuser or
accused. Thus it is no country's interest, ex ante, to agree that, ex post, either
the accuser should be unconstrained in its ability to punish or the accused
should be unconstrained in its ability to proceed without punishment. This
generates a role for dispute settlement." WILFRED "J. ETHIER, PUNISHMENTS AND
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN TRADE AGREEMENT 5 (2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=273212 (last visited Sept.
11, 2003) (PIER Working Paper 01-021).
46. This article generally focuses on the institutions created by Parties to
supplement remedies for a breach of treaty obligations under customary
international law, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 901
(1987) and Patricio Grane, Remedies Under WTO Law, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 755,
757-58 (2001), although the importance of customary international law as a
backdrop is recognized. On the law of remedies and the International Law
Commission's articles on reparations, see Dinah Shelton, Righting Wrongs:
Reparations in the Articles on State Responsibility, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 833 (2002).
For game-theoretic, institutionalist analyses of the law of State responsibility,
see Verdier, supra note 1; Setear, Responses to Breach of a Treaty, supra note 7.
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themselves. The approach taken in various international
agreements for dealing with the compliance dilemma varies
considerably, as demonstrated in the third part of this
article, which analyzes the GATT/WTO regime and the
Ozone regime."
International trade and international environmental
law reflect considerably different evolutions of international
law in large part due to evolving institutional approaches to
compliance." For example, international trade law has
evolved into a relatively strong version of public inter-
national law because of the evolution of innovative
compliance institutions, particularly the WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding ("DSU"). 9  This compliance
institution has enabled States to effectively coordinate their
behavior around explicit substantive legal obligations with
a credible means of detecting and evaluating violations and
prospectively sanctioning on-going violations. The DSU em-
bodies a legalistic approach to international cooperation, °
which works well in the trade context for various reasons
associated with the nature of the underlying dilemma
States face.51 Notably, the DSU evolved from the GATT
47. See infra Part III.
48. Dinah Shelton makes the following observation regarding evolving
institutional approaches to compliance:
Interstate issues of compliance and breach are increasingly handled
through nonconfrontational procedures within international
organizations and treaty bodies. The rise of such nonadversarial
compliance procedures seems to have brought a corresponding decline
in recourse to the law of state responsibility. The shift to compliance
mechanisms from enforcement procedures is seen especially in the
environmental field....
Increasingly, compliance procedures are centered on promoting
changes in state behavior rather than sanctioning breaches of
international obligations. Environmental agreements, in particular,
focus on transparency and positive incentives rather than coercive
measures, while most global human rights agreements utilize state
reporting and "constructive dialogue" as means to encourage
compliance.
Shelton, supra note 46, at 855 (footnotes omitted).
49. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multinational Trade Negotiations, Annex 2, arts. 16(4), 17(14),
reprinted in THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 404, 417-18 (1994).
50. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 109-11 (2d ed. 1997).
See infra Part III.A.
51. See infra Part III.A.1 (discussing interdependency problem); III.A.2.b
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dispute settlement system, which was primarily a political
institution.
5 2
Recent innovations in international environmental law
have also enabled States to effectively coordinate their
behavior, but not typically in the legalistic (adversarial)
manner accomplished in trade." Instead, progress in
international environmental regimes involves varying
degrees of binding and nonbinding commitments and multi-
faceted compliance systems. These compliance systems tend
to be facilitative and directed at encouraging compliance
through positive incentives and constructive norm-building
rather than discouraging noncompliance through the
possibility of sanctions. This "management-oriented"
approach to international cooperation works well and is
arguably necessary in the environmental context for
various reasons associated with the nature of the
underlying problem motivating cooperation among States. 5
Interestingly and importantly, both international trade
law and international environmental law are still evolving
and, in a sense, "learning" from each other and adopting
successful institutional innovations made in one issue-area
to work to the benefit of the other.56 For example, the WTO
regime increasingly relies on nonadversarial, management-
oriented institutions to encourage cooperation in pursuit of
trade liberalization by existing and potential members.
These institutional developments range from the Trade
Policy Review Mechanism ("TPRM"), which periodically
evaluates domestic implementation and compliance with
trading rules, to capacity-building programs and financial
(discussing evolution of GATT in response to the growing importance of
nontariff barriers).
52. On the differences between legal/rule-oriented institutions and
political/power-oriented institutions, see, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 50, at 109-
11; William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51
(1987).
53. See infra Part III.B.2.
54. See infra Part II.F (discussing the "management-oriented" approach).
55. See id.; infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the underlying interdependency
problem motivating cooperation in the Ozone regime).
56. See Edith Brown Weiss, Strengthening National Compliance with Trade
Law: Insight from Environment, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW 457 (M. Bronckers & R. Quick eds., 2000) (hereinafter NEW
DIRECTIONS) (discussing ways in which trade law has learned from
environmental law).
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and technical assistance.57  Furthermore, international
environmental regimes increasingly include enforcement-
oriented institutions, ranging from legalistic adjudication to
compliance panels with authority to impose sanctions of
various types. 8
II. A DYNAMIC INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW
This part of the article develops a dynamic institutional
theory of international law that integrates and builds from
insights in the legal, economics (game theory), and
international relations disciplines."9 While a number of
57. See infra Part III.A.2.c.ii (discussing the TPRM and other institutional
developments in the WTO regime).
58. See generally GLENN M. WISER, COMPLIANCE SYSTEMS UNDER
MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS (Center for International Environmental Law, Oct.
1999), available at http://www.ciel.orgfPublications/SurveyPaperl.pdf (last
visited Sept. 11, 2003).
59. There are numerous articles setting forth the various international
relations theories regarding international cooperation and how those theories
relate to international law. See Abbott, supra note 11; Kenneth W. Abbott,
International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing
Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 361 (1999); Jack L. Goldsmith
& Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
1113 (1999); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and
International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993);
Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International Law and International Relations
Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L.
367 (1998). Scholars have also applied international relations theories to
particular issue-areas of international law. See G. Richard Shell, Trade
Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade
Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829 (1995) (trade); Richard W. Parker, The Use and
Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the Global Commons: What We Can Learn
From the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 57-98 (1999)
(international environmental law case study); Hathaway, supra note 12 (human
rights); Helfer, supra note 11; Note, Tackling Global Software Piracy Under
TRIPs: Insights From International Relations Theory, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1139
(2003) (TRIPs). On institutionalism and international law, see, e.g., William J.
Aceves, Institutionalist Theory and International Legal Scholarship, 12 AM.
U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 227 (1997); Edwin M. Smith, Understanding Dynamic
Obligations: Arms Control Agreements, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1549 (1991); Setear,
An Iterative Perspective on Treaties, supra note 7. There is rich literature on the
application of game theory to international cooperation. See generally THOMAS
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (2d ed. 1960); ROBERT AXELROD, THE
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY:
COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984); Robert
Axelrod & Robert 0. Keohane, Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy:
Strategies and Institutions, in COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 226 (Kenneth A.
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scholars have applied game theory and international
relations theories to international law, the theory is both
novel and useful because it provides a theoretic framework
for (1) analyzing international commitments, compliance
institutions, and the dynamic process by which
international legal regimes evolve; and for (2) examining
and comparing the strategic institutional approaches taken
to address compliance issues in different regimes." Each of
these contributions is significant. With respect to the first
contribution, international scholars have not developed a
rational choice theory that integrates consideration of
commitments, institutions and dynamicism. The theory
that comes closest is iterated game theory, but, as noted
above and developed more fully below, the iterated game
theorye fails to account for the dynamic nature of
international cooperation and the institutions that States
create to maintain regime stability in the face of dynamic
change. With respect to the second contribution,
international scholars have not developed a theory that
supports comparative analysis of the strategic institutional
approaches taken to address compliance issues. The
dynamic institutional theory highlights compliance
strategies that have received very little attention by
international scholars despite the prominence of such
strategies in practice.6'
The theory is developed in six sections. The first four
sections discuss background principles derived primarily
from the game theory and international relations
disciplines. The first section sets forth the assumptions and
limitations that flow from viewing States as rational
decision makers. The second section provides an
introduction to game theory and describes four simple two
player games that illustrate different types of
interdependency problems and the need for cooperative
solutions. The third section builds from the first two
sections and explains why devising cooperative solutions to
most international problems is significantly more
Oye ed., 1986); RASMUSEN, supra note 2, at 16-19; JON HovI, GAMES, THREATS &
TREATIES: UNDERSTANDING COMMITMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1998).
60. While the focus is on treaty-based regimes, the theory can be extended
to other areas of international law.
61. As discussed below, managerial theorists have discussed institutions
that implement Type II and Type III strategies. See infra note 162; see also
infra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
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complicated and difficult than suggested by two player
games. This section concludes with a brief summary of the
iterated game, which is frequently used in the game theory
and international relations disciplines (and increasingly in
the legal discipline) as a model for international coopera-
tion. The fourth section considers the role of institutions
within the framework of iterated game theory. This section
suggests that there is a gap between theory and reality in
the sense that the iterated game fails to explain the
existence of a host of important institutions.
The final sections develop a new theory of international
cooperation that extends beyond the concept of an iterated
game to that of an evolving game, and helps explain the
disconnect between the role of institutions predicted by
theory and the role of institutions seen in the real world.
The fifth section develops a model of the dynamic, three-
staged process by which States identify and delineate
interdependency problems, devise cooperate solutions, and
implement those solutions. The sixth section focuses on the
design of compliance systems that institutionalize a suite of
compliance strategies to sustain cooperation over time.
First, it presents two competing theories on compliance
strategies-an enforcement theory based on the threat
and/or use of deterrent sanctions as a means of coercing
compliance and a managerial theory based on facilitating
compliance by reducing ambiguity regarding obligations
themselves, creating positive incentives to comply prior to
an incidence of noncompliance, and adapting treaties to
changing conditions-and explains how these theories can
be reconciled. It then analyzes the different strategies that
States implement to maintain continued cooperation over
time and classifies these strategies according to the
different types of impediments to cooperation that States
may target through jointly created institutional
mechanisms.
A. Rationalist Assumptions and Limitations
Game theory, a form of rational choice theory, provides
a useful framework for analyzing international cooperation
and institutions because it provides a relatively straight-
forward model of rational decision-making by entities in
situations where their decisions are interdependent and
they face conflicting strategic incentives. The primary
700 [Vol. 51
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variables are the players (States), possible actions
(cooperate/comply or defect/breach), and outcomes (payoffs).
Taken together, these variables constitute the "rules of the
game." Other important factors include information,
strategies, and the number of iterations (how many times
will the game be played). When the rules of the game are
set, one can predict an equilibrium (or more often, a set of
equilibriums) in terms of expected actions and outcomes.62
International cooperation has often been analyzed as a
Prisoners' Dilemma or some variant thereof, described
below. 63
As with any theoretical framework, it is important to
recognize that a number of assumptions come into play.
Consideration of the assumptions themselves provides
insight into the complexities that shape international
cooperation. Game theoretic (and institutionalist) analyses
often focus on States as "players" and assume that States
are unitary rational actors acting to maximize their
"individual" welfare.64 Of course, this assumption builds on
additional assumptions that may not hold up perfectly in all
cases." Although the point here is not to debate the fine
details, it is important to recognize and consider briefly the
following limitations: (1) the actions taken by States are the
products of complicated domestic and international
processes involving public and private actors and
institutions; (2) numerous public actors within State
governments have active roles in international negotiations,
implementation of agreements, decisions whether and to
what extent to comply with commitments, and other State
actions;" and (3) defining a State's "individual welfare" is
62. See, e.g., RASMUSEN, supra note 2, at 10.
63. See, e.g., Snidal, supra note 2, at 77 (noting ubiquity of game theory); see
sources cited supra note 2.
64. See Abbott, supra note 11, at 348-51; see also Slaughter, supra note 27,
at 722 (citations omitted) (Realism assumes that first, "states are the primary
actors in the international system, rational unitary actors who are functionally
identical;" second, "power determines the outcomes of state interactions;" and
third, "states can be treated as if their dominant preference were for power.").
65. See Graham Allison, Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,
63 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 689 (1969) (seminal piece exposing weakness of
assumptions).
66. There are various game theoretic approaches to modeling the
interactions between domestic and international politics. The seminal paper
setting forth the theory of two-level games was written by Robert Putnam.
Robert Putnam, Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games,
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itself a complicated task, particularly given the fact that
States sometimes act in the best interest of a particular
domestic group rather than the country as a whole.
Acknowledging these complications, this article none-
theless folds them into the game theoretic framework. In
reality, States are the dominant (although by no means ex-
clusive) actors in international relations ' and the primary
sources of international law.68 The international agreements
42 INT'L ORG. 427, 460 (1988); see also GRAHAM ALLISON & PHILIP ZELIKOW,
ESSENCE OF DECISION 39 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing the importance of domestic
politics).
67. This is true at least for realists and rational choice theorists. See, e.g.,
Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty,
55 STAN. L. REV. 1749, 1751 (2003) ("For realist (or rational choice) approaches,
the state is modeled as a rational, unitary actor pursuing fixed preferences in
an anarchic international arena."); Hirsch, supra note 2, at 81 ("Prevailing
international relations theory assumes that ... [sltates are the central actors in
the international system."); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States
Act Through Formal International Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3
(1998) (assuming that States are the principal actors in world politics);
Slaughter, supra note 27, at 722 (citations omitted) (Realism assumes "states
are the primary actors in the international system, rational unitary actors who
are functionally identical.").
68. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-2
(5th ed. 1998); MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1 (4th ed. 1982) (stating that "international law is primarily concerned
with states") (emphasis omitted); ANTHONY CLARK AREND, LEGAL RULES AND
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 43 (1999) (discussing states as the primary actors in
international relations); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES, pt. I, ch. 1 introductory n. (1987) ("The principal entities
of the international political system are states."); see also Kal Raustiala, The
Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the
Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002) (acknowledging the
dominant role of States); cf Joel Richard Paul, Cultural Resistance To Global
Governance, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 13-14 n.55 (2000) (commenting that since
international law is focused on states, non-state actors have traditionally not
been addressed); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE
REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER 35 (1996) ("While states remain the primary actors
in world affairs, they also are suffering losses in sovereignty, functions, and
power. International institutions now assert the right to judge and to constrain
what states do in their own territory."); but cf Kal Raustiala, The "Participatory
Revolution" in International Environmental Law, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 537,
537-38 538 (1997) ("But while states have traditionally been the dominant
actors in the creation and maintenance of conventional international law,
recent changes in international environmental law have afforded a historically
unparalleled opportunity for participation by private, nongovernmental
organizations ("NGOs"). As has long been the case in domestic environmental
law, NGOs are now major actors in the formulation, implementation, and
enforcement of international environmental law.") (citations omitted); Edith
Brown Weiss, The Rise or Fall of International Law?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 345,
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considered in this article are agreements among States to
undertake commitments and to create compliance
institutions.69 Thus, as far as commitments and compliance
are concerned, "the State" undertakes commitments and
"the State" either complies or does not comply with its
commitments, even if (non)compliance is, practically
speaking, the result of actions by sub-national actors.
Although not discussed in detail here, international
agreements create complicated webs of legal (and nonlegal)
relationships such that compliance with and the
effectiveness of an agreement may depend on the actions of
both States and private actors." While actions by domestic
(public or private) actors may lead to State noncompliance,
States remain "responsible" for the commitments
undertaken in an international agreement (of course, what
"responsibility" means depends on the compliance
institutions involved).7'
States make decisions based on some notion of expected
payoffs (i.e., cost-benefit or welfare analysis). It is clear that
decisions are not made solely on the basis of "national
welfare" or some objective evaluation of aggregate
individual preferences within a country, because domestic
346 (2000) (arguing that "[ilt is necessary to redefine international law to
include actors other than States among those who make international norms
and who implement and comply with them, and to include legal instruments
that may not be formally binding"). I recognize that in some cases NGOs play a
dominant role in forming an international agreement. See, e.g., Kenneth
Anderson, The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of
International Non-Governmental Organizations and The Idea of International
Civil Society, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 91 (2000) (discussing the predominant role of
NGOs in forming the Landmines Convention).
69. See infra Part III.
70. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 27; BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS,
supra note 7, at 550-563 (discussing various webs among public and private
actors). For example, if States commit themselves to curb domestic greenhouse
gas emissions and agree to implement their commitments through an
international emissions trading system, the effectiveness of the trading system
would ultimately depend on private trading and the effectiveness of the overall
regime would ultimately depend on State regulation of private parties, i.e.,
domestic enforcement of emissions limitations. See Frischmann, supra note 43,
at 469-80.
71. See IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE
RESPONSIBILITY, PART I (1983); Daniel Bodansky & John R. Crook, Symposium:
The ILC's State Responsibility Articles, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 773 (2002);
International Law Commission, DRAFT ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY, UN
Doc. A/CN4/L528/Add.2 (July 16, 1996); UNITED NATIONS CODIFICATION OF
STATE RESPONSIBILITY (Marina Spinedi & Bruno Simma eds., 1987).
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processes are imperfect and often involve a competition
among domestic preferences."2 Moreover, because States act
through people, such as politicians and bureaucrats, the
individual preferences and biases of those people may skew
perceived payoffs from particular decisions away from the
socially optimal ideal.73 Again, the point here is not to model
fully the processes by which payoffs are perceived by States
(or delegated decision makers). It should be sufficient for
the purposes of this article to highlight that States make
decisions based on an estimation of expected payoffs and
that ultimate payoffs are uncertain and are subject to
continuous reevaluation by relevant decision makers. The
extent to which the relevant measure of payoffs is "national
welfare" as opposed to "politicians' welfare" (or the most
powerful domestic interest's welfare) varies among States
and across issue-areas. 74 As described below, the payoff
structure in both international trade and international
environmental games depends on both measures: the
payoffs associated with cooperation are generally diffuse,
widespread, long-term, and arguably more closely linked to
perceptions of national welfare, while the payoffs associated
with defection are generally concentrated among particular
industry groups, short-term, and more closely linked to the
welfare of politicians and special interests. Rather than
belabor the point that there are important limitations in
72. See, e.g., JOAN E. SPERO & JEFFREY A. HART, THE POLITICS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 49 (5th ed. 1997) ("Congress tends to link
trade policy with particular domestic interests, [while] the U.S. executive
branch often links trade policy with larger foreign policy and foreign economic
goals.").
73. See, e.g., Alan 0. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of
International Trade, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1999) (discussing the public
choice perspective on international trade agreements); Jonathan R. Macey, A
Public Choice Model of International Economic Cooperation and the Decline of
the Nation State, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 925 (1996) (discussing public choice
theory and its application to international cooperation).
74. See, e.g., Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 11. Schwartz & Sykes stated:
Public choice teaches that the objectives that individual countries
pursue through international agreements are determined by an
interaction among organized interest groups. While this process is not
fully understood and assuredly varies across nations, there is wide
agreement that producer interests will exercise disproportionately
greater influence than will consumer interests, at least in the
democracies that dominate the developed world (and thus the trading
community).
Id. at 183-84 (footnote omitted).
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the underlying assumptions that States are unitary
rational actors that make decisions with the intent to
maximize national welfare, it is sufficient for the purposes
of this article to apply the game theoretic framework and
keep in mind its limitations.
B. Basic Game Theory
This section provides a basic introduction to game
theory in order to highlight the importance of inter-
dependent decision-making and the need to identify
problem structures and opportunities to devise cooperative
solutions.76 At its most basic level, game theory may be
explained in terms of simple two player games such as
Prisoners' Dilemma, Harmony, Chicken, Suasion, and
others.77 Prisoners' Dilemma is a commonly told story that
75. Acknowledging the differences between realist, rationalist/utilitarian,
liberal/institutional, norm-driven, process-oriented, and sociological theories of
international relations and international law, this article contends that a
flexible game theoretic framework is a useful organizational construct that may
encapsulate the key considerations of many of these theories. A full exploration
of this idea is beyond the scope of this article. For an overview of these theories,
see generally THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 2.
76. See KEOHANE, supra note 59, at 68-69 (discussing the heuristic value of
the Prisoners' Dilemma).
77. There are numerous two player games in a "two-state, two-choice, one-
play world." Snidal, supra note 18, at 926 (citing A. Rapoport & M. Guyer, A
Taxonomy of 2 X 2 games, 11 GENERAL SYSTEMS YEARBOOK 203 (1966)). Abbott
stated:
There are 78 different 2 x 2 games, the simplest and most common
form, in which two players must each choose between two moves. Out
of this total, there are six games in which (a) each player prefers
mutual cooperation to mutual defection, providing an incentive for
agreement, and (b) each player prefers that if one player is to defect, it
be the one to do so, providing a basis for conflict. These six games,
including [Prisoners' Dilemma] and [Stag Hunt], as well as Chicken
and complex coordination games, have been the subject of most
research in the application of game theory to social, political and
economic cooperation.
Abbott, supra note 19, at 3 n.15. See Jack Hirshleifer, Evolutionary Models in
Economics and Law: Cooperation Versus Conflict Strategies, in ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR IN ADVERSITY 211 (1987) (discussing a variety of games). This section
touches on a few types of games simply to introduce the basic dynamics of
interdependency, incentives, and strategic decision making. For a more detailed
but still accessible introduction to game theory and its application to
international law, see Hirsch, supra note 2, at 78-94; Lisa Carlson, Game
Theory: International trade, conflict and cooperation, in GLOBAL POLITICAL
ECONOMY: CONTEMPORARY THEORIES (Ronen Palan ed., 2000); AXELROD, supra
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describes the difficulty of getting two players to cooperate
when the action taken by each player affects the welfare of
the other (i.e., interdependency). 9 Suppose that two players,
A and B, face a decision regarding whether to cooperate
with each other and that they expect the following payoffs:"
(1) If both players cooperate, each receives a payoff of 3, for
a total of 6.
(2) If both players defect (or decide not to cooperate), each
note 59. For a more sophisticated introduction to game theory, see SHAUN P.
HARGREAVES HEAP & YANIS VAROUFAKIS, GAME THEORY: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION (1995); RASMUSEN, supra note 2.
78. The traditional story goes something like this:
Suppose two co-defendants are being interrogated in separate cells and that the
police have sufficient evidence to convict both defendants of a robbery but
insufficient evidence of specific factors that would enhance their sentences-
say, for example, violence. The police attempt to get each prisoner to "rat" on
the other (defect) regarding his or her violent conduct in exchange for leniency.
The payoffs may be the number of years of imprisonment less than the ten-year
maximum, for example. If both prisoners refuse to talk with the police (and thus
cooperate with each other), they both receive a sentence of seven years; if one
prisoner implicates the other (defects) while the other refuses to do so
(cooperates), the defector receives a sentence of 6 years while the cooperator
receives a sentence of nine years; if both prisoners defect, they each receive a
sentence of eight years. If the prisoners understand the payoff structure, are
unable to communicate, and have no other assurance mechanism, they will
follow their dominant strategies and end up with eight year sentences. If,
however, the prisoners care about their reputations (in or out of jail), expect to
partner up in the future, have a pre-existing agreement or understanding
regarding future dealings (in or out of jail), have the ability to retaliate against
defection, etc., cooperation is more likely.
For other variations, see Kenneth A. Oye, Explaining Cooperation under
Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies, 38 WORLD POL. 1, 7-8 (1985); R. DUNCAN
LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 94-95 (1957); MICHAEL TAYLOR,
ANARCHY & COOPERATION 4-8 (1976); RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 2
(1982).
79. See KEOHANE, supra note 59, at 68.
80. Payoffs refer simply to some normalized measure of utility. See id. at 79.
In the traditional Prisoners' Dilemma story, for example, the payoffs refer to
the expected length of jail sentences. I should note that, for purposes of this
article, payoffs need not be conceived of narrowly in terms of economically
measurable units but rather may be thought of more abstractly in terms of
utility. Thus, when States evaluate whether to enter into an agreement and
form a game, see infra, the perceived legitimacy of commitments may be a factor
in each State's utility function. The reason I mention this is to clarify that game
theoretic analysis need not focus on "dollars and cents" and may instead
incorporate broader notions of welfare. Even when such a broader view is taken,
game theory remains a useful organizational construct for analyzing strategic
decision making and the factors that influence international cooperation.
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receives a payoff of only 2, for a total of 4.
(3) If one player cooperates and the other defects, then the
cooperator receives a payoff of 1 and the defector receives a
payoff of 4, for a total of 5.81
The result that maximizes joint welfare is for both to coop-
erate and receive joint benefits of 6. Each player knows,
however, that it can get a better individual payoff if it de-
fects and the other player cooperates. Moreover, each player
knows that if it cooperates and the other player defects, the
cooperator will get a payoff of only 1, and therefore it would
have been better off had it also defected. In other words, if
each player knows what the payoff structure looks like ex
ante' and must decide whether to cooperate, each player
will reach the conclusion that it is in its best interest to de-
fect-if A cooperates, B is better off defecting (4>3), and if A
defects, B is better off defecting (2>1). Thus, in the end,
each player has a dominant strategy to defect.83
Achieving cooperation when facing the Prisoners'
Dilemma payoff structure requires mutual assurance in
some form or another. Where an enforceable agreement
between the players can be reached (for example, a contract
between two individuals enforceable under domestic law),
cooperation is possible, although not guaranteed
(transaction costs, uncertainty, opportunistic behavior,
strategic bargaining and other factors may inhibit effective
cooperation by contracting). Other forms of assurance
mechanisms include reputation and the expectation of
future interactions between the same players as well as
linking the outcome in a particular game to actions taken in
other unrelated games between the players. Importantly,
assurance mechanisms are intended to make cooperation
an equilibrium strategy by altering the expected payoffs,
whether by expected damages for breach of contract,
reputational harm, or costs inflicted in future iterations or
other linked games in the event of defection, or by expected
side-payments for contractual performance, reputational
gains, or benefits gained in future iterations or other linked
81. I have chosen to present the payoffs in an atypical manner (neither in a
chart or tree diagram) for ease of presentation to those unfamiliar with game
theory.
82. This key assumption illustrates the importance of information and its
role in strategic decision making.
83. See Carlson, supra note 77; AXELROD, supra note 59.
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games (perhaps through the promise of continued
cooperation) in the event of cooperation.
The counterpart to the Prisoners' Dilemma game is a
game called Harmony."4 Again, suppose that two players, A
and B, face a decision regarding whether or not to cooperate
with each other and that they expect the following payoffs:
(1) If both players cooperate, each receives a payoff of 4 for
a total of 8.
(2) If both players defect, each receives only a payoff of 1,
for a total of 2.
(3) If one player cooperates and the other defects, then the
cooperator receives a payoff of 3 and the defector receives a
payoff of 2, for a total of 5.
In contrast to the Prisoners' Dilemma, both players
have a dominant strategy to cooperate, hence the name
Harmony. The primary impediment to cooperation where
the interdependence among States gives rise to a Harmony
game is identification of such a situation. In other words,
once identified, States should be able to reach an agreement
without much concern over noncompliance. Coordination or
standardization problems essentially precede a Harmony
game.8" International aviation rules and the choice of which
side of the road to drive on are often cited as examples.86
Once the rules are established and "parties understand the
84. Illustration continued: Suppose that the police in our previous example
misrepresented the payoff structure to the co-defendants by exaggerating the
possibility of leniency and understating the cumulative effect of additional
evidence concerning violence on a jury. In reality, the payoff structure might be
that of a Harmony game-cooperating with the police can only lead to more jail
time. Unless the prisoners learn of this, however, they may proceed to defect
because they view the payoff structure as a Prisoners' Dilemma. See Guzman,
supra note 10, at 1858-59 (analyzing how parties' mistaken beliefs about the
payoff structure may affect their decisions to enter into a legal agreement to
coordinate their behavior); Ronald B. Mitchell & Patricia M. Keilbach, Situation
Structure and Institutional Design: Reciprocity, Coercion and Exchange, 55
INT'L ORG. 891, 904 (2001).
85. On the Harmony game, see Abbott, supra note 11, at 355-57; KEOHANE,
supra note 59, at 51-52. On coordination games, which can be quite complicated,
see Snidal, supra note 18.
86. See, e.g., Raustiala, supra note 12, at 400; Abram Chayes et al.,
Managing Compliance: A Comparative Perspective, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES,
supra note 10, at 43-44.
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rules, no actors have incentives to violate them. 8 7
Moreover, due to potential network externalities, non-
parties have an incentive to adopt the rules as well.88
The Prisoners' Dilemma and Harmony represent two
extremes where players have symmetric dominant
strategies and incentives to negotiate a cooperative
solution.89 There are variations of the basic two-player
scenario that involve asymmetries in strategies and
incentives. Consider, for example, a game called Suasion.
Again, suppose that two players, A and B, face a decision
regarding whether or not to cooperate with each other and
that they expect the following payoffs:
(1) If both players cooperate, A receives a payoff of 4 and B
receives a payoff of 3, for a total of 7.
(2) If both players defect, A receives a payoff of 1 and B
receives a payoff of 2, for a total of 3.
(3) If A cooperates and B defects, then A receives a payoff of
2 and B receives a payoff of 4, for a total of 6.
(4) If A defects and B cooperates, then A receives a payoff of
5 and B receives a payoff of 1, for a total of 6.
In Suasion, mutual cooperation is optimal, B has a
dominant strategy to defect (regardless of what decision A
makes, B should defect), and A does not have a dominant
strategy. However, if A knows what the payoff structure
looks like, A will cooperate because it expects B to defect. To
maximize joint benefits through mutual cooperation, A
must make a side-payment to B to adjust the payoff
structure and make cooperation more appealing than
87. Chayes et al., Managing Compliance: A Comparative Perspective, in
ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 10, at 44.
88. See Nicholas Economides, The Economics of Networks, 14 INT'L J. INDUS.
ORG. 673 (1996); Mark Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of
Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998).
89. Deadlock is a less interesting game where the parties each have the
dominant strategy to defect and no incentive to cooperate because the joint
payoff from cooperation is the minimum joint payoff. But see Oye, supra note
78, at 7 ("When you observe conflict, think Deadlock-the absence of mutual
interest-before puzzling over why a mutual interest was not realized. When
you observe cooperation, think Harmony-the absence of gains from defection-
before puzzling over how states were able to transcend the temptations of
defection.").
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defection. D° International cooperation often hinges on the
promise of such side-payments.9 1
Finally, in the game called Chicken, neither player has
a dominant strategy.92 Suppose that two players, A and B,
face a decision regarding whether or not to cooperate with
each other and that they expect the following payoffs:
(1) If both players cooperate, both players receive a payoff of
3, for a total of 6.
(2) If both players defect, both players receive a payoff of 1,
for a total of 2.
(3) If A cooperates and B defects, then A receives a payoff of
2 and B receives a payoff of 4, for a total of 6.
(4) If A defects and B cooperates, then A receives a payoff of
4 and B receives a payoff of 2, for a total of 6.
In this game, mutual cooperation is not the only way to
maximize joint welfare; maximizing joint benefits requires
that at least one player cooperate. Given the possibility of a
relative gain if one player defects when the other
cooperates, each player has an incentive to defect and free-
ride on the other's cooperation. Of course, the risk in
Chicken is that both players end up defecting, and the
challenge is to coordinate their behavior.93
The simple games discussed in this section highlight
the importance of interdependent decision-making and the
need to identify problem structures and opportunities to
devise cooperative solutions. While scholars have employed
these two player models to yield important insights
regarding international cooperation, it is well-recognized
that it is necessary to move beyond these (and other
related) two player single-play games to more complex
90. The side-payment would have to be greater than one, in order to provide
B with sufficient incentive to cooperate, and, given the hypothetical payoff
structure, A would not go as high as two. Essentially, A and B must split the
surplus created by their cooperation. Of course, the promise to make a side-
payment must be credible. See Ulrich J. Wagner, The Design of Stable
International Environmental Agreements: Economic Theory and Political
Economy, 15 J. ECON. SURVEYS 377, 395-97 (2001).
91. See infra Parts II.F. (discussing positive incentives); III.B.2. (discussing
side-payments in the context of the Ozone regime).
92. See Oye, supra note 78, at 8-9.
93. See RASMUSEN, supra note 2, at 72-73 (explaining the Chicken game).
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frameworks that better reflect international legal regimes."
Hereinafter, this article will focus on games with a "mixed
motive" component, where the risk of defection is present
(collaboration games).95
C. Moving Beyond the Basic Games to Game Structures
that Better Represent International Legal Regimes
Devising cooperative solutions to most international
problems is significantly more complicated and difficult
than suggested by two player games. For most
international legal regimes, the "rules of the game"-the
number and identity of participants, range of possible
actions, payoff structures, number of iterations (or times
that the game is played in succession)-are considerably
more complex than the two player games suggest. 6 Not
surprisingly, so are the mechanisms used to coordinate
behavior.
First, the number and identity of (potential)
participants are particularly important considerations for
compliance purposes. Games involving N players, where N
is greater than two are considerably more complex than
two player games. In some cases, the scope of the
interdependency problem may require the cooperation of
only a small number of States while in other cases a large
coalition of States may be necessary.98 Generally, it is easier
to coordinate behavior among a smaller group, in part
because it is easier to bargain and in part because it is
94. For a discussion on the limitation of two player games see Barbara
Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 INT'L
ORG. 761, 765 (2001) and Snidal, supra note 18, at 925, 925 n.6.
95. As the next section suggests, multiplayer games are tricky because they
may involve complex payoff structures that may involve both collaboration and
coordination subgames. As a general matter, this article focuses on
international regimes in which the risk of strategic defection is one pressing
concern that States must overcome to sustain cooperation. On the differences
between coordination and collaboration games and the institutional solutions to
such problems, see Snidal, supra note 18, at 925.
96. See Koremenos et al., supra note 94, at 765.
97. See, e.g., RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF
EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 141-42 (1986); Oye, supra note
78, at 18-20.
98. See, e.g., Daniel G. Arce, The Evolution of Heterogeneity in Biodiversity
and Environmental Regimes, 44 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 753, 754, 762-68 (2000)
(analyzing the importance of coalition size for producing global environmental
benefits).
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easier to monitor compliance and overcome the compliance
dilemma.99 Apart from the numbers, the importance and
identity of particular participants may stifle or facilitate
cooperation. The participation of a particular State (or
group of States) may be essential to successfully dealing
with a particular problem, in which case that State gains
leverage that can be exploited during negotiations and
potentially re-exploited thereafter depending on the nature
of the compliance institutions adopted.1"' In addition, the
presence of a State (or group of States) with the resources,
power, and will to encourage/coerce participation during
negotiations; to provide administrative, financial or
technical assistance; or to threaten/impose unilateral
sanctions in response to noncompliance may facilitate
cooperation. TM
In some cases, a paradox may arise in putting together
an international coalition to address a particular problem.
On one hand, maximizing the number of participants may
99. See, e.g., Koremenos et al., supra note 94, at 783-84 ("The more severe
the enforcement problem, the more restricted the membership."); Amir N. Licht,
Games Commissions Play: 2x2 Games of International Securities Regulation, 24
YALE J. INT'L L. 61, 76 (1999) (discussing three reasons why larger numbers of
participants may inhibit effective cooperation, which include "(1) the fraction of
the group benefit received by any one individual declines as the group size
increases; (2) larger groups are less likely to exhibit small-group strategic
interaction that could help in collective good provision; and (3) organization
costs increase with an increase in group size"); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION 35 (1965) ("[The larger the group, the farther it falls short
of providing an optimal amount of a collective good.").
100. See infra Part III.B (discussing this dynamic in the context of the
Ozone regime).
101. For example, the United States has threatened to use, and at times,
has used unilateral sanctions to promote compliance. See Adam Smith, A High
Price to Pay: The Costs of The U.S. Economic Sanctions Policy and The Need
For Process Oriented Reform, 4 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 325, 330
(1999-2000) ("[T]he U.S. [frequently] uses economic sanctions to force another
country to change its objectionable policies or, alternatively, to mitigate the
effects of those policies."); Joanmarie M. Dowling & Mark P. Popiel, War By
Sanctions: Are We Targeting Ourselves?, 11 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L. J. 8, 8
(2002) ("Historically, the United States has imposed Sanctions to advance a
number of its foreign policy goals, such as nuclear non-proliferation, counter-
terrorism, environmental conservation, and human rights protection."); Sarah
P. Schuette, U.S. Economic Sanctions Regarding the Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons: A Call for Reform of the Arms Export Control Act Sanctions, 35
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 231, 233 (2001-02) (discussing the use of unilateral sanctions
to deter development of nuclear weapons). On hegemonic stability theory, see
KEOHANE, supra note 59, at 63-69; Duncan Snidal, The Limits of Hegemonic
Stability Theory, 39 INT'L ORG. 579 (1985).
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be the primary objective of negotiations. This may be due to
the global scope of the problem, as in the case of global
warming or ozone depletion, where solving the problem may
be impossible without broad-based participation or where
nonparticipants can effectively hold-up participating
States.1°2 On the other hand, States may find it necessary to
constrain the number of participants to a manageable
number for compliance-management purposes. 1 3 As the
number of States increase, it may become more difficult to
detect (potential) defections and encourage compliance
through either facilitative measures or retaliation.'
Moreover, transaction costs and uncertainties may increase
with the number of participants and thereby inhibit
cooperation, for example, by making it more difficult to
estimate payoffs due to more complicated interdependent
welfare functions.0 ' The equilibrium position(s) between
these opposing objectives will vary depending on the nature
of the underlying problem motivating international
cooperation, the particular States involved and their intent
and capacity to comply, and their willingness or ability to
commit ex ante in a sufficiently credible manner.
Second, the range of options or possible actions that
participants in a game may take are seldom binary (i.e.,
102. See infra Part III.B.
103. For a discussion of the disabling effects of increased numbers on
compliance, see, e.g., David Vogel & Timothy Kessler, How Compliance
Happens and Doesn't Happen Domestically, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note
10, at 24-25 (attributing "[m]uch of the variance in national patterns of
compliance with the treaties examined.., to the number of sources that require
monitoring"); Harold K. Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss, Assessing the Record
and Designing Strategies to Engage Countries, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra
note 10, at 521 ("[Olur study confirms the conventional wisdom that the smaller
the number of actors involved in the activity, the easier it is to regulate it.").
But see ERIC DANNENMAIER & ISAAC COHEN, PROMOTING MEANINGFUL
COMPLIANCE WITH CLIMATE CHANGE COMMITMENTS 31-37 (Nov. 2000) available
at http:// www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/compliance%2Epdf (last visited Sept.
7, 2003) (discussing the importance of broad participation for compliance
purposes).
104. See, e.g., Koremenos et al., supra note 94, at 783-84 (conjectures M1
and M2); Oye, supra note 78, at 19-20.
105. See Oye, supra note 78, at 19 ("Cooperative behavior rests on
calculations of expected utility-merging discount rates, payoff structures, and
anticipated behavior of other players. Discount rates and approaches to
calculation are likely to vary across actors, and the prospects for mutual
cooperation may decline as the number of players and the probable
heterogeneity of actors increases.").
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comply or not comply) and may vary along many
dimensions. There may be numerous obligations of varying
degrees of importance (to the coalition as a whole and to a
particular party) within a negotiated treaty structure;
compliance with particular obligations may be a higher
priority for some participants than for others; and parties
may lack the capacity (administrative, economic, scientific,
political or otherwise) to comply with particular
commitments. In the end, compliance is often a matter of
degree along a continuum. Moreover, there is a significant
difference between intentional noncompliance (or oppor-
tunistic noncompliance), which some scholars have argued
is less frequent than presumed to be the case, and
unintentional noncompliance, which may result from the
lack of capacity.106
Third, and related to variability in possible options
available to parties, the payoff structures in the real world
differ in important ways from the basic two player games.
First, the magnitude and relative value of payoffs may vary
considerably. Certain players may benefit more than others
from mutual cooperation, perhaps by orders of magnitude.
This may lead to concerns over the equitable distribution of
gains among cooperators as well as opportunities for
strategic holdout (i.e., refusal to cooperate unless gains are
shared)."7 In the international environmental area, for
example, distributional concerns are particularly acute for a
few reasons: Not all countries have consumed or polluted
natural resources in the same manner or to the same
degree; the present welfare status of countries and their
citizens is not uniform but rather is markedly
differentiated; and the value systems and cultural
preferences of domestic constituencies varies considerably
among countries. These factors, among others, bring
distributional issues to the forefront of international
environmental law, as demonstrated prominently by
Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development that, "[iin view of the different contributions
to global environmental degradation, States have common
106. See, e.g., Chayes et al., Managing Compliance: A Comparative
Perspective, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 10, at 44; Abram Chayes &
Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175, 187-88 (1993);
Helen V. Milner, International Political Economy: Beyond Hegemonic Stability,
110 FOREIGN POL. 112 (1998).
107. See infra notes 143, 189.
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but differentiated responsibilities."' 8 Second, the inter-
dependencies among players may complicate payoff
structures considerably based on the number of players and
the relative importance of each player's actions to every
other player's welfare.' ° This may lead to the emergence of
numerous conflicting strategies and/or the formation of
internal coalitions with strategic advantages."'
Finally, the number of iterations (or as Robert Axelrod
has dubbed the notion, the "shadow of the future") is also
an extremely important consideration for compliance
purposes."' Generally, participation in an international
legal regime involves a continuous series of decisions
regarding compliance such that the game is repeated
indefinitely unless and until a party withdraws completely.
The "shadow of the future" refers to the fact that players'
expectations regarding the future-specifically, future
iterations of the game-affect decisions made in the present
depending, of course, on "discount factors" and the
possession of information regarding future payoffs."'
To increase the likelihood of cooperation, players may
adopt strategies (decision-making rules) that depend on
other players' performance ("reciprocal strategies")."'
Perhaps the most famous reciprocal strategy (used in the
108. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 7, June 14, 1992, U.N.
Doc.A/CONF.151/26/Rev. 1 (Vol.I) at 3, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, 878 (1992);
see Paul G. Harris, Common But Differentiated Responsibility: The Kyoto
Protocol and United States Policy, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 27, 30 (1999).
109. See Oye, supra note 78, at 19.
110. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 6-7 ("[A] multilateral
negotiating forum provides opportunities for weaker states to form coalitions
and organize blocking positions."); Helfer, supra note 14 (discussing changes in
bargaining coalitions in the TRIPs context).
111. AXELROD, supra note 59, at 12; see, e.g., Abbott, supra note 18, at 14
("The most important condition of play, at least if the relationship is PD, is the
degree of iteration."); Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties, supra note 7,
at 185-89; see also sources cited supra note 7 (explaining iteration).
112. See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 2, at 86-87.
113. See AXELROD, supra note 59; Oye, supra note 78, at 14-16. As Axelrod,
Oye, and others have noted, the "conditions of play [in international relations]
can limit the effectiveness of reciprocity." Id. at 15. States may create
institutions that modify the conditions to enable reciprocity, for example, by
creating institutions that shed light on State behavior and facilitate
reciprocation and that "lengthen the shadow of the future" and increase the
number of iterations. Id. at 16-18; see also Setear, An Iterative Perspective on
Treaties, supra note 7 (analyzing institutions in treaty law that promote
iteration).
715
716 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
Prisoners' Dilemma context) is "tit-for-tat," where a player
cooperates during the first round and thereafter commits to
doing whatever the other player did in the previous
round.'14 By punishing defection and rewarding cooperation,
the tit-for-tat strategy facilitates cooperation when the
other player sufficiently values future payoffs; it allows
players to signal to each other their strategy and their
willingness to reciprocate either cooperation or defection. It
is important to understand that the point of reciprocal
strategies is to "exploit the sequential nature of the game"
and affect the incentives to cooperate/defect before players
decide what to do.115 If credible and sufficiently strong to
offset the expected gains of defection, the threat to punish
in the event of defection (or promise to reward in the event
of cooperation) alters the payoff structure perceived ex ante
by players and removes the incentive to act
opportunistically."6
114. See AXELROD, supra note 59, at 13; Setear, An Iterative Perspective on
Treaties, supra note 7, at 29-30; see also id. at 31-33 n.52 (citing literature on
limitations of tit-for-tat strategy in various situations). There are numerous
other strategies that players may adopt. See generally DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN
TIROLE, GAME THEORY (1991). For example, players may adopt penance
strategies-after one player defects, other players remain in defection with
respect to the initial defector until the defector cooperates, at which point the
players return to cooperation. Id. at 179-182. Tit-for-tat is not a penance
strategy because the defector will have to cooperate in a period, even though the
other players did not in the previous period, in order to restore cooperation by
all. Players may adopt grim trigger strategies-all players remain in
noncompliance forever after noncompliance by a single player is observed.
JAMES D. MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 266 (1994). The
difficulty with such penalties is that they may not be deemed credible because
they are so costly to invoke, and therefore they may fail to deter defection. In
particular, penalties may hurt the punisher as much as the punishee, and thus
be deemed not "renegotiation-proof' because players expect that any instance of
defection will be followed by immediate renegotiation to cooperation. See
Wagner, supra note 90, at 389-90 (explaining renegotiation-proofness). Finally,
players may adopt trigger strategies with (exogenous or endogenous) periods of
penalty following an instance of noncompliance. The difficulty with such trigger
strategies is making the penalty phase not so onerous that it is not credible, nor
so short that it is not a deterrent. See GEORGE W. DOWNS & DAVID M. ROcKE,
OPTIMAL IMPERFECTION? DOMESTIC UNCERTAINTY AND INSTITUTIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 44-54 (1995).
115. Wagner, supra note 90, at 389-90 (explaining reciprocity and
renegotiation-proofness).
116. See id.
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While scholars have explored a number of theoretical
models that incorporate the complications set forth in this
section, 117 the game theoretic model most frequently
employed is an iterated multiplayer game,... often an
iterated N-player prisoners' dilemma."9 Generally, scholars
assume that players recognize ex ante (before play begins)
that they will play a continuous sequence of rounds and
that players decide what strategies to adopt for the initial
117. See, e.g., SCHELLING, supra note 59 (outlining basic game theory and
applying it to international conflict); Lisa L. Martin, Interests, Power, and
Multilateralism, 46 INT'L ORG. 765 (1992) (discussing various games within the
confines of international relations); Robert Powell, Absolute and Relative Gains
in International Relations Theory, 85 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1303 (1991) (using
simple game-theoretic models to discuss relative and absolute gains in
international relations); Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International
Politics, 38 WORLD POL. 25 (1985) (applying different basic game models to
international relations); Snidal, supra note 18 (comparing Coordination and
Prisoners' Dilemma to highlight issues involving international cooperation);
Wagner, supra note 90, at 389-90.
118. See, e.g., Daniel G. Arce M., Leadership and the Aggregation of
International Collective Action, 53 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 114 (2001) (using
various iterated game theoretic models to analyze the role of leadership in
collective action); Carlisle Ford Runge, Institutions and the Free Rider: The
Assurance Problem in Collective Action, 46 J. POL. 154 (1984) (applying an
iterated assurance problem to collective action issues); Duncan Snidal, Relative
Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation, 85 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 701
(1991) (moving away from two-player Prisoners' dilemmas into more complex
games and discussing the effect of relative gains in international cooperation);
Wagner, supra note 90, at 378-82 (modeling international abatement of
environmental problem as a N-player prisoners' dilemma game).
119. See, e.g., Robert Axelrod, The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoists,
75 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 306 (1981) (using an iterated Prisoners' dilemma to
discuss cooperation in international relations); Jonathan Bendor & Dilip
Mookherjee, Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action,
81 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 129 (1987) (using an N-person Prisoners' dilemma model
to show that the logic of repeated decision making has significant implications
for the institutional forms of collective action); Fiona McGillivray & Alastair
Smith, Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-specific Punishments, 54 INT'L
ORG. 809, 810 (2000) ("Scholars typically use the prisoners' dilemma game as a
metaphor for international cooperation.") (citations omitted); Wagner, supra
note 90, at 378-82 (modeling international abatement of environmental problem
as a N-player prisoners' dilemma game). John Setear has analyzed the
importance of promoting iteration in international relations structured by
treaties. See Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties, supra note 7 (applying
an "iterative perspective" to analyze a treaty regime); John K. Setear, Law in
the Service of Politics: Moving Neo-Liberal Institutionalism from Metaphor to
Theory by Using the International Treaty Process to Define "Iteration", 37 VA. J.
INT'L L. 641 (1997) (same); John K. Setear, Ozone, Iteration, and International
Law, supra note 7, at 208 (same); Setear, Responses to Breach of a Treaty, supra
note 7 (same).
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and future rounds based on the information held ex ante.12
While some strands of game theory, such as evolutionary
game theory, allow players to alter their individual
strategies as the game is played based on the players'
performance,'2' the payoff structure itself generally remains
fixed. 2 2 Figure 1 is a simple illustration of an indefinitely
repeated multiplayer game.
FIGURE 1: Visualizing an indefinitely repeated game. This figure is intended to
be a simple illustration of an iterated game. Each matrix represents the payoff
structure for N players in a single round of play, and the ellipsis indicates that the
game is expected to be repeated indefinitely.
Payoff structure at Payoff structure at
the initial round. ! the nth round.
120. See Hirsch, supra note 2, at 90-91 (discussing the use of pre-play
information to adopt strategies for future rounds of iterated games); see
generally R. Andrew Muller & Asha Sadanand, Order of Play, Forward
Induction, and Presentation Effects in Two-Person Games, 6 EXPERIMENTAL
ECON. 5 (2003).
121. See, e.g., Arce, supra note 98, at 755 ("From a dynamic perspective, the
advantage of the evolutionary [game theory] approach over the classic repeated
games approach is that agents are no longer committed to a strategy that most
often represents a history-dependent preset program. Instead, agents are
involved in a dynamic interplay in which they can learn about the relative
merits of strategies through a process of trial and error. As a result, cooperation
need no longer be achieved through punishment or coercion but through a
process of give-and-take that more closely resembles the regime-building
experience."); see generally HARGREAVES HEAP & VAROUFAKIS, supra note 77, at
195-235. On the role of reputation, see Guzman, supra note 10, at 861-64;
Snidal, supra note 18, at 931.
122. See Snidal, supra note 2, at 83.
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D. The Role of Institutions
Game theory suggests that jointly created institutions
may play a strong role in facilitating cooperation. In
addition to adopting individual reciprocal strategies,
players may agree to create institutions to systematically
implement strategies that increase the likelihood of
sustained cooperation over time. 123 For example, players
may "tie their hands" ex ante and credibly commit to
cooperation by creating monitoring and enforcement
institutions that are empowered to reward cooperators or
punish defectors.12 1 Such institutions directly affect the
payoff structure of present and future iterations, and
consequently, the players' strategies and decisions as
well.12 Figure 2 is a simple illustration of an indefinitely
repeated multiplayer game with a monitoring and
enforcement institution.
123. See Hirsch, supra note 2, at 110-11 (discussing the use of "international
legal mechanisms to modify the structure of settings susceptible to collective
action failure"); Beth A. Simmons & Lisa L. Martin, International
Organizations and Institutions, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 192, 195-96. See generally COOPERATION UNDER
ANARCHY (KennethA. Oye ed., 1986); KEOHANE, supra note 59, at 80-84.
124. See infra Part II.F.1 (discussing Type I strategies); sources cited supra
note 123. As Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann observed regarding the GATT:
Governments know very well that compliance with their self-imposed
GATT commitments, and with GATT dispute settlement rulings,
increases national economic welfare; and that by "tying their hands to
the mast" (like Ulysses when he approached the island of the Sirenes),
reciprocal international pre-commitments help them to resist the siren-
like temptations from "rent-seeking" interest groups at home.
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Organizations,
17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 398, 436-37 (1996-97); see also Frischmann, supra
note 43, at 479-80, 484, 491, 506-07 (arguing that for an international emission
trading system to work, States must "bind themselves to intrusive detection
and serious reprisal mechanisms").
125. See, e.g., Mitchell & Keilbach, supra note 84, at 896-97, 902-03
(discussing the role of institutions in restructuring incentives); Wagner, supra
note 90, at 385, 389 (noting that international agreements use both "'carrots'
and 'sticks' " to adjust payoff structures, and explaining that "[a] credible
punishment discourages cheating ex ante by virtue of the inevitability by which
it is going to be carried out.").
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International relations scholars, in particular
institutionalists, have devoted substantial attention to the
role of institutions in facilitating international coopera-
tion.126 From a theoretical perspective, many international
relations scholars employ game theory to frame their
analysis and evaluate the design of institutions that
rational players might create to increase the likelihood of
126. See KEOHANE, supra note 59; Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 59, at
226; Koremenos et al., supra note 94; Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons,
Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions, 52 INT'L ORG. 729
(2001) (providing an overview of the scholarship on institutions); see also
Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 12, at 542-44 (discussing "solution
structure," which "comprises the specific institutional design choices of [an]
agreement"). See generally COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY (Kenneth A. Oye ed.,
1986). Institutionalism has been described as "a loose composite of transaction
cost economics and the noncooperative game theory." DOWNS & ROCKE, supra
note 114, at 19.
FIGURE 2: Visualizing an iterated game with a monitoring and enforcement
institution. Building from Figure 1, this figure depicts an iterated game with the
presence of a monitoring and enforcement institution (the shaded arrow).
• WA4
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cooperation." 7 From an empirical perspective, international
relations scholars examine institutions that States actually
create and evaluate whether such institutions are
rationally designed.28
There is an interesting gap between the types of
institutions that traditional game theory predicts should
exist and the types of institutions found in reality. Analyses
of iterated multiplayer games suggest that rational players
would create institutions that affect payoff structures in a
predictable manner so that "forward-looking" players
choosing strategies ex ante (or even as a game progresses)
are more likely to cooperate. Accordingly, players should
create institutions to monitor players' decisions, to adjust
payoffs either by rewarding cooperators or punishing
defectors, to promote iteration (or lengthen the shadow of
the future), to promote issue-linkage, to enable signaling of
preferences and strategies, and to perform other functions
that facilitate credible commitment ex ante.2 ' Such
institutions do exist, but there are a number of institutions
created by parties to international agreements that cannot
be explained by the traditional game theory model. The
model does not explain, for example, why parties invest
resources in the creation of institutions that have nothing
to do with reducing the risk of defection. 3 '
127. See Koremenos et al., supra note 94 (discussing the rational design of
institutions); Snidal, supra note 2, at 85. See generally Special Issue, Rational
Design: Explaining the International Institutions, 55 INT'L ORG. (2001).
128. See generally Special Issue, supra note 127.
129. See sources cited supra note 126. But cf Andrew T. Guzman, The
Design of International Agreements, mimeo (Aug. 2003) (analyzing why
"rational states sometimes prefer to design their agreement in such a way as to
make them less credible"). See generally HOVI, supra note 59, at 96-100
(discussing modifications to the basic prisoners' dilemma model, including
variable discount factors, imperfect detection of violations, incomplete
information, multiple options, and package deals).
130. Each of the institutional functions listed above focuses on adjusting the
expected payoffs in a manner that lessens the risk of strategic defection-i.e.,
make cooperation more attractive than defection by adjusting the expected
payoffs. I do not mean to suggest that international relations scholars have not
observed or analyzed institutions focused on issues other than countering
strategic defection. To the contrary, scholars that study international regimes
and the manner in which regimes evolve have suggested that States employ
institutions that facilitate bargaining, reduce transactions costs, centralize
information gathering and processing functions, and perform other functions
that promote sustained cooperation. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 67, at 8
("[T]he role of IOs [international organizations] is best understood through a
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The next two sections present a model of international
cooperation that bridges the gap between traditional game
theory and reality. The model is based on the observation
that in reality, the games being played by States evolve,
meaning that the rules of the game may change
dynamically in response to exogenous events, independent
from players' performance and chosen strategies. States
understand ex ante not only that they face noncompliance
risks as traditionally conceived (defection based on
incentives presented in iterated game context, for example)
but also that dynamic change may threaten the stability of
the game.13' Accordingly, ex ante, States design institutions
(to implement strategies) directed not only at detecting
defection and altering payoffs in the event of defection-as
predicted by traditional game theory-but also to maintain
cooperation in the face of dynamic change triggered by
exogenous events."2 As described in more detail below,
States create institutions to reduce uncertainty and
transaction costs associated with such events and to adjust
commitments in future iterations; such institutions
facilitate internal change and maintain cooperation by
relieving parties of the need to return to the bargaining
synthesis of rationalist (including realist) and constructivist approaches. States
consciously use IOs both to reduce transaction costs in the narrow sense and,
more broadly, to create information, ideas, norms, and expectations; to carry out
and encourage specific activities; to legitimate or delegitimate particular ideas
and practices; and to enhance their capacities and power."). Snidal, supra note
2, at 83-85. My point is that the (game) theory relied upon by many scholars
fails to account for the existence of these institutions. In a sense, the theory
developed in this article connects game theory and regime theory in a more
coherent way.
131. See Snidal, supra note 18, at 939-40.
132. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 67, at 10-12 (suggesting that
international organizations may strengthen cooperation in the face of changing
conditions); id. at 15 (suggesting that states may create procedures to deal with
unanticipated contingencies and to "elaborat[e] rules, standards, and
specifications... even when member states retain the power to reject or opt
out"); id. at 26 ("Emerging compliance problems due to changing circumstances
can be managed by 10 [international organization] political and judicial organs
with authority to interpret and adapt agreements and elaborate norms."); see
also Koremenos et al., supra note 94, at 792 (suggesting that States "design
institutions that protect them from unforeseen circumstances"); id. at 793-94
(explaining why states may plan to renegotiate aspects of an agreement when
facing uncertainty about the state of the world); cf id. at 788 ("When states are
uncertain about the state of the world, all may benefit from joint efforts to
gather and pool information.").
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table to reform agreements every time the game structure
changes.
E. The Dynamic Process of Framing, Forming, and Playing
Games
International cooperation is the product of a complex,
dynamic process that is rife with collective action problems,
strategic behavior, transaction costs and uncertainty. 1
A
This process may be summarized as follows: (1) States
identify an interdependency problem, delineate its contours
and possible solutions ("framing the game"); (2) negotiate
an agreement and create compliance institutions ("forming
a game"); and (3) implement the agreement ("playing the
game").3
1. Framing the Game. The first step towards
international cooperation involves identification of the
interdependency problem (or set of problems), potential
participants, options for addressing the problem, expected
payoffs, duration (number of iterations) and other factors
133. See supra Part I (listing various impediments to cooperation).
134. Each of these stages has been explored in considerably more detail
elsewhere (as the footnotes in the subsections below indicate). See generally
Ronald B. Mitchell, International Environment, in THE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 500 (reviewing literature). At each
stage, there are repeated interactions between domestic and international, and
public and private actors. The point here is to provide a broad outline of the
cooperative process and how these three stages dynamically interrelate. The
"regime formation process" has similarly been divided. See, e.g., O.R. YOUNG,
CREATING REGIMES: ARCTIC ACCORDS AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE (Cornell
Univ. Press 1998) [hereinafter YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE] (dividing
the cycle of regime formation into three stages-agenda formation, negotiation,
and operationalization); O.R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING
THE ENVIRONMENT IN A STATELESS SOCIETY (Cornell Univ. Press 1994); Mitchell,
supra (dividing international environmental "policy process" into similar "policy
stages"); see also EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY 181-87 (1998) (describing international and domestic processes
involved in treaty-making); id., App. III (General Steps in Formulating
Multilateral Agreements); Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties, supra
note 7 (analyzing treaties from an "iterative perspective"); Setear, Responses to
Breach of a Treaty, supra note 7 (using iterated prisoners' dilemma to analyze
international law); YANG, supra note 10, at 27-28 (analyzing "international legal
norm implementation" as "two-phased," bargaining and enforcement); Fearon,
supra note 5 (same); ROGER FISHER, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL LAW 170 (analyzing "international legal norm implementation"
as "two-phased," bargaining and enforcement).
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that define the rules of the game. 135 Problem identification
and definition may be extremely complex and may involve
uncertainty in various dimensions (scientific, economic, and
political) relevant to decision-making.136 During this stage,
domestic and international policy makers, bureaucrats,
non-governmental organizations ("NGOs"), businesses and
other interested entities home in on an issue and begin to
debate the merits of potential (international) solutions.' In
some cases, problem identification, issue framing and
informal negotiations may occur at the sub-State level for
years before formal diplomatic negotiations take place.
When an issue has risen among national priorities to the
point where a State is willing to invest the time and
resources necessary to fully explore a cooperative solution,
negotiations may begin. 1
38
2. Game Formation. Once an interdependency problem
has been identified and potential participants decide that
taking action as opposed to maintaining the status quo may
be worthwhile, States negotiate some form of agreement,
135. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 110 ("Analytically, the first
stage is the development of data about the situation under regulation and the
activities of the parties with respect to it."); Abbott, supra note 18, at 13 ("At the
outset, the crucial facts relate to the nature of the interaction: the strategic
structure of the relationship (whether it is actually a PD or some other game)
and the conditions under which the game will be played. Many PD analyses
assume that all players have complete information on the structure of the
game. In international politics, however, the parties are likely to suffer from
1prospective uncertainty' as to all the basic determinants of game structure: (a)
the courses of action available to them and the results of different combinations
of choices; (b) the preferences of the other side, which determine the payoff
structure; and (c) the conditions of play.") (footnotes omitted); see also Mitchell,
supra note 134, at 502-04 (providing an overview of literature on the "agenda-
setting" stage in the international environmental policy process).
136. On the reliance of international environmental regimes on science and
technology, see Sheila Jasanoff, Contingent Knowledge: Implications for
Implementation and Compliance, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 10, at 63-
87; Peter M. Haas, Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts
to Protect Stratospheric Ozone, 46 INT'L ORG. 187 (1992).
137. See Mitchell, supra note 134, at 502-04.
138. The complicated processes by which national priorities are set (and
changed) are beyond the scope of this article.
139. See Mitchell & Keilbach, supra note 84, at 895. Of course, negotiations
over a new issue area do not always focus on a brand new agreement;
negotiations are often highly contingent on the outcomes of past negotiations in
related issue areas and may lead to bargaining over which existing regime
should serve as the locus for developing cooperative solutions. I thank Larry
2003] A DYNAMIC INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 725
such as a treaty.4 ° Importantly, this step affects the ex-
pected payoffs for participants by virtue of the commit-
ments undertaken, concessions made and compliance
systems established. 4'
The negotiation of an agreement is a dynamic process
in itself that redefines the rules of the game:1 2 While the
preliminary game structure may be framed simply in terms
of two options (maintaining the status quo or doing
something), negotiations modify the initial payoff structure
by bringing to light the full range of options with associated
costs, benefits, timeframes, and distributional patterns. 3
Thus, negotiations give form and substance to potential
commitments expanding the range of options along various
dimensions, such as the depth of substantive commitments
(for example, to liberalize trade or to regulate emissions of
environmentally harmful substances by specific quantita-
Helfer for bringing my attention to this point. On the strategic dynamics of
regime shifting, see Helfer, supra note 14.
140. Nonbinding resolutions may also serve the same purpose. Nonbinding
agreements may embody commitments with which States intend to comply,
while at the same time, explicitly reserving flexibility to adjust commitments as
necessary. See Guzman, supra note 10, at 1854-57, 1879-81; Helfer, supra note
11, at 1841; Raustiala, supra note 12, at 425-26. See generally COMMITMENT AND
COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH
NONBINDING ACCORDS (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1997).
141. See Hirsch, supra note 2, at 110 ("The most frequent tool employed by
international law to change payoff structures is the formulation of substantive
norms, which create new rights and obligations for States. Establishing a legal
obligation to follow a particular course of action modifies the payoff structure to
a party, who then must contemplate whether or not to pursue the legally
required course of action."). It may also affect the payoffs for nonparticipants, as
in the case of the non-party trade ban in the Ozone regime, discussed below. See
infra Part III.B.2.
142. On bargaining and negotiation, see Christer Jonsson, Diplomacy,
Bargaining, and Negotiation, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
supra note 12. On the application of game theory to bargaining and negotiation,
see generally DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 219-43
(1994); HARGREAVES HEAP & VAROUFAKIS, supra note 77, at 111-45. Various
actors-public and private, domestic and international-may continue to frame
the problem and potential solutions (or at least, attempt to do so) through
political and other discursive processes. See Mitchell, supra note 134, at 505-07.
143. Distributional issues add an extra layer of complexity to the analysis.
The folk theorems of noncooperative game theory show that repeated
collaboration games, such as the iterated prisoners' dilemma, give rise to
multiple equilibria, meaning that "[Iln most circumstances, states have
simultaneously to worry about reaching efficient outcomes and resolving
distributional conflict." Martin & Simmons, supra note 126, at 745.
726 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
tive measures) and the timeframes over which
commitments must be satisfied, and "generat[ing] expecta-
tions of compliance in others." '144 Notably, international
negotiations tend to be quite different from legislative
negotiations at the domestic level because international
negotiations require consensus rather than majority
approval,4 ' at least when States initially enter into an
agreement to undertake commitments and create
institutions."'
When States negotiate over the details of an agreement,
they must take into account a wide range of considera-
144. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 106, at 184.
145. This nature of international negotiations results from the fact that a
State must consent to an agreement for it to be bound. See S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v.
Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7) ("The rules of law binding
upon States... emanate from their own free will ... ."). See generally Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Many
scholars have explored the comparison with contract law. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, pt. III,
introductory note, at 147 (1986) (Treaty law "resembles domestic contract law,
as international agreements often resemble contracts."); see also ETHIER, supra
note 45, at 5 (analyzing international agreements as incomplete contracts);
Guzman, supra note 10, at 1865-66; Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 11, at 179.
Of course, there are significant differences between treaty law and contract law.
See, e.g., Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties, supra note 7, at 149
(contrasting the legal effect of a party's signature under domestic contract law
and treaty law). On consent-based theories of international law, see for
example, id. at 156-162; Guzman, supra note 10, at 1833-34. As noted by
Chayes and Chayes, "[t]reaty making is not purely consensual, of course.
Negotiations are heavily affected by the structure of the international system,
in which some states are much more powerful than others." Chayes & Chayes,
supra note 106, at 183.
146. One interesting example of dynamic institutionalism is the creation of
voting rules within a regime that allow for future negotiations to be governed by
something less than a consensus rule, such as a majority rule. See Martin,
supra note 117, at 773. While consent is the baseline for a new agreement,
States may foresee the need to make collectively binding decisions to address
new problems or issues without obtaining the consent of each party. Adopting
voting rules that facilitate amendment of the original agreement, creation of
new sub-agreements (or protocols), or creation of new institutions reflects an
awareness that international cooperation is a dynamic game that may require
repeated cycling through the three stages. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5,
at 225-27; see also Koremenos et al., supra note 94 (discussing voting rules as
an institutional feature that varies among issue areas); Setear, Ozone, Iteration,
and International Law, supra note 7, at 213-15 (discussing the convention-
protocol approach). For a discussion of alternative voting rules, see Jonathan
Weiner, Global Environmental Regulations: Instrument Choice in Legal Context,
108 YALE L.J. 677, 735-42 (1999).
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tions. 14 7 While the substantive commitments often deserve
the most attention, institutional design is an important
aspect of negotiations. Most importantly for consideration
in this article, States are aware of noncompliance risks
prior to undertaking substantive commitments and may
work out the details of a compliance system while
negotiating substantive commitments or condition their
acceptance of substantive commitments on the development
of an acceptable compliance system.4 ' As described below,
what States consider to be an "acceptable compliance
system" depends on the agreement and varies across issue-
areas. Commitments and compliance institutions are
inexorably intertwined. 9
3. Play. Once an agreement has been negotiated,
"play" begins.5 ' Participants cooperate by complying with
147. For an interesting analysis of bargaining to create international
governance systems, see YOUNG, supra note 134, at 81-116.
148. States may overestimate the risks of noncompliance. This may inhibit
cooperation in the first place if, for example, the costs of creating an
"acceptable" compliance institution exceed the benefits of cooperation, or such
overestimation may lead to the creation of unnecessary compliance institutions
and thereby raise the costs of cooperation. For example, imagine that two
States perceive their joint regulation of a shared problem to be a Prisoners'
Dilemma game due to uncertain payoffs where in fact it is a Harmony game.
See sources cited supra note 84. The expected costs of creating and maintaining
a compliance institution may exceed the expected benefits of cooperation and
thus lead both States to opt out of the potential agreement. Alternatively, the
States may enter into an agreement and create an unnecessary compliance
institution.
149. See George W. Downs et al., The Transformational Model of
International Regime Design: Triumph of Hope or Experience?, 38 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 465, 478-79, 502-09 (2000); George Downs et al., Managing the
Evolution of Multilateralism, 52 INT'L ORG. 397 (1998); Downs et al., supra note
42; Ronald B. Mitchell, Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and
Treaty Compliance, 48 INT'L ORG. 425 (1994); B. Peter Rosendorff & Helen V.
Milner, The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty
and Escape, 55 INT'L ORG. 829, 832 (2001); James McCall Smith, The Politics of
Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts, 54
INT'L ORG. 137 (2000); Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionism as a "Safeguard": A Positive
Analysis of the GATT "Escape Clause" with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI.
L. REV. 255 (1991); David G. Victor, Enforcing International Law: Implications
for an Effective Global Warming Regime, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 147
(1999).
150. Of course, precisely when an agreement becomes effectively binding
depends on the type of agreement. Treaties require ratification; some are self-
executing while others require domestic legislation to implement the
international commitments; nonbinding accords may require much less. See
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their commitments and defect by not complying with them.
Participants repeatedly find themselves faced with the
question of whether or not to comply, unless they choose to
withdraw, are suspended, or are otherwise forced to
withdraw. According to the conventional view (illustrated in
Figure 3 below), States go through these stages once, settle
in the third stage, and play an iterated game, thereafter
deciding on an iterative basis whether to comply.151
FIGURE 3: Visualizing the process of framing, forming and playing an
iterated game.
Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties, supra note 7, at 150-51. The
relevant distinctions between "start times" for various types of international
agreements are not especially important for the purposes of this article. On this
issue, see id. at 150-51.
151. See generally Guzman, supra note 10; Oye, supra note 78; Setear, An
Iterative Perspective on Treaties, supra note 7.
Playing the
game.
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This view leads both compliance and institutional analysts
to focus on the final stage and the role of monitoring and
enforcement institutions in facilitating cooperation.152
Yet the three "stages" are not really independent, and
the cooperative process is not necessarily linear. Games
may reframe and reform dynamically during play,"3
affecting payoff structures, the opportunities for
opportunism, and the bargaining/strategic positions of
players." Exogenous events unrelated to parties' actual
compliance decisions (or adopted strategies) may occur
while the iterated game is being played.55 Such events may
prompt States to return to the framing and forming stages.
Consider a few possibilities. First, a better understanding of
the underlying problem may emerge, for example, through
advancements in scientific understanding of an
152. See Guzman, supra note 10; supra Part II.D.
153. In addition, the reframing and reforming of games may have an
important constructive function. On constructivism, see generally Emanuel
Adler, Constructivism and International Relations, in THE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 73. While it is tempting to attempt
to connect rational choice theories and constructivist theories through this
dynamic, I leave this added complication for another day.
154. Cf MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION 107 (1987)
(arguing that "the most important shortcoming of the Prisoners' Dilemma
supergame as a model of the process of public goods provision is that it takes
place in a static environment: the supergame consists of iterations of the same
ordinary game" and suggesting that a more realistic model would require "a
changing payoff matrix") (emphasis supplied); Smith, supra note 59, at 1598,
1603 (analyzing nuclear arms control agreements between the United States
and the Soviet Union as a dynamic regime); Snidal, supra note 18, at 930 n.17
(noting similar limitations on the use of iterated games to approximate dynamic
situations). I should note that the theory of evolving games presented in this
article is distinct from evolutionary game theory, which concerns the evolution
of strategies and the search for evolutionary stable strategies based on the
decisions, strategies, and conventions of other players. See Arce, supra note 98,
at 755 ("From a dynamic perspective, the advantage of the evolutionary [game
theory] approach over the classic repeated games approach is that agents are no
longer committed to a strategy that most often represents a history-dependent
preset program. Instead, agents are involved in a dynamic interplay in which
they can learn about the relative merits of strategies through the process of
trial and error. As a result, cooperation need no longer be achieved through
punishment or coercion but through a process of give-and-take that more closely
resembles the regime-building experience."). See generally HARGREAVES HEAP &
VAROUFAKIS, supra note 77, at 195-235 (noting that evolutionary game theory
assumes that people will adjust behavior based on others' performance to seek
the highest possible payoff).
155. See Martin, supra note 117, at 789; Snidal, supra note 2, at 83; Snidal,
supra note 18, at 939-40.
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environmental threat.1 56 Second, unanticipated (or under
appreciated) aspects of a problem may surface and threaten
cooperative efforts, for example, when initial efforts
successfully abate the most prominent aspect of a problem
only to reveal more difficult issues to resolve. 57 Third, the
expected costs (benefits) of implementing a particular
obligation may be less than expected, for example, when
technological advancements reveal alternative, less costly
means of achieving agreed-to ends.5 8 Finally, a host of
exogenous factors may alter the existing payoff structure or
the relative priority of a given commitment, for example,
when economic or political conditions change in a
significant manner. Each of these possibilities (and others)
may alter the payoff structure and prompt parties to revisit
the existing agreement and, inter alia, adjust existing
commitments, strengthen enforcement institutions, provide
for unanticipated side-payments, or simply exit.'59 From the
game theoretic perspective, returning to the game framing
156. Monitoring institutions frequently collect and analyze information
relating to the underlying problem itself and the means by which the threat has
been addressed; even where full compliance exists, the coordinated effort may
be poorly targeted and in need of redirection. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note
5; LAWRENCE E. SUSSKIND, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY: NEGOTIATING MORE
EFFECTIVE GLOBAL AGREEMENTS 99-121 (1994).
157. See infra Part III.A.2.b (discussing the evolution of the GATT regime
into the WTO regime and the emergence of issues, such as non-tariff barriers,
that were especially challenging for the GATT regime).
158. See Jasmine Abdel-khalik, Prescriptive Treaties in Global Warming:
Applying the Factors Leading to the Montreal Protocol, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 489,
510 (2001) ("One of the chief reasons the Montreal Protocol has been effectively
implemented is the availability of alternative, ozone friendly, technologies.").
See generally Colin B. Picker, A View From 40,000 Feet: International Law and
the Invisible Hand of Technology, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 149 (2001) (discussing
how technology has played an important role in changing the face of
international law in various areas, such as agreements on weapons of mass
destruction, nuclear weapons, space law, and environmental law).
159. See Chayes et al., Managing Compliance: A Comparative Perspective, in
ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 10, at 56 ("Treaties do not remain static. To
endure, they must adapt to inevitable economic, technological, social, and
political changes."); Chayes & Chayes, supra note 106, at 184 ("Treaties that
last must be able to adapt to inevitable changes in the economic, technological,
social, and political setting."); Koremenos et al., supra note 94, at 793-94
(recognizing that unforeseen developments may prompt parties to reconsider or
revisit an agreement); Rosendorff & Milner, supra note 149, at 832-35
(discussing unforeseen developments); Snidal, supra note 18, at 939-40.
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and forming stages signals the creation of a new game,"' asillustrated by figure 4 below.
FIGURE 4: Visualizing a series of iterated games. Building from figure
3, this figure depicts the formation of a new iterated game in response to an
unforeseen event (vertical dotted line), which prompts players to return to
either the framing or forming stage of the process. Although the graphical
illustrations of the first and second iterated game look the same, it is
important to keep in mind that the rules of the game and the institutional
structure may change as a result of exogenous pressures or bargaining.
160. This view is not limited to game theory. For example, in his description
of the staged international environmental policy process, Ronald Mitchell states
that:
Evolution and learning constitute something like a fifth policy stage
facilitating revision and improvement in the other stages. Policy
change may involve simple repetition of the policy process under
changed circumstances. New environmental problems may develop and
be identified, move onto the international agenda, be addressed
through a transnational or international policy process, and be
implemented through new mechanisms. When such changes result
from changes in exogenous factors, they may deserve our attention but,
conceptually, involve simply new instances of these policy processes.
Mitchell, supra note 134, at 511.
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While this model captures the role of monitoring and
enforcement institutions and, to some extent, the dynamic
nature of international cooperation, it fails to capture the
role of institutions that States employ to facilitate
cooperation in the face of dynamic change. States are aware
not only of the risk of defection, for which monitoring and
enforcement institutions may be needed, but States are also
keenly aware of the risk that dynamic change poses for
sustained cooperation. Accordingly, when States form
games in the first instance, they may create institutions to
adjust commitment levels, payoff structures, or other insti-
tutional features in response to unforeseen developments
and thereby avoid a new round of bargaining and the
formation of a new game."' The degree to which games
reframe and reform during play (i.e., the "dynamicism" of
the evolutionary process) is an important factor in the
design of such compliance institutions,'62  which is
161. Scholars certainly recognize that States in fact create such institutions.
See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 225-27 (briefly discussing such
institutions); Chayes & Chayes, supra note 106, at 184-85 ("In sum, treaties
characteristically contain self-adjusting mechanisms by which, over a
significant range, they can be and in practice are commonly adapted to respond
to shifting interests of the parties."). For example, Koremenos et al. refer to the
Antarctic Treaty as an example of a treaty that "was designed to allow states to
learn from their experience and modify the agreement over time." Koremenos et
al., supra note 94, at 793. Importantly, the process for modifying the treaty was
more flexible than ordinary treaty formation procedures. Thus, foreseeing
dynamic change, the parties adopted a flexible agreement with institutional
mechanisms for adjusting commitments. See id.; see also id. at 792 ("[States]
design institutions that protect them from unforeseen circumstances."); id. at
793-94 (noting that States may plan to renegotiate aspects of an agreement
when facing uncertainty about the state of the world); id. at 788 ("When states
are uncertain about the state of the world, all may benefit from joint efforts to
gather and pool information."); infra Part III.B.2 (discussing similar
institutions in the Ozone regime). Institutions, such as escape clauses, that
provide actors with flexibility in the face of uncertainty as to the (future) state
of the world are another example. See Rosendorff & Milner, supra note 149;
Sykes, supra note 149. Yet the game theoretic account of international
cooperation fails to account for the existence of such institutions, and there has
been little theoretical attention to these institutions from the rational choice
school. Cf Snidal, supra note 2, at 82-86 (discussing dynamicism as a challenge
to rational choice theory).
162. In his analysis of treaties from an iterative perspective, Setear
considers institutions of treaty law designed to facilitate repeated interactions.
Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties, supra note 7, at 190-204, 217-23.
His analysis suggests that States may have some degree of control over the
dynamicism of regime evolution that depends upon the precision and intended
stability of initial commitments and the degree of delegation to institutions
2003] A DYNAMIC INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 733
highlighted below in the context of multilateral trade and
multilateral environmental agreements."' Rather than
playing a series of iterated games (as in figure 4 supra),
States may opt to play an evolving game, where the game
structure evolves as it iterates due to internal adjustments
resulting from the operation of institutions.6 Figure 5
below illustrates this model.
capable of dynamically adjusting commitments in future iterations. See id. On
the issue of choosing the degrees of obligation, precision, and delegation to
institutions required to solve international problems, see Kenneth W. Abbott et
al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT'L ORG. 401, 401 (2000); Kenneth W.
Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54
INT'L ORG. 421, 421 (2000); Judith Goldstein et al., Introduction: Legalization
and World Politics, 54 INT'L ORG. 385, 393-96 (2000); Helfer, supra note 11, at
1841 ("States consciously design human rights agreements in response to
specific problems, choosing the degrees of obligation, precision, and delegation
required to solve those problems. But legalization is not costless. To the
contrary, greater legalization necessarily requires a more far-reaching
diminution of sovereignty, raising the important question of what motivates
states to create legalized human rights agreements in the first place.") (footnote
omitted). As noted earlier, States may choose to adopt voting rules that require
less than a consensus to create binding commitments in the future. See sources
cited supra note 146 and accompanying text. This would promote a relatively
more dynamic regime than a regime without such rules. The Ozone regime,
discussed in Part III.B below, presents an excellent example; the regime has
evolved rapidly in large part because of its flexible procedures through which
parties could adjust commitments (targets and timetables) for covered
chemicals without requiring each party's consent. See infra Part III.B.2. The
"convention-protocol" approach also facilitated iteration and regime evolution.
See id.; CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 225 (discussing "convention-
protocol" approach as means to evolve); Setear, An Iterative Perspective on
Treaties, supra note 7, at 217-23 (discussing "convention-protocol" approach
from iterative perspective and considering the Ozone regime as well as other
international environmental regimes); Setear, Ozone, Iteration, and
International Law, supra note 7, at 213-15 (discussing "convention-protocol"
approach in context of the Ozone regime).
163. See infra Part III.
164. See DOWNS & RocKE, supra note 114 (analyzing games of imperfect
information and the role of institutions designed to cope with uncertainty, but
focusing on the risk of defection); Rosendorff & Milner, supra note 149 (using a
two stage model where the first stage involves bargaining over the form of the
institution, the second stage involves a repeated (sub)game in which parties set
domestic trade policies, and the escape clause is an institution endogenous to
the model). Of course, as illustrated below in the context of both the
GATT/WTO regime and the Ozone regime, institutions (or more broadly,
regimes) themselves also evolve to meet the demands of parties and changing
conditions and to better facilitate sustained cooperation. See Koremenos et al.,
supra note 94, at 767-68.
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FIGURE 5: Visualizing an evolving game. Building from figure 3, this
figure depicts an iterated game with the presence of both a monitoring and
enforcement institution and an institution designed to respond to
unforeseen events. When a triggering event occurs (vertical dotted line),
the second institution adjusts commitment levels, payoff structures, or
other institutional features, allowing the game to evolve and avoiding a
new round of bargaining and the formation of a new game.
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Of course, States do not always choose an evolving
game over a series of iterated games; such decisions
necessarily vary across issue-areas and depend upon the
nature of changes at issue.165 The next section considers in
more detail the types of strategies that States may
implement through institutions to sustain cooperation as
the game evolves.
F. Compliance Strategies
Recognizing ex ante that potential compliance problems
may plague efforts to address an interdependency problem,
States may reach agreement on the design of a compliance
system66 that institutionalizes a suite of compliance
strategies.167 Compliance systems can be thought of as a
systematic method of adjusting the rules of the game in
165. Cf CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 225-27 (discussing a few ways in
which "treaty bodies exercise what is in substance legislative power").
166. The advantage of looking at international agreements through the lens
of game theory is that the strategic considerations embodied in the agreement
and its constituent commitments can be explored. See, e.g., Abbott, supra note
18. During negotiations, each party must consider the effects of its and other
countries' compliance with the agreement on its citizens, as a whole and taking
into account distributional implications. Each party also must contemplate both
the likelihood and the potential impact of strategic defection and dynamic
change. In some cases, the ex ante balancing of expected costs and benefits may
lead to outright rejection of any agreement because the costs vastly outweigh
the benefits; in other cases, the opposite may occur - for example, easy
coordination problems. In the middle, there is a class of situations where the
balancing suggests that agreement may be feasible provided that a compliance
system is integrated into the agreement, which of course entails its own cost-
benefit analysis. See BETH V. YARBROUGH & ROBERT M. YARBROUGH,
COOPERATION AND GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE STRATEGIC
ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH 13 (1992). Creating a compliance system itself may
be analyzed as an additional collective action problem, beyond the underlying
interdependency problem itself. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 64
(discussing organization of sanctions as a collective action problem in itself); cf
YANG, supra note 10, at 6-9 (arguing that treaty enforcement itself is a public
good).
167. See Brown Weiss, Strengthening National Compliance with Trade Law:
Insight from Environment, in NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 56, at 458 ("Parties
should have a suite of compliance methods available that can be tailored to
meet the needs of particular countries for particular agreements."); Brown
Weiss, supra note 12, at 1559 (stating that "[i]nternational agreements evolve
over time, as do the national implementing measures"); Mitchell, supra note
149, at 428 (analyzing the "integrated compliance systems" of the international
regime controlling intentional oil pollution).
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either an evolving game or a series of games.6 ' As the
tremendous volume of literature discussing monitoring and
enforcement institutions indicates, the strategies discussed
below may be implemented through a wide range of
institutions. The focus here is primarily on function rather
than institutional form.'69
Recent empirical research on national compliance with
international commitments suggests that national intent
and national capacity to comply are critical variables for
actual compliance.
170
The level of State compliance depends on having the leaders and
the citizenry understand that it is in their self-interest to comply
and on their acting on this understanding. While external
pressures and assistance can push a country toward compliance,
there is no substitute for engaging 'self-interest.' In some cases,
the issue is one of prioritization: How much of the country's
national resources to devote to complying with particular
agreements. This is especially difficult when compliance requires
States to coordinate actions among several powerful ministries,
with provincial and local governments, or with powerful business
and industry organizations.
171
Furthermore, the capacity to comply with international
agreements depends on numerous assets, such as "[aln
honest and effective bureaucracy, economic resources,
168. See supra Figures 4 & 5.
169. For articles focusing on institutional form, see generally Special Issue,
Rational Design: Explaining the International Institutions, 55 INT'L ORG. 761
(2001) (analyzing institutional design); Special Issue, Legalization and World
Politics, 54 INT'L ORG. 385 (2000) (analyzing forms of legalization, which is "a
particular form of institutionalization"); McCall Smith, supra note 149
(comparing institutional form across trade accords). As Duncan Snidal
suggested in an important early article on the application of game theory to
international cooperation, observed variation in institutional form and function
may be explained as "different solutions to the same fundamental problem" or
"different solutions to fundamentally different problems." Snidal, supra note 18,
at 923-24.
170. See Jacobson & Brown Weiss, A Framework for Analysis, in ENGAGING
COUNTRIES, supra note 10, at 1-18; Jacobson & Brown Weiss, Assessing the
Record and Designing Strategies to Engage Countries, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES,
supra note 10, at 511-54.
171. Brown Weiss, Strengthening National Compliance with Trade Law:
Insight from Environment, in NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 56, at 458-59; see
Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 12, at 547 (discussing structural links
between international institutions and domestic actors).
2003] A DYNAMIC INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 737
technical expertise, and public support.017 2 Importantly,
these variables change over time, and the variables are
subject to endogenous and exogenous influence. Thus,
cooperation, particularly over the long-term, depends in
part on adjusting the individual benefit-cost structures
faced by States to affect the intent of parties and in part on
building the capacity of participants so that compliance is
feasible. '
International law and international relations scholars
have suggested two general approaches to designing
compliance systems, an enforcement-oriented approach
based essentially on the threat and/or use of sanctions as a
means of deterring noncompliance, and a management-
oriented approach based essentially on reducing ambiguity
regarding obligations themselves, creating positive
incentives to comply prior to an incidence of noncompliance,
and adapting treaties to changing conditions. 7' The
172. Brown Weiss, Strengthening National Compliance with Trade Law:
Insight from Environment, in NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 56, at 459. "The
greater the capacity of the political unit to implement the accord, the more
likely it is that it will comply. Administrative and bureaucratic capacity
depends upon economic resources, but it also involves education, technical
training and skills, and attitudes." Jacobson & Brown Weiss, Assessing the
Record and Designing Strategies to Engage Countries, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES,
supra note 10, at 1, 11; see also Vogel & Kessler, How Compliance Happens and
Doesn't Happen Domestically, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 10, at 19,
20-23 (reviewing compliance with environmental legislation in the United
States and the European Community); Mark A. Drumbl, Does Sharing Know its
Limits? Thoughts on Implementing International Environmental Agreements: A
Review of National Environmental Policies, A Comparative Study of
Capacity-Building, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 281 (1999).
173. See Jackson & Brown Weiss, A Framework for Analysis, in ENGAGING
COUNTRIES, supra note 10, at 11; see also HOvI, supra note 59, at 96-100
(discussing modifications to the basic prisoners' dilemma model, including
variable discount factors, imperfect detection of violations, incomplete
information, multiple options, and package deals); Abbott & Snidal, supra note
67, at 26 ("State incapacity is addressed directly by financial and technical
assistance.").
174. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5 (championing the management-
oriented approach and attacking the enforcement-oriented approach); Downs et
al., supra note 42 (challenging Chayes and Chayes and defending the
enforcement-oriented approach); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey
International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2639 (1997) (reviewing THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY and suggesting that the two approaches may complement each
other (1995)); Abbott & Snidal, supra note 67, at 26-27 (suggesting that the
"role of IOs [international organizations] in ensuring compliance with
international commitments can best be understood by integrating managerial
and enforcement views of the process" and analyzing the role of IOs); Guzman,
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enforcement-oriented approach is consciously focused on the
problem of opportunistic defection and the solution of
altering States' individual incentives and aligning them
with the mutually desired cooperative outcome.'75 It relies
on the imposition of "hard" sanctions (such as trade or other
economic sanctions) in the event of noncompliance. 176 The
WTO DSU is often considered a good example of an
institution embodying this approach, although the analysis
in Part III below suggests otherwise. 17 The management-
oriented approach is premised on the belief that "states
have a propensity to comply with their international com-
mitments,"' de-emphasizes the problem of opportunistic
defection, 7" and largely rejects the use of "hard" sanctions
supra note 10, at 1830-33 (arguing that the managerial model works well for
coordination problems but is less useful for other interdependency problems);
Frischmann, supra note 43, at 493 ("A rough continuum exists where at one
extreme there are management-oriented (soft) approaches and at the other end
there are enforcement-oriented (hard) approaches."); id. at 500-07 (arguing that
an enforcement-oriented approach is necessary for an international emissions
trading system to work and proposing how to design such a system); see also
Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 12, at 542-44 (discussing the management-
enforcement debate in the compliance literature); YANG, supra note 10, at 2-3
(same); Raustiala & Victor, Conclusions, in IMPLEMENTATION AND
EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 12, at 681-84 (same); JAN CORFEE MORLOT,
ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH A GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AGREEMENT, 57-59
OECD Information Paper, ENV/EPOC(98)5/REV1, (1998) (same); Jacob
Werksman, Designing a Compliance System for the UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change, in IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (James Cameron et al. eds., 1996) (same); Oran Young,
The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical
Variables, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN
WORLD POLITICS 160 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992)
(same). An important distinction between the two approaches, which arises
from the underlying premises upon which both approaches are based, is the
type of compliance problem(s) each is designed to address-intentional
noncompliance as opposed to unintentional noncompliance.
175. See Downs et al., supra note 42; Chayes & Chayes, supra note 106, at
187.
176. There are enforcement institutions that do not rely on
adjudication/dispute settlement. For example, the United Nations Security
Council is a collective mechanism for imposing hard sanctions, U.N. CHARTER
arts. 39-51, and, of course, States may fall back on unilateral sanctions as a
means to punish noncompliance.
177. See infra Parts III.A.2.a.ii, III.A.2.c.ii.
178. Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 12, at 542; see CHAYES & CHAYES,
supra note 5, at 3-4; Chayes & Chayes, supra note 106, at 179-80.
179. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 106, at 183 ("[Ihf the agreement is
well-designed-sensible, comprehensible, and with a practical eye to probable
patterns of conduct and interaction-compliance problems and enforcement
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and other forms of enforcement as "costly, difficult to
mobilize, and of doubtful efficacy."8 ' It relies primarily on
positive incentives, "soft" negative sanctions (such as
publication of noncompliance reports and suspension of
privileges), dynamic commitment-readjustment, and other
mechanisms aimed at encouraging continued participation,
building capacity, and increasing public awareness and
support. 8' International environmental regimes are often
considered good examples of this approach.
The types of compliance strategies that States
implement through institutions "can best be understood by
integrating managerial and enforcement views of the
process"' and keeping in mind that the nature of the
underlying interdependency problem will have a significant
effect on the game structure and attendant demand for
compliance institutions.'83 Based on its conception of the
manner in which the international cooperative process
works (described in the previous section), the dynamic
institutional theory developed in this article provides a
coherent way to integrate the two approaches within a
rational choice framework.'84
issues are likely to be manageable. If issues of noncompliance and enforcement
are endemic, the real problem is likely to be that the original bargain did not
adequately reflect the interests of those that would be living under it, rather
than mere disobedience.").
180. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 106, at 178.
181. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5 (the seminal work on the
management-oriented approach to compliance); cf Guzman, supra note 10, at
1830-33 (arguing that the managerial model works well for coordination
problems but is less useful for other interdependency problems).
182. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 67, at 26; see Mitchell, supra note 149, at
428 ("[T]he [equipment subregime of the international regime controlling
intentional oil pollution] elicited compliance when it developed integrated
compliance systems that succeeded in increasing transparency, providing for
potent and credible sanctions, reducing implementation costs to governments by
building on existing infrastructures, and preventing violations rather than
merely deterring them.").
183. See Downs et al., supra note 42, at 379-80; Mitchell & Keilbach, supra
note 84, at 891-904; Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 12, at 545; Snidal, supra
note 18, at 924.
184. It should not be surprising that the management-oriented approach
can be framed in rational choice terms. Compare Hathaway, supra note 12, at
1950 n.46 (suggesting that Guzman's game-theoretic model may mesh with the
management-oriented approach to compliance), with Guzman, supra note 10, at
1832 n.30 (suggesting otherwise: "the core of the managerial model is clarity
and communication ex ante to prevent conflict. In contrast, the reputational
model considers how sanctions, applied ex post, affect the compliance decisions
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As the previous section shows, States recognize ex ante
not only that they face noncompliance risks as traditionally
conceived (defection based on incentives presented in the
iterated prisoners' dilemma context, for example) but also
that dxnamic change may threaten the stability of the
game.' Accordingly, ex ante, States design institutions to
implement strategies directed not only at monitoring State
behavior and altering payoffs based on observed behavior(i.e., decision to cooperate or defect), but also to maintain
cooperation in the face of dynamic change. States create
institutions to reduce uncertainty and transaction costs
associated with such change and to adjust commitment
levels, payoff structures, or other institutional features in
future iterations. In some cases, such institutions may
facilitate internal change and maintain regime stability by
relieving parties of the need to return to the bargaining
table every time the game structure changes.'86
While compliance strategies may be grouped and
classified in a number of different ways,' the theory
developed in this article suggests that compliance strategies
may be analyzed based on the aspect of the game targeted
by the strategies. Specifically, compliance strategies may
target (1) expected payoffs, or the payoff structure itself
of self-interested states."), and YANG, supra note 10, at 27-28. Yang suggests, in
similar fashion as Guzman, that positive incentives and other managerial-
approaches to promoting compliance must be treated distinctly from negative
incentives because the former occur in the bargaining stage (ex ante) and the
latter occur in the enforcement stage (ex post). See id. This view fails to account
for the dynamic nature of the process: first, the threat of sanctions act as a
deterrent ex ante (i.e., prior to an incidence of noncompliance) even though
sanctions must be applied ex post; and second, positive incentives are often
contingent on compliance over time (and thus become a factor ex ante and ex
post). Yang does seem to suggest that legislative agreements may involve a
more complicated, dynamic process. See id. at 34-36 (discussing norm
cultivation, regulatory regime creation, and regulatory oversight).
185. Dynamic change may lead to enforcement-oriented or management-
oriented problems, or may prompt parties to reconsider the initial agreement
itself. See infra Part II.E.3 (listing a few examples of exogenous events that may
dynamically change the game structure).
186. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 67, at 3, 8, 11-12, 15, 17, 22.
187. See, e.g., ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 10 (three strategies are
positive incentives, negative incentives and sunshine); see also Knox, supra note
12 (discussing adjudicatory model and managerial model). The three strategies
discussed by Brown Weiss and Jacobson-positive incentives, negative
incentives and sunshine methods-are all incentive-based, payoff-altering
strategies (Type I). For an interesting classification of mechanisms used to
globalize regulation, see BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 7, at 532-49.
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("Type I strategies"); (2) the cooperation-inhibiting factors,
such as transaction costs and uncertainties, that are not
contingent upon the decisions of players ("Type II
strategies"); and (3) dynamic adjustment (reframing and
reforming) of the game in response to exogenous events
unrelated to the decisions of players ("Type III strategies").
1. Type I Strategies-Altering Incentives by Targeting
the Payoff Structure. Through Type I strategies, States seek
to reduce the risk of intentional noncompliance. States
directly target the payoff structure (and thus, players'
incentives) by making concessions or side-payments to
encourage cooperation and offset the perceived benefits of
defection ("positive incentives") or by committing parties to
retaliate against defection through some form of sanction
("negative incentives"). 8  Positive incentives tend to
influence both national capacity and national intent, for
example, by lowering the costs of implementation, while
negative incentives tend to influence only national intent.
Where a potential participant lacks the capacity to
cooperate, positive incentives become an essential
ingredient in the mix of institutional mechanisms incorpo-
rated into an agreement or negotiated on the side.
Importantly, the promise of side-payments (or the threat of
sanction) itself effectively adjusts the expected payoffs and
thus acts as an inducement (deterrent). Thus, both positive
and negative incentives are aimed at making compliance
with commitments more attractive than noncompliance
from an ex ante perspective. This is the basic insight from
game theory that informs institutional analyses:
institutions facilitate cooperation where they adjust the
expected payoff structure and thus the incentives to
cooperate/defect.189
188. Negative incentives, or sanctions, are generally associated with the
enforcement-oriented approach to compliance where parties are "coerced" into
compliance and deterred from noncompliance through the (threatened) use of
force, or power, as punishment. See YANG, supra note 10, at 10-13 (discussing
the concept of enforcement). Positive incentives are generally associated with
the management-oriented approach to compliance where cooperation is
facilitated by financial or technical assistance. As noted in the previous note,
both types of incentive-based mechanisms target the payoff structure. See
Mitchell & Keilbach, supra note 84, at 891-92.
189. Adjusting the payoff structure also may be aimed at making the
distribution of net payoffs equitable in the eyes of participants. For example,
institutional mechanisms that redistribute gains may lessen the risk of forced
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Generally, incentive-based strategies depend on
compliance over time, and a necessary component to the
success of such strategies is information regarding the
parties' performance. 9 ° To facilitate such strategies, States
may develop monitoring systems to improve the likelihood
that cheating will be detected, thereby also adjusting the
expected payoffs.'
An important source of information regarding State
behavior is the State itself. For example, most international
renegotiation through holdout strategies. If joint cooperation between A and B
is expected to yield a payoff of 20 to A and 4 to B for each iteration of the game,
B may threaten to defect (even if B seemingly has a dominant strategy to
cooperate, as in a Harmony game) in order to force A to renegotiate and share
"more equitably." In such a situation, it may be in both parties' interest to work
something out ex ante and thereby avoid holdouts, renegotiations, and
associated transaction costs in the future. See Jacobson & Brown Weiss,
Assessing the Record and Designing Strategies to Engage Countries, in
ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 10, at 511, 528 (see Table 15.3 listing
"perceived equity of the obligations" in a treaty as an important characteristic
for compliance analysis); Mitchell & Keilbach, supra note 84, at 892 ("The
distribution of costs and benefits in asymmetric externalities makes actors
reluctant to join an institution and encourages them to violate institutional
rules if they do, suggesting that distribution problems are not always separable
from, and indeed sometimes drive, enforcement problems.").
190. Although generally associated with a negative incentive strategy (i.e.,
enforcement-oriented approach), detecting noncompliance is essential under a
positive incentive compliance strategy as well. A stream of positive incentives
(e.g., financial support, technology transfer, etc.) over the course of many
rounds of play may be contingent on compliance, such that detected
noncompliance would stop the flow of benefits or at least initiate a facilitative
response aimed at bringing the party into compliance. See Chayes et al.,
Managing Compliance: A Comparative Perspective, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES,
supra note 10, at 39, 53 (describing conditional assistance). For example, funds
made available to States by the Global Environment Facility to facilitate
compliance with the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer have been contingent on compliance with reporting obligations. See
IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 12, at 17-18.
191. See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 18 (analyzing informational
arrangements); Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Implementation, Enforcement, and
Compliance with International Environmental Agreements-Practical
Suggestions in Light of the World Bank's Experience, 9 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L.
REv. 37, 37 (1996) (describing "international networks for diffusion of
information, verification, and monitoring" as enforcement tool); see also Abbott
& Snidal, supra note 67, at 20 (describing the role of international organizations
as neutral information providers); id. at 26-27 (describing in more detail the
role of international organizations in the enforcement process). For an analysis
of institutions that monitor treaty implementation and compliance, see Kal
Raustiala, Police Patrols, Fire Alarms and Treaty Compliance (Working Paper,
June 2003) (on file with author).
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environmental agreements that have a monitoring system
rely on national reporting. Like the substantive obligations
undertaken by States, reporting obligations similarly raise
compliance problems. That is, States do not always provide
full and accurate reports. Of course, this is not surprising.
What distinguishes one monitoring system from another is
the degree to which the information can be verified and
reviewed.'92  Beyond national reporting obligations,
international monitoring systems can be designed in many
different ways ranging from the creation of a formal
intergovernmental organization ("IGO"), delegation of
monitoring responsibilities to an existing organization (IGO
or NGO), or other institutional mechanisms. The scope of
monitoring responsibilities delegated to an organization
may vary considerably.'93 For example, parties may limit
the scope to gathering information and disseminating
information to the parties and/or the public generally. Or
parties may expand the scope to include a more substantive
role in assessing and verifying compliance. Informal
monitoring may also arise independently through the
actions of NGOs or other private parties. For example, in
the trade context, importers and exporters regularly
monitor State actions as a necessary consequence of doing
business. In the environmental context, environmental
NGOs also play an important role by voluntarily monitoring
the compliance of States with their international
commitments and by publicizing reports of noncompliance.
192. See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 18 (analyzing informational
arrangements); Raustiala, supra note 191 (same); see also Chayes et al.,
Managing Compliance: A Comparative Perspective, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES,
supra note 10, at 39, 46 (discussing self-reporting and noting Panama's
deliberate misreporting of kills to the International Whaling Commission and
the increased use of independent reporting and verification as a means of
avoiding the "'self-incrimination' problems inherent in [self-reporting]
systems").
193. As Helfer explains:
Levels of delegation in human rights instruments are also extremely
diverse. Most human rights treaties contain their own independent
monitoring mechanisms to review states' compliance with their
international commitments. These mechanisms take many forms,
ranging from fully adversarial courts to nonadversarial managerial
bodies, with many gradations in between. A large number of treaties
contain some kind of judicial or court-like procedure for individuals and
private parties to bring complaints alleging violations of their treaty
rights against governments.
Helfer, supra note 11, at 1841.
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Transparency requirements further assist compliance
monitoring. For example, pursuant to GATT Article X,
WTO members must publish laws, regulations, judicial
decisions and administrative rulings of general application
that pertain to classification, valuation, duty rates, taxes or
other charges or requirements, restrictions or prohibitions
on import or export; or that affect the sale, distribution or
transportation, insurance, warehousing, processing mixing
or other use of products.1 4 Professor Reichman describes
how, under TRIPs, a "rule of transparency" "makes all
countries aware of the risks of non-compliance with the
black letter rules by rendering it difficult to avoid detection
of non-conforming laws," which facilitates a managerial
approach to avoiding potential compliance problems, and
"also reveals disputes that cannot be settled by herbal tea,
by consultation or mediation, and for which states may
logically turn to the dispute settlement procedures of the
DSU.'
1
1
2. Type H Strategies-Facilitating Cooperation by Re-
ducing Transaction Costs and Uncertainty. Through Type II
strategies, States seek to reduce transaction costs and
uncertainty that inhibit cooperation. In contrast with Type
I strategies, the focus is on reducing the risk of
unintentional noncompliance due to capacity problems,
ambiguity regarding what constitutes compliance, and
changing circumstances.19 Nonetheless, with respect to
reducing transaction costs, there is some overlap with the
positive incentives component of Type I strategies. The
impetus behind capacity-building programs may be
facilitative and premised on the managerial belief that
States have a propensity to comply, and at the same time,
such programs affect incentives, especially when financial,
technical, or other support is contingent upon compliance.
194. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. X, 61 Stat.
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (entered into force Jan.12, 1948) [hereinafter GATT].
195. See J.H. Reichman, The TRIPs Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or
Cooperation with the Developing Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 441,
445 (2000).
196. See, e.g., Aceves, supra note 59, at 243-45 (describing how institutions
may reduce transaction costs); id. at 250-51 (describing how institutions may
reduce uncertainty); see also Abbott & Snidal, supra note 67, at 8, 12, 15-17, 22
(describing how IOs may reduce transaction costs).
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With respect to reducing uncertainty, there may seem
to be an overlap with the informational component of Type I
strategies; however, Type II strategies should be viewed
more broadly than compliance monitoring (in the assurance
and verification sense).97 For example, States often create
organizations, such as a secretariat, to coordinate
information gathering, information sharing, communica-
tions among parties, and other activities that facilitate
cooperation and reduce uncertainties associated with
problem identification, possible solutions, payoffs, time
horizons, and other variables that affect States' willingness
and capacity to participate in negotiations in the first
instance, to comply with commitments undertaken in a
negotiated agreement, and to continue to cooperate more
broadly (beyond express commitments) as the regime
evolves. 98 Institutionalizing this strategy may lessen the
risk of sudden dynamic change triggered by exogenous
events. Depending on the issue area, it may facilitate
renegotiation in a new bargaining stage or the operation of
institutions implementing a Type III strategy (discussed
below).'99
Consider, for example, the role of an adjudicative (or
legalistic) dispute settlement institution. In addition to
197. For analysis of informational arrangements that implement Type I
strategies, see Abbott, supra note 18; see also Frischmann, supra note 43, at
484-89 (considering functions and design options for an international
monitoring institution).
198. See, e.g., David G. Victor et al., Systems for Implementation Review, in
IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 12, at 47-53 (describing
Systems for Implementation Review as a series of activities that serve these
Type II functions); Chayes et al., Managing Compliance: A Comparative
Perspective, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 10, at 39, 58-61 (discussing the
role of IGOs, including secretariats, and NGOs in performing Type II functions);
James Salzman, Labor Rights, Globalization and Institutions: The Role and
Influence of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 21
MICH. J. INT'L L. 769, 835 (2000) (discussing the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development and other IGOs that perform Type II functions);
Abbott & Snidal, supra note 67, at 8, 12, 15-17, 22 (discussing role of various
secretariats and other international organizations that perform these
functions).
199. Cf Abbott & Snidal, supra note 67, at 10 ("An established international
organization provides a stable negotiating forum, enhancing iteration and
reputational effects. Such a stable forum also allows for a fast response to
sudden developments."); Rosendorff & Milner, supra note 149, at 834 ("In the
presence of exogenous shocks, international institutions may be much better
served by allowing countries to make temporary, ad hoc use of escape clauses
that permit them to break the rules for a short period and pay a cost to do so.").
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facilitating a payoff-altering, incentive-based strategy by
"generat[ing] information about [particular] instance[s] of
defection" and providing a basis for imposing sanctions,200
an adjudicative dispute settlement institution may reduce
uncertainty regarding the interpretation, scope, and
applicability of various obligations and exceptions within a
treaty as the regime evolves.2"' As stated by James McCall
Smith,
In new economics of organization terminology, dispute settlement
operates in this respect as a type of relational contract. Because
the parties to [an international] agreement cannot foresee all
possible contingencies, they find it very difficult ex ante to define
compliance. The accord they negotiate is inevitably incomplete; it
does not specify how the parties are to behave under all possible
circumstances. As circumstances change, conflicts of interpretation
may arise, potentially jeopardizing the treaty. To avoid such
conflicts, parties agree in relational contracts to assign rights and
responsibilities to define compliance, a role that [international]
accords [sometimes] confer on impartial third parties.2 2
Essentially, to the extent that the line between compliance
and noncompliance itself is blurry, adjudicative institutions
(and other institutions performing the same function)
identify problem areas, provide useful guidance and reduce
uncertainty for future iterations. 23 As seen below, this
appears to be the primary function of the legalistic,
adjudicative approach taken in the multilateral tiading
regime.2 4 Furthermore, there may be an important value
associated with the expression of evolving legal norms
through such institutions.
200. McCall Smith, supra note 149, at 146.
201. See, e.g., id.; Aceves, supra note 59, at 245; see also Chayes & Chayes,
supra note 106, at 190-92 (discussing treaty ambiguity).
202. McCall Smith, supra note 149, at 146.
203. See generally CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 201-25 (analyzing
various types of dispute settlement institutions). Of course, this function need
not be performed by an adjudicative institution. Instead, for example, a panel of
experts may address technical or legal uncertainty in a nonadversarial process.
See infra notes 415-26 and accompanying text (describing how the Technology
and Economic Assessment Panel and the Non-Compliance Procedure perform
this function in the Ozone regime).
204. See infra Parts III.A.2.a.ii & c.ii (analyzing the dispute settlement
process in GATT and WTO).
205. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 67, at 25; Elizabeth S. Anderson &
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3. Type III Strategies-Maintaining Cooperation by
Adjusting Commitment Levels, Payoff Structures, or Other
Institutional Features. Finally, States may adopt Type III
strategies by incorporating institutional mechanisms for
dynamically adjusting commitment levels, payoff struc-
tures, or other institutional features."' Once commitments
are undertaken and an expected payoff structure is in place,
States may find it necessary to do more than reward
compliance or punish noncompliance. The underlying
commitments may need to be relaxed, made more stringent
or changed completely depending on the circumstances.20
1
Particularly where the number or identity of participants is
important or where the expected benefits of cooperation in
future rounds outweigh comparable benefits in a current
round, parties may prefer to forgive a party's non-
compliance and readjust the party's commitments in a
manner that improves the likelihood that it will comply in
Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000).
206. See BROWN WEISS ET AL., supra note 134, at 186 (discussing "living
treaties" and the "devices" "written into a particular treaty" that enable the
treaty to change); Chayes et al., Managing Compliance: A Comparative
Perspective, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 10, at 39, 49 (managerial
model of compliance involves "adjusting the rules to improve regime
performance"); id. at 56-58 (discussing various approaches to adjusting
commitments); Chayes & Chayes, supra note 106, at 184 ("Treaties that last
must be able to adapt to inevitable changes in the economic, technological,
social, and political setting."); id. at 195-97 (discussing the temporal dimension);
Koremenos et al., supra note 94, at 793-94 (recognizing that unforeseen
developments may prompt parties to reconsider or revisit an agreement);
Rosendorff & Milner, supra note 149 (same); Victor et al., Systems for
Implementation Review, in IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 12,
at 47, 49 (explaining how Systems for Implementation Review "contribute to
assessing the adequacy of commitments," and arguing that "[sluch assessments
may lead to the dynamic adjustment (and expansion) of commitments").
International relations scholars describe this strategy in terms of flexibility. See
Koremenos et al., supra note 94, at 793-95; Rosendorff & Milner, supra note
149, at 834 (analyzing the use of escape clauses in trade agreements as a
"flexibility-enhancing device" and noting that escape clauses add flexibility to
an agreement that might be difficult to sustain in the presence of uncertainty).
207. See Helfer, supra note 11, at 1854; Smith, supra note 59. During the
formation stage where parties negotiate over the content of the law, the level of
commitments, and the creation of compliance institutions, the inclusion of a
series of exceptions to substantive commitments serves a similar purpose. See
Sykes, supra note 149, at 281-82, 286-87 (analyzing the economics of GATT
escape clause jurisprudence); Rosendorff & Milner, supra note 149 (modeling
how States design escape clauses).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
the future.2 8 Furthermore, as Alan Sykes has argued
persuasively with respect to the "escape clause" in GATT,
the inclusion of such institutions in an agreement may
facilitate bargaining over substantive commitments in the
formation stage.2"9
Notably, such mechanisms are not always responsive to
concerns over opportunism. States may create institutions
to facilitate the adjustment of commitments (or other
aspects of the agreement) for the purpose of attaining
collective goals without having to reform a new
agreement. Such adjustment may be accomplished
through structured bargaining conventions, as in the case
of ratcheting down tariffs in the GATT/WTO regime,21' or
through institutional mechanisms delegated authority to
adjust commitments in a less formal manner, as in the case
of ratcheting up production and consumption limitations for
ozone-depleting substances.212 Interestingly, as discussed
below, both the GATT/WTO system and the Ozone regime
work toward their respective goals of liberalized trade and
significantly limited consumption of ozone-depleting
substances by successive ratcheting of commitments made
possible through institutional mechanisms. In both cases,
the parties anticipated dynamic change and chose to
208. See infra Part III.B (examples in the Ozone regime); cf Rosendorff &
Milner, supra note 149, at 834 ("In the presence of exogenous shocks,
international institutions may be much better served by allowing countries to
make temporary, ad hoc use of escape clauses that permit them to break the
rules for a short period and pay a cost to do so. There is no retaliation.");
CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 105 (discussing "possible future costs" of
retaliation against a defector).
209. GATT art. XIX (permitting member States to suspend GATT
obligations when increased imports "cause or threaten serious injury to
domestic producers of... competitive products ... to the extent and for such
time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury."). See Sykes, supra
note 149 (analyzing GATT art. XIX); see generally Rosendorff & Milner, supra
note 149 (analyzing the use of escape clauses in trade agreements).
210. Chayes and Chayes refer to these institutions as "the less cumbersome
'nonamendment amendment' devices devised by modern treaty lawyers."
CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 7.
211. See infra Part III.A.2.
212. See infra Part III.B.2; see also sources cited supra note 146 (discussing
voting rules).
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participate in an evolving game rather than a series of
iterated games.2 13
Furthermore, beyond adjusting commitment levels,
States may wish to modify existing institutions or create
new ones as necessary to respond to unforeseen develop-
ments. Of course, States may hesitate to delegate the power
to make such "adjustments" as a general matter, but they
also may hesitate when contemplating the prospect of
repeated multilateral negotiations over institutional
details, particularly in an issue area where States expect a
significant degree of dynamic change and the expected
bargaining costs are high. 14
This part developed a dynamic institutional theory of
international law. The theory extends the traditional game
theory model of iterated games in an attempt to explain the
class of international institutions focused not on deterring
opportunism-intentional, strategic noncompliance-but
rather on sustaining cooperation in the face of dynamic
change. States rationally decide to create institutions to
implement Type II and Type III strategies based on a
realistic conception of the dynamic process of international
cooperation, which the iterated game theory model fails to
capture. The dynamic institutional theory provides a
rational choice bridge between the enforcement and
managerial theories of compliance that arguably removes
the need to choose one school of thought over the other as a
matter of principle and allows the choice of enforcement-
oriented or management-oriented strategies to be context-
driven.21 As this part has necessarily been rather abstract
in setting forth a general theory, the next part applies the
theory and demonstrates its utility for evaluating
compliance system design.
213. Of course, as discussed below, the transition from GATT to WTO
involved a transition from one evolving game to another. See infra Part
III.A.2.B.
214. See sources cited supra notes 161-62.
215. As noted above, the dynamic institutional theory also provides a more
coherent bridge between game theory and regime theory. See supra note 130.
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III. APPLYING THE DYNAMIc INSTITUTIONAL THEORY TO
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
REGIMES
This part applies the dynamic institutional theory set
forth above to two regimes: the GATT/WTO regime within
international trade law, and the "Ozone regime" within
international environmental law. Rather than exhaustively
survey the substance of both fields, the purposes here are to
(1) illustrate the applicability of the theoretic framework for
interdisciplinary analysis of international legal regimes
generally and (2) shed light on the compliance strategies
and institutions involved in these particular regimes.
Analysis of the strategic considerations in international
trade and international environmental regimes provides
important insights into the choices made regarding
compliance strategies.
A. International Trade Law and the GATTI WTO Regime
This section begins by analyzing the interdependency
problem motivating international cooperation in the area of
international trade. This first step is important because the
nature of complex interdependency problems often shapes
the institutions created by States to facilitate cooperative
solutions.216 The section then describes the basic contours of
both the GATT regime and the WTO regime, and analyzes
the relevant compliance strategies and institutions.
Attention is also given to the manner in which the GATT
regime evolved into the WTO regime.
1. The Underlying Interdependency Problem and the
Need for International Cooperation. Since World War II, the
level of economic interdependence among nations has
increased dramatically, and national economies have
216. See Mitchell & Keilbach, supra note 84, at 891-904 (analyzing the
relationship between "situation structure" and institutional design); Raustiala
& Slaughter, supra note 12, at 545 ("[Tlhe nature of the necessary...
institution[s] flows from the nature of the underlying problem: the type and
degree of cooperation that must be achieved."); Snidal, supra note 18
(considering different institutional arrangements that should be expected for
different problems).
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become increasingly dependent on international trade. 17
International trade is understood to be a positive, welfare-
enhancing activity that benefits both importing and
exporting States..2 1 Essentially, the argument in favor of
international trade can be simplified as follows: (1)
competitive markets are generally the most efficient way to
provide private goods to consumers; (2) international trade
simply involves competition between domestic and foreign
firms in domestic markets; (3) government-imposed
restrictions on international trade-whether tariffs,
subsidies, quotas, or regulatory measures-artificially raise
the costs of foreign firms, reduce the scope of entry and
reduce competition; and (4) removing existing restrictions
on international trade makes markets more competitive, is
generally efficient, and is thus economically desirable. 9
It is well-understood that international cooperation on
trade liberalization is needed because of the conflict
217. See, e.g., JACKSON ET AL., supra note 27, at 6-7; Helen V. Milner,
International Trade, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 448, 448-
50 (2002).
218. Liberal economists argue that assuming competitive markets, the
absence of production or consumption externalities, and the absence of
economies of scale, unrestricted international trade maximizes global welfare
for a fixed quantity of resources and technology due to efficient specialization.
See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 9-14 (1990)
[hereinafter JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING]; EDWIN MANSFIELD, ECONOMICS:
PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, DECISIONS 357-58 (7th ed. 1992); PETER H. LINDERT,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 15-39 (9th ed. 1991); YARBROUGH & YARBROUGH,
supra note 166, at 357-58. Even when the aforementioned assumptions are
relaxed, the argument goes, the case for unrestricted international trade
generally remains quite strong because of the dynamicism of markets. As
natural barriers to international trade become less formidable - for example,
when technological advances lead to reductions in transportation and/or
communication costs or when cultural differences are overcome through
increased social interdependency and relationship building - foreign entry into
non-competitive markets may challenge incumbents and lead to the
development of competitive markets over time. Moreover, the possibility of such
a dynamic serves as an incentive to invest in technologies and social relations
that facilitate international trade.
219. Of course, this analysis breaks down at the same points that
traditional arguments in favor of "the market" or against "government
intervention into the market" break down. As the analysis generally goes for
government intervention into domestic markets, the presence of positive or
negative externalities may justify government action aimed at encouraging or
discouraging production or consumption. See generally ROBERT COOTER &
THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 40-41 (2d ed. 1997); W.H. Oakland, Theory
of Public Goods, in 2 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 485, 486 (Auerbach et al.
eds., 1987); OLSON, supra note 99.
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between efficiency gains associated with minimizing
artificial government-made barriers to foreign competition
("liberalization") and the political gains associated with
protecting domestic industry from foreign competition
("protectionism"). Ignoring the transaction and adjustment
costs, trade liberalization can be seen as a positive sum
game. Classic economic theory suggests that States, acting
in their own individual self-interest, would unilaterally
liberalize trade (i.e., adopt a cooperative strategy regardless
of what others do) and make the whole world better off
while doing so.22° The primary explanation for why this
behavior does not occur, and why domestically-
constructed barriers to trade persist, is typically associated
with the distributional consequences of liberalizing trade.
Liberalizing trade provides dispersed benefits, such as
lower prices to consumers, at concentrated costs to domestic
industries that are hurt by competition. Under this view,
the "political economy of trade" biases domestic policy away
from trade liberalization and towards protectionism
because politicians may maximize the sum of social welfare
and campaign contributions (and other personal payoffs),
rather than simply maximize social welfare."
220. See, e.g., Milner, International Trade, in THE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 217, at 448 ("The central theoretical
conclusion of the [economics] field, of course, has been that free trade is the best
policy for most countries most of the time. Thus economists have puzzled over
why, given this finding, countries invariably employ at least some protectionist
policies."); Sykes, supra note 149, at 260-61 (discussing the classical economic
theory of trade policy that "[t]he purported source of net gains to the
international community (and to the importing nation) lies with the eventual
emergence of efficient competitors"). In the presence of adjustment costs,
liberalizing trade may lower social welfare in the short run; thus, States with a
high discount factor seeking to maximize social welfare may decide not to
liberalize trade.
221. See YARBROUGH & YARBROUGH, supra note 166, at 56-61 (explaining
that in the mid-Nineteenth century, Britain adopted a unilateral trade policy of
liberalization but suggesting that such a policy is not viable "[o]nce relation-
specific investments enter the picture."). Cf Milner, International Trade, in THE
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 217, at 448 ("Since the
1970s countries across the globe have adopted freer trade policies. Many lesser
developed countries, like Mexico, India, Poland, Turkey, Ghana and Morocco,
have chosen to unilaterally liberalize their trade policies.").
222. See Milner, International Trade, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, supra note 217, at 448-49. As Yarbrough and Yarbrough explain,
various theories have been developed to explain the trade liberalization-
protectionism paradigm and the conditions under which States adopt certain
policies and institutional arrangements. See YARBROUGH & YARBROUGH, supra
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Economists have also pointed out that, in certain
special cases, strategic trade policy may encourage
protectionist measures as a means to obtain/retain market
dominance in imperfectly competitive, winner-take-all
markets. Consider, for example, the simple illustration
presented by Paul Krugman."-Krugman explains how in a
winner-takes-all game, where the stakes are high, States
may find it in their best interest to subsidize (or otherwise
provide a regulatory benefit to) a domestic producer with a
chance at the stakes. Krugman uses the example of Boeing
and Airbus and suggests that the hypothetical payoff
structure absent government intervention would be as
follows:
(1) If both companies produce a particular plane, each
company receives a payoff of -5.
(2) If neither company produces, each receives a payoff of 0.
(3) If one company produces and the other does not, then
the producer receives a payoff of 100, while the other
receives a payoff of 0.
There is not a unique solution to this game; if one
company was able to decide first, it would choose to produce
note 166, at 7-13. The neoclassical economic explanation of the liberalization-
protectionism paradigm supposes that States balance efficiency gains from
trade against distributional concerns. Id. at 7-9. Business cycle theories suggest
that States will liberalize trade when unemployment is low (or when the
economy is booming), but will revert to protectionism when unemployment is
high (or in times of contraction). Id. at 9-10. Political power theory focuses on
the political power of gainers and losers from liberalized trade. Id. at 10-11.
Hegemony theory focuses on the power of a single powerful nation (a hegemon)
to coerce or entice liberalization. Id. at 12. And there are others. See, e.g.,
Milner, International Trade, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
supra note 217, at 450-53 (discussing various theories). Each theory has its
advantages and disadvantages, but none fully explains the institutional form
that accompanies trade liberalization.
Yarbrough and Yarbrough apply a strategic organizational approach to the
problem of institutional form and argue that the degree to potential
opportunism between trading parties (i.e., the risk of intentional
noncompliance) and the effectiveness of third-party mechanisms for enforcing
commitments influences the institutional form. See YARBROUGH & YARBROUGH,
supra note 166; see also DOWNS & RocKE, supra note 114, at 76-104 (analyzing
how uncertainty about domestic interest group demands affects institutional
design).
223. Paul R. Krugman, Is Free Trade Passd?, 1 ECON. PERSP. 131-44 (1987),
reprinted in JACKSON ET AL., supra note 27, at 24-29.
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and then the other would not. Absent a head start, it is
essentially a race between the companies to commit to
producing in order to discourage the other company from
doing so. Krugman explains through his example how a
subsidy of ten from Europe to Airbus would adjust the
payoff matrix, give Airbus a dominant strategy to produce
(regardless of what Boeing decides, Airbus is better off
producing), and thereby deter Boeing from producing,
provided, of course, that Boeing is made aware of the
altered payoff structure.224 Thus, with government interven-
tion, the following payoffs are expected:
(1) If both companies produce, Airbus receives 5 while
Boeing receives -5.
(2) If neither company produces, each receives 0.
(3) If Airbus produces and Boeing does not, Airbus receives
110 while Boeing receives 0.
(4) If Boeing produces and Airbus does not, Boeing receives
100 while Airbus receives 0.
Thus, for a cost of 10, Europe may help secure the surplus
for domestic industry. Of course, in reality, both Europe.
and the United States are capable of, and have the
incentive to, subsidize their respective producer. Action by
Europe is likely to spur retaliation on the part of the United
States. Much like the race to commit first that the
companies would find themselves in without a head-start,
the States similarly may find themselves in a race to
subsidize, or even a trade war.22 Such a dynamic is
particularly troublesome economically where the game is
iterated and the companies (and host States via
protectionist measures) are competing for a dominant
market position.
224. Cf Suasion game, discussed supra Part II.B.
225. A race to subsidize would involve competition between governments in
"investments" made in a particular industry (or company) to secure a dominant
market position in an international market. Government "investment" may
take many forms, e.g., direct subsidies, tax subsidies, procurement advantages,
etc. To the extent that a domestic market constitutes a major portion of the
international market, a race to subsidize may involve protectionist measures,
e.g., tariff and/or non-tariff barriers. A trade war (narrowly defined) would
involve retaliation (rather than "subsidy competition"), which may be
accomplished through trade sanctions in a separate, unrelated market (e.g.,
automobiles rather than airplanes).
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The importance of this simple strategic trade policy
example is that it illustrates first, a situation in which
protectionist policy may be in the national interest (by
"securing" a surplus for domestic industry with attendant
jobs and tax revenue at a "small" cost), and second,
additional impetus for international cooperation in order to
avoid wasteful "races to subsidize" and potential trade
wars. 226
A third reason why States do not unilaterally tear down
all domestic barriers to international trade is that some
domestic measures that act as barriers, in the sense that
the measures impose "artificial" (government-induced) costs
on foreign firms, are directed at legitimate domestic ends.227
It is well-understood that domestic "intervention" into the
market is (economically and socially) justified where
positive or negative externalities (or other forms of market
failure) are prevalent.228 Basically, where markets fail (e.g.,
to produce public goods), the government is legitimately
226. The simple strategic trade policy example discussed above can be
expanded into a more complex, theoretical argument for government promotion
of particular industries that generate positive externalities and for government
measures aimed at ensuring that the surplus thereby created is captured
domestically. Research and development ("R&D") intensive industries are a
prime example. See, e.g., Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Trade,
Innovation and Growth, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 86, 86-91 (1990); see also Brett
Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of U.S.
Science and Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347, 407-11 (2000) (discussing the
Bayh-Dole Act as a potential U.S. response to foreign free-riding on U.S.
government research investments). In a sense, this strategic trade policy
argument looks very similar to the basic market failure justification discussed
below.
227. See, e.g., Sykes, supra note 73, at 46 ("Regulatory measures can have
protective effects, however, without constituting 'regulatory protectionism' as
defined herein-measures that are nondiscriminatory and are essential to the
attainment of some regulatory objective other than protectionism may burden
foreign firms.").
228. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM.
ECON. REV. PAPERS AND PROC. 347, 348 (1967) (Externality is an ambiguous
concept that includes external costs, external benefits, and non-pecuniary as
well as pecuniary externalities.). Elsewhere, I have argued that the traditional
"government intervention into the market" analysis is incomplete and perhaps
biased towards market-oriented solutions to public goods, governance, and
other social problems. See Brett Frischmann, Privatization and
Commercialization of the Internet Infrastructure: Rethinking Market
Intervention into Government and Government Intervention into the Market, 2
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, (June 8, 2001) at
http://www.stlr.org/cite.cgi?volume=2&article=l (last visited Sept. 18, 2003). I
do not develop that analysis here, however.
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expected to step in and regulate, tax, stimulate, subsidize or
otherwise promote the public welfare.229 The problem in the
international trade context is that, on the one hand,
governments take a wide range of actions aimed at
achieving legitimate regulatory objectives rather than
protectionism, even though the measures may have
protectionist effects by giving competitive advantages to
domestic firms."' On the other hand, governments may
mask protectionist measures under the guise of legitimate
regulatory objectives for political or strategic reasons.131
Perhaps the most difficult situation that arises along these
lines in the international trade context is where a domestic
229. For example, national security is an important public good that on one
hand may justify particular border measures aimed at inspection and
verification of imports and on the other hand may justify particular explicitly
protectionist measures aimed at particular defense-related markets. On
national security exceptions in the GATT and WTO context, see for example,
Dapo Akande and Sope Williams, International Adjudication on National
Security Issues: What Role for the WTO?, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 365 (2003); Rene E.
Browne, Revisiting "National Security" in an Interdependent World: The GATT
Article XXI Defense After Helms-Burton, 86 GEO. L.J. 405 (1997); Wesley A.
Cann, Jr., Creating Standards and Accountability for the Use of the WTO
Security Exception: Reducing the Role of Power-Based Relations and
Establishing a New Balance Between Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 26 YALE
J. INT'L L. 413 (2001).
230. See Sykes, supra note 73, at 3-5.
231. McGinnis and Movsesian aptly describe the problem in the WTO
context as follows:
The WTO's success in lowering tariffs and prohibiting open
discrimination against imports creates pressure for concentrated
interests to adopt a more subtle strategy. Because protectionist groups
cannot successfully lobby their governments for measures that overtly
discriminate against imports, they are likely to make even greater
efforts to lobby for substitute measures that covertly accomplish the
same end. For example, because protecting the environment, health,
and safety is a public good that governments traditionally provide,
measures ostensibly aimed at these objectives furnish a particularly
useful disguise for the imposition of burdens on competing imports.
McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 20, at 549. See also Howard F. Chang, An
Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the Global Environment, 83
GEo. L.J. 2131, 2164-65 (1995) (discussing ways in which countries "may abuse
environmental trade measures for protectionist reasons"); ESTY, supra note 24,
at 45 (noting that there is a "danger that environmental regulatory processes
will be 'captured' by protectionist interests, who will use environmental
standards as a guise for erecting barriers to imports"); McGinnis & Movsesian,
supra note 20, at 516-17, 572-73 (discussing "covert protectionism" problem);
Sykes, supra note 73, at 3-4, 17 (discussing the same problem). But cf Driesen,
supra note 24, at 353-55 (arguing that the concept of protectionism is not very
clear and that disguising protectionism is a myth in the environmental area).
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regulation addresses a valid non-trade concern and is
applied in the same manner to domestic and foreign firms
but imposes a significant burden on foreign firms that is not
felt by domestic firms (for example, where domestic firms
are technologically equipped to meet the burden without
any additional incremental cost while foreign firms are not).
In the end, the "legitimacy" of domestic measures is difficult
to define, much less measure, because it hinges on the
motives and objectives of sovereign States.232
In framing the trade liberalization game and
delineating the underlying problem and potential solutions,
it is important to recognize the difficulty that arises in
distinguishing between legitimate restrictions and
illegitimate (intentionally protectionist) restrictions.23 It is
also important to note that the existence of this difficulty is
one further reason for international cooperation on trade
liberalization.234  Unilateralism leaves it to States to
individually assess the "legitimacy" of other States'
domestic programs and to decide whether to retaliate
through similar measures or other means (e.g., unilateral
trade sanctions). International cooperation through a legal
and institutional framework provides both a set of
principles and a forum for assessing legitimacy collectively.
Such cooperation may take place within the trade regime,
other international regimes, or both. The GATT/WTO
regime provides what might be considered, depending on
one's perspective, default principles and a forum for
assessing the legitimacy of various trade-inhibiting
measures.
Although envisioning the "trade liberalization game"
through classic economic theory tends to evoke images of a
Harmony game where each State has a dominant strategy
to cooperate by liberalizing trade with every other State,
the political benefits of "defecting" by maintaining or
creating barriers to protect domestic industries may
transform the game into a Prisoners' Dilemma (or in some
instances another mixed-motive game). 35 In the first
232. See, e.g., McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 20; Sykes, supra note 73.
233. See discussion of non-tariff barriers infra Part III.A.2.b.
234. Hereinafter "liberalization" will refer to the removal of illegitimate
restrictions on international trade.
235. In some cases, "trade liberalization" very well may be a "disguised"
Harmony game. Like the police officers that misrepresent the payoff structure
(i.e., the consequences of their actions) to the prisoners, domestic lobbyists and
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instance, trade liberalization is seen as a two-player game
because trade barriers, such as tariffs and quotas, tend to
be bilateral when actually applied (i.e., the barrier directly
affects a foreign firm). In addressing the problem of trade
liberalization, States have entered into bilateral, regional
and multilateral agreements, linking and integrating two
player games. The Most-Favoured Nation principle ("MFN")
of the GATT/WTO regime has effectively made
international trade a multiplayer game for its members.
The payoff structures across sets of countries vary
considerably and are not amenable to simple
generalization. It is worth noting, however, that beyond the
internal (or domestic) distributional consequences of
liberalizing trade, the magnitude of payoffs derived from
cooperating to liberalize international trade varies
considerably based on differences in, inter alia, the size and
economic development of potential cooperators, and the
existing level and types of restrictions. For example,
gaining access to U.S. markets on better terms may be
considerably more valuable than gaining equally liberal
access to the markets of a smaller or less-developed
country.236 Moreover, as evidenced by the formation of
various bilateral, trilateral, regional and other coalitions,
the identity of participants in a particular trade
liberalization game is an important factor because of the
complex economic interdependencies across different sets of
countries.237 Finally, States expect to play the game
special interests may distort decision-makers' perceptions of the payoff
structure. See supra note 84. In other words, if politicians sought to maximize
social welfare rather than the sum of social welfare and campaign contributions
(or other special interest-related payoffs), liberalization might be a dominant
strategy, at least for some States.
236. Interestingly, trade negotiations proceed on the basis of exchanging
liberalization concessions (e.g., reductions in a particular tariff) where the
benefits are seen as increased access to a foreign market for particular domestic
industries. Thus, looking at the payoff structure, these concessions may be seen
as political benefits that offset the political gains from defection. See Kyle
Bagwell et al., It's a Question of Market Access, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 56 (2002);
Sykes, supra note 73, at 24-25. The more diffuse national welfare benefits of
cooperating almost seem incidental. See id.; cf Sykes, supra note 149, at 255
(observing that while the "GATT can largely be justified by sound arguments
about the public interest in a liberal trading order, it is best understood with
the aid of public choice theory").
237. The economic interdependencies themselves arise not simply from
government policies but also from, inter alia, social and cultural
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indefinitely (cessation of trade relations altogether is not
generally foreseeable) .
2. The GATT/WTO Regime. The most important
institutional arrangement of the post-World War II trading
system is the GATT/WTO. The GATT/WTO regime is a
multilateral regime that originated with the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"),239 evolved
through many trade rounds, and culminated with the
creation of the WTO. 24 ° The analysis below focuses primarily
on the manner in which the regime has evolved with
respect to substantive obligations, principles, commitments,
and compliance institutions.
a. The GATT Regime. The GATT was established
shortly after World War II. 21 The Parties agreed to a multi-
lateral cooperative effort generally aimed at liberalizing
trade through a series of tariff reductions. Four principles
constitute the most important (although by no means
exclusive) substantive obligations between Parties. The core
principle of the GATT system, set forth in article II, is that
Parties will not charge a tariff for a particular product
above the level agreed to and set forth in the tariff
schedules. To be clear, tariffs themselves are legal, and
Parties may charge whatever tariff they like for products
interdependencies. Such complexities are, however, beyond the scope of this
article.
238. See, e.g., Sykes, supra note 149, at 279 ("GATT is not a 'single-play'
game.").
239. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. All,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1948). "Parties" or "contracting
parties" refers to those nations that have acceded to (1) the GATT under the
Protocol of Provisional Application; (2) a Special Protocol (Chile, Sept. 1948); or
(3) respective Protocols of Accession. Notably, the 1947 GATT has been
superceded by the 1994 GATT and is no longer in effect, although GATT
commitments continued or were enhanced in the 1994 GATT. The 1994 GATT
is essentially the same as the 1947 GATT, although some modifications were
made during the Uruguay Round. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 1A, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994)
(incorporating the 1947 GATT into the WTO). Nonetheless, because the focus of
this article is the evolving GATT/WTO regime, the article generally uses the
GATT to refer to the operative agreement at a given time and distinguishes
between the two agreements only where necessary.
240. For background on the evolution of the GATT/WTO regime, see
JACKSON, supra note 49; JACKSON ET AL., supra note 27, at 208-45.
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not listed in the schedules. But once a "tariff binding" has
been negotiated for a particular product, Parties are bound
to charge at or below that level.242 This simple obligation
provides the institutional foundation for gradually
"ratcheting" down artificial barriers to trade through
negotiations and reciprocal commitments. Furthermore, it
is relatively easy obligation to police for compliance
purposes. First, the obligation itself is rather clear and not
open for renegotiation24 or broad interpretation, and the
tariff schedules themselves provide a precise, detailed,
quantitative baseline for gauging compliance. Second, with
respect to detecting noncompliance, "governments and
international organizations collect mountains of trade
statistics; tariff lists are publicly available; and the
possibility of tracing goods through customs exists."2"
A second principle, set forth in Article I, is General
MFN Treatment. This nondiscrimination principle, which
"has long been a cornerstone of international trade law,"
245
241. On the evolution of the GATT regime, see generally JACKSON,
RESTRUCTERING, supra note 218, at 9-17; JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND
THE LAW OF GATT (1969) [hereinafter JACKSON, WORLD TRADE]; JACKSON ET AL.,
supra note 27, at 208-45. When negotiated, GATT was intended to be "a
subsidiary agreement" under the charter of a broad international organization
called the "International Trade Organization" ("ITO"). See, e.g., JACKSON,
RESTRUCTERING, supra note 218, at 9-17; JACKSON ET AL., supra note 27, at 212-
14. The GATT was provisionally adopted through a "Protocol of Provisional
Application" under the assumption that the Protocol would "fall by the wayside"
when the ITO Charter entered into force. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 27, at
213; see also Shell, supra note 59, at 840-41 ("The provisional nature of GATT's
early history shaped its dispute resolution processes, which began as a
diplomatic system of dispute settlement and gradually evolved into a rule-
oriented but formally nonbinding arbitration scheme."). However, the U.S.
Senate ultimately rejected the ITO Charter, and it instead fell to the wayside,
leaving the GATT in effect. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 27, at 213. On the long,
"troubled history" of the GATT, see generally id. at 211-18.
242. Paragraph 1(a) of Article II of the GATT specifically provides: "Each
contracting party shall accord to the commerce of the other contracting parties
treatment no less favourable than that provided for in the appropriate Part of
the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement." See GATT art. II, para.
1(a).
243. The bindings themselves are subject to renegotiation, but the core
obligation not to charge a tariff above the relevant binding is not.
244. YARBROUGH & YARBROUGH, supra note 166, at 35.
245. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Institutional Misfits: The GATT, the ICJ & Trade-
Environment Disputes, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1043, 1049, n.15 (noting that MFN
clauses have been included in trade agreements since the twelfth century)
(citing STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., THE MOST-
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requires that each Party grant to every other Party
treatment with respect to any imports and exports no less
favorable than it grants to any other nation. Thus, MFN
ensures that any trading advantages given by one Party to
another nation, whether a Party or not, will also be given to
each Party. In essence, this principle "multilateralizes" the
trade liberalization game (at least with respect to
obligations and negotiations) and provides a significant
incentive for non-members to join.246
A third principle, set forth in Article III, is National
Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation. This
nondiscrimination principle requires that with respect to
internal taxation and regulatory measures, each Party treat
imports from other Parties no less favorably than
domestically produced goods. Finally, a fourth principle, set
forth in Article XI, is that "No prohibitions or restrictions
other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made
effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other
measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any
contracting party on the importation of any product of the
territory of any other contracting party or on the
exportation or sale for export of any product destined for
the territory of any other contracting party., 247 In essence,
these latter two principles, along with a number of other
GATT clauses limiting government actions affecting
imports and exports, are aimed at restricting measures that
could be substituted for tariffs as protectionist tools and at
protecting the potential benefits of binding and then
reducing tariffs."48 While the GATT treaty system is
extremely complex, incorporating hundreds of agreements,
and protocols, incredibly detailed schedules of tariff
bindings and many important exceptions,4 9 these four
FAVORED-NATION CLAUSE PROVISION, EXECUTIVE BRANCH GATT STUDY No. 9
(Comm. Print 1974)).
246. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE, supra note 241, at 258 (discussing MFN status
as an incentive to join GATT).
247. GATT art. XI, para. 2. Notably, this principle is subject to significant
exceptions; for example, the use of quotas to maintain agricultural price support
schemes is permissible. See id. While the exceptions are an extremely important
aspect of the GATT and its evolution as sources of friction, bargaining power,
and demand for side-agreements, analysis of the exceptions is beyond the scope
of this article.
248. See Sykes, supra note 73, at 14-17.
249. See, e.g., GATT art. XIX (escape clause allowing temporary use of
import restraints when imports cause serious injury to domestic industry); id.
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principles create the basic institutional framework for
multilateral trade liberalization through reciprocal tariff
concessions. By most accounts, the framework has been
extremely successful in reducing or eliminating tariffs,
quotas, and other traditional instruments of protection-
ism.
250
i. GATT Compliance Institutions. The GATT itself did
not set forth a comprehensive, integrated compliance
system.25' It imposed reporting and publication obligations
on Parties.252 In addition to formal obligations, a substantial
amount of information is available regarding trade:
Governments and international organizations collect
"mountains" of trade information,253 and, most importantly,
the experience of importers and exporters naturally exposes
barriers to trade. 4
The GATT compliance system generally relied on the
parties to initiate and participate in dispute settlement
procedures beginning with consultations and shifting into
GATT art. XX (health and safety regulation); GATT art. XXI (national security);
GATT art. XXIV (allowing customs unions and free trade areas); GATT art.
XXV (waiver authority); GATT art. XXVIII (authorizing renegotiation of tariff
bindings).
250. See Alan 0. Sykes, Domestic Regulation, Sovereignty, and Scientific
Evidence Requirements: A Pessimistic View, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 353, 353 (2002).
251. On the GATT dispute settlement system, see Shell, supra note 59, at
840-42.
252. For example, Article XVI states:
If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy, including
any form of income or price support, which operates directly or
indirectly to increase exports of any product from, or to reduce imports
of any product into, its territory, it shall notify the contracting parties
in writing of the extent and nature of the subsidization, of the
estimated effect of the subsidization on the quantity of the affected
product or products imported into or exported from its territory and of
the circumstances making the subsidization necessary.
GATT art. XVI. Likewise, Article X states that virtually all "[I]aws, regulations,
judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application pertaining
to [imports and exports] shall be published promptly in such a manner as to
enable governments and traders to become acquainted with them." GATT art.
X. On the role of notice, reporting and publication requirements in unveiling
regulatory protectionism, see Sykes, supra note 73, at 18-23.
253. YARBROUGH & YARBROUGH, supra note 166, at 35.
254. Cf Susan K. Sell, TRIPs and the Access to Medicines Campaign, 20
WIs. INT'L L.J. 481, 491-92, 517-18 (2002) (discussing how industry actors
remain "vigilant in monitoring implementation [ofl and compliance" with
TRIPs).
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arbitration if necessary.255 The major dispute settlement
provision in the GATT was Article XXIII, although other
compliance-oriented clauses permeate the treaty text-for
example, numerous clauses in the GATT require consulta-
tion between parties, permit compensatory withdrawal or
suspension of concessions, and delineate exceptions.256
Article XXIII requires parties to consult first and in the
event that consultations are unsuccessful, "the matter may
be referred to the Contracting Parties., 25 7  "If the
Contracting Parties consider that the circumstances are
serious enough.. .they may authorize a contracting party
or parties to suspend the application to any other
contracting party or parties of such obligations or
concessions under this Agreement as they determine to be
appropriate in the circumstances." ' Article XXIII does not
set forth comprehensive procedures for determining when
''circumstances are serious enough to justify such action," or
what actions would "be appropriate in the circumstances." '59
Rather, the dispute settlement procedures (in contrast with
the substantive rules) evolved over time into a detailed
practice where a panel of arbitrators preside over the
dispute and issue a report recommended for adoption by the
Parties.60
Two important aspects of the GATT dispute settlement
process significantly limited its effectiveness. First, panel
reports (i.e., final decisions of an arbitration panel) were not
255. See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO
122-23 (2000) [hereinafter JACKSON, JURISPRUDENCE].
256. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADE, supra note 241, at 163-89; JACKSON,
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 255, at 119-20.
257. GATT art. XXIII, para. (2).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See, e.g., JACKSON ET AL., supra note 27, at 257; JACKSON,
RESTRUCTERING, supra note 218, at 56-66. The procedures used were codified in
the 1979 Tokyo Round Understanding and subsequently modified through
various understandings, interpretations and declarations. See Understanding
Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance,
Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 210-14 (1980); 1982 Ministerial
Declaration on Dispute Settlement Procedures, Nov. 19, 1982, GATT B.I.S.D.
(29th Supp.) at 13-16 (1983); 1984 Action on Dispute Settlement Procedures,
Nov. 30, 1984, GATT B.I.S.D. (31st Supp.) at 9-10 (1985); 1989 Improvements to
the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures, Apr. 12, 1989, GATT
B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 61-67 (1989); see also ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL
SYSTEM (1993).
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adopted by the Parties and thus made "binding" on the
participants unless the Parties reached a consensus.261 The
obvious, debilitating result of this rule was that the losing
party could block adoption of the report.262 This veto power
restricted the dispute settlement institution's deterrent
effect because a party contemplating noncompliance as a
strategic decision would know ex ante that it could rely on
the veto power to avoid a formal finding of noncompliance.
Second, even if a report established, for example, that
one party's breach had caused another party's nullification
or impairment and the Parties adopted the report, the effect
of the report was limited.263 Specifically, the report would
establish the existence of a violation (or situation leading to
nullification or impairment) and would require the
offending party to bring itself into compliance. As one
author notes,
[t]he recommendations offered by panels under the GATT dispute
settlement system sought, first and foremost, cessation of the
violation and performance of the primary rule. In cases where the
panel found a violation of a substantive provision, it recommended
that the respondent cease in its violation by withdrawing the
offending measure.
26 4
In the event that the offending party failed to do so and
the disputants failed to negotiate a compromise solution,
the Parties could authorize (again by consensus) the injured
State to utilize trade measures to accomplish adequate
261. See, e.g., JACKSON, WORLD TRADE, supra note 241, at 163-89; JACKSON,
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 255, at 123.
262. Professor Hudec conducted a study of the actions of "losing" parties
from 1947 to 1992 and concluded that the losing party eventually accepted the
results of an adverse panel report in approximately ninety percent of the cases.
See HUDEC, supra note 260, at 278.
263. There certainly were other deficiencies with the dispute settlement
system created by and developed under the GATT. For example, there was no
procedure for appellate review of panel reports. Of course, given the fact that
panel reports have no precedential value and the existence of the consensus
rule, it is not clear that an appellate body would have been at all useful.
Nonetheless, an appellate body has been a crucial element in the successful
development of the WTO dispute settlement system. See infra Part III.A.2.c.i.
264. Grane, supra note 46, at 759.
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compensation or retaliation 265 on a prospective basis to offset
future harms from continued noncompliance.266 An injured
265. In the GATT/WTO context, there is a technical, legal distinction
between "compensation" and "retaliation." See DSU art. 22; 2 RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 901 (1987); see
also BROWNLIE, supra note 71, at 199-240 (examining in detail the "forms and
functions of reparation," i.e., the various remedies for "breaches of duty," under
customary international law). A simplified explanation of this distinction is as
follows: Compensation refers to trade measures implemented by the
noncompliant party, such as a reduction in existing tariffs, essentially aimed at
offsetting the externalized costs associated with its unlawful action; retaliation
refers to trade measures implemented by the injured party, such as the
suspension of existing concessions, essentially aimed at offsetting the
externalized costs associated with the noncompliant party's unlawful action.
Significant complications arise when one analyzes the appropriate aim of such
measures under the rules of the dispute settlement system. For example, it is
not clear whether compensation or retaliation is limited to some specific
measure of externalized cost (e.g., trade effects) or may be broadened to offset
more completely the benefits gained by the noncompliant party. The first
measure would appear to permit efficient breaches while the latter would not.
This issue is beyond the scope of this article, however, and accordingly is left for
future work. On the issue of whether the WTO system permits efficient
breaches, see Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 11. See also ETHIER, supra note 45,
at 5 (Each "country will also be aware, ex ante, that it might find, ex post, itself
in a position where it would [be costly not to comply with its obligations]. This is
the reciprocal-conflict problem: Each country knows that it might turn out to
be either the accuser or the accused. Thus it is in no country's interest, ex ante,
to agree that, ex post, either the accuser should be unconstrained in its ability to
punish or the accused should be unconstrained in its ability to proceed without
punishment. This generates a role for a dispute settlement mechanism.").
266. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 27, at 311-12 (emphasizing that the
remedies available under the WTO DSU are determined on a prospective basis)
(excerpt from WILLIAM J. DAVEY, WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (2001)); Monika
Bitler & Heinz Hauser, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: A First
Assessment From an Economic Perspective, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 503, 518
(2000) ("Recall that the trade value of the retaliation measures must not exceed
the trade value of incurred losses and the complainant gets no retroactive
remedy."); Grane, supra note 46, at 755-72 (providing a thorough analysis of
remedies available under GATT and WTO). On the law of remedies for breaches
of international law, see generally Shelton, supra note 46, at 855. In a handful
of subsidy and countervailing duties cases, however, a panel has recommended
retroactive compensation. See Grane, supra note 46 (analyzing cases). For
example, in New Zealand-Imports of Electrical Transformers from Finland,
the Parties recommended a refund of antidumping duties that were
inappropriately collected, but the U.S. blocked adoption of the report. See July
18, 1985, GATT B.I.S.D. (32d Supp) at 55-70 (1986). The U.S. later argued that
the recommendation was "of an extraordinary retroactive and specific nature."
JACKSON ET AL., supra note 27, at 309 (quoting GATT Activities 1992, at 40).
More recently, in Australia-Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of
Automotive Leather, a panel recommended that an export subsidy that was
deemed WTO-inconsistent could only be "withdrawn" by "full repayment." See
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party was not authorized to seek compensation for past
harms26 7 or to implement punitive measures.
261
This limitation severely constrained the effectiveness of
the institution from an enforcement- or deterrence-oriented
compliance perspective.269 The threat of sanction could not
adequately alter the expected payoffs for noncompliance
from an ex ante perspective, where a nation was deciding
whether to defect on the basis of the expected payoffs.
Suppose a State was deciding whether to implement a
protectionist government measure in conflict with a
particular GATT obligation. The expected benefits of
noncompliance would depend primarily on the length of
JACKSON ET AL., supra note 27, at 309 n.3 (noting that: (1) the panel report was
"quite controversial and heavily criticized at the DSB meeting and (2) there was
no appeal because the parties had previously agreed that neither side would
appeal) (citing Australia-Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of
Automotive Leather, WT/DS126/RW (adopted by the DSB on Feb. 11, 2000)).
267. For the purposes of this article, "compensation" generally is used in the
ordinary economic sense to refer to the transfer of payoffs from the
noncompliant party to the injured party in an amount equivalent to the costs
imposed upon the injured party. Compare the discussion of remedies, including
compensation, in general international law. See 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 901 (1987); BROWNLIE, supra
note 71, at 222-27; Shelton, supra note 46. An important distinction developed
in this article is between prospectively compensatory and retroactively
compensatory transfers. Retroactive compensation requires a transfer of
benefits from the noncompliant party to the injured party in an amount
equivalent to the costs imposed upon the injured party in the past (i.e., prior to
the dispute settlement ruling). Prospective compensation, on the other hand,
requires a transfer of benefits from the noncompliant party to the injured party
in an amount equivalent to the costs to be imposed upon the injured party in
the future if the noncompliant party remains in noncompliance. The distinction
between these two remedies is important when one considers the incentive
effects of each.
268. Notably, the text of Article XXIII does not expressly preclude
retroactive compensation or punitive sanctions, but GATT practice generally
rejects such measures. See Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures
in the WTO: Rules are Rules-Toward a More Collective Approach, 94 AM. J.
INT'L L. 335, 337-38 (2000).
269. As described below, the institution primarily served management-
oriented functions. Enforcement- or deterrence-oriented functions were
accomplished primarily through reputation and unilateral retaliation. See
Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 11, at 179; Downs et al., supra note 42, at 395
(suggesting that GATT dispute resolution did not play an overwhelming role in
promoting compliance: "far more successful have been the rounds of
multilateral negotiations that have operated over time [at ensuring] that
certain categories of disputes would reappear less often," but arguing that
unilaterally driven enforcement played an "important, if controversial, role in
the operation and evolution of the GATT").
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time (or number of iterations) that the State could maintain
noncompliance without surrendering payoffs thereby
obtained if caught.27' Because the GATT system first
provided a noncompliant State with the opportunity to
bring itself into compliance with no penalty, other than
collateral consequences such as a loss of goodwill or
reputation and unilateral retaliation, 271 and second would
withhold benefits only on a prospectively compensatory
basis, a State intending to act opportunistically would
weigh the expected benefits of defection only against
collateral costs that could occur upon detection.272 Of course,
the collateral costs might be quite high in some cases and
for some nations.273 The point here is simply to recognize
and emphasize the important, yet unappreciated and
270. Cf Butler & Hauser, supra note 266, at 517-18 (modeling the
"implementation stage" that occurs after a negative panel or appellate body
ruling and analyzing the strategies of the parties under a similar payoff
structure).
271. Of course, these collateral consequences could be quite significant and
act as an important deterrent to noncompliance in a vast number of scenarios.
See Guzman, supra note 10, at 1847-51 (modeling the manner in which
reputation can affect compliance decisions); Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 11,
at 193-99, 200-01 (arguing that: (1) formal sanctions were unimportant in
encouraging compliance with the GATT; (2) "the incidence of flagrant cheating
under the GATT system was indeed quite low;" and (3) "the domestic costs of
violations, reputational sanctions for noncompliance, and unilateral retaliation
against violators" explain why parties generally complied with their GATT
obligations). But cf Jack Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations
Theory, and International Law, 52 STAN. L. REV. 959, 985 (2000) (asserting that
"reputation... is a weaker force with nations than with individuals. For
example, a reputation for compliance with international norms is not the best
means-and certainly not the only means-for a national ruler to accomplish
foreign policy objectives.") (book review); Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 59, at
1135-39 (examining the role of reputation in explaining compliance with
customary international law norms); Robert 0. Keohane, International
Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 487, 496-99
(1997) (analyzing "problem [s] with reputation as a guarantor of compliance").
272. According to Butler and Hauser:
[Tihe preventative power of the WTO dispute settlement system is too
limited to discourage new trade restrictions. Even if the probability of
winning a case is slim, countries have an incentive to introduce trade
restrictions, as rents continue to accrue during the litigation process,
and sanctions or compensations for past damages do not exist.
Butler & Hauser, supra note 266, at 526 ; see also id. at 518 (reaching the same
conclusion with respect to parties' behavior after a negative ruling by a panel or
the appellate body).
273. See Downs et al., supra note 43, at 397; Schwartz & Sykes, supra note
11, at 179.
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overlooked, limitations of the compliance institution as a
deterrent to intentional noncompliance. As discussed below,
the same institutional limitations persist in the WTO
regime, and yet most experts fail to appreciate these
limitations and view the WTO dispute settlement
institution as a hard-edged, enforcement-oriented institu-
tion.274
ii. GATT Compliance Strategies. On its face, the
compliance strategy undergirding the GATT dispute
settlement system appears to have been a Type I strategy
aimed at the payoff structure, in the sense that it relied on
an adjudicative dispute settlement process that authorized
an injured party to prospectively withhold benefits that
would otherwise flow to the other party.27 To the extent
that one focuses on the GATT dispute settlement
institution's capability to effectuate alterations in the ex
ante incentives to defect, however, the institution appears
weak. Besides the difficulty created by the consensus rule,
the inability to seek compensation for past harm (much less
punitive retribution) severely limited the effectiveness of
the institution in deterring intentional noncompliance
through alterations in the expected payoff structure.
The most obvious and prevalent reason offered by
scholars to explain why the GATT system did not expressly
authorize retroactively compensatory or punitive measures
(or evolve in a manner that authorized such measures) is
rooted in sovereignty concerns and the view that the GATT
dispute settlement system was primarily a political
institution rather than a judicial one.277 This view is
undoubtedly accurate, but it is not complete.
274. See infra Part III.A.2.c.
275. See supra notes 265-74 and accompanying text (discussing the nature
of remedies available under the GATT).
276. As Schwartz and Sykes point out, deterrence may not have been a
necessary function for the dispute settlement process because unilateral
sanctions and reputation sufficiently deterred intentional noncompliance. See
Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 11, at 193-99, 200-01 (arguing that: (1) formal
sanctions were unimportant in encouraging compliance with the GATT; (2) "the
incidence of flagrant cheating under the GATT system was indeed quite low;"
and (3) "the domestic costs of violations, reputational sanctions for
noncompliance, and unilateral retaliation against violators" explain why parties
generally complied with their GATT obligations).
277. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 50, at 109-11; YANG, supra note 10, at 80
("The cost of sanctions is also of special concern because states are sovereigns. If
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Perhaps another reason is that disputes generally did
not concern intentional noncompliance,278  which would
warrant such measures from the perspective of deterrence,
but rather concerned either real disputes over the scope and
interpretation of the rules or capacity problems, either of
which would not warrant such measures from the
perspective of deterrence because noncompliance would not
an enforcement mechanism is effective .... [t]he result is the effective loss or
diminishment of sovereignty and autonomy of action by the target state.").
Yang also asserts that:
... [Tihe effective loss of autonomy and power is a cost that does not
affect each prospective treaty party equally. Effective enforcement
mechanisms restrict state autonomy to a common denominator with
regard to matters covered by the treaty-the norm, obligation or
restriction set out by the treaty. The result is to restrict the powerful,
those who had more autonomy, control, and options to begin with,
much more than others. As a result, the effects of the loss of autonomy
and power are strongly asymmetrical. The asymmetry suggests that
the most powerful nations, those which thus stand to lose the most
from effective enforcement mechanisms, are least likely to support
them.
Id. at 81. Related to the sovereignty/political institution explanation is the
argument that States face a reciprocal-conflict problem, described above. See
ETHIER, supra note 45. Downs and Rocke explain in detail how uncertainty
about domestic interest group demands (and the attendant demand to defect)
leads to a weak enforcement rule. See DowNs & RocKE, supra note 114, at 76-
104. The fact that the dispute settlement system may not be geared properly for
enforcement-oriented purposes, such as deterring intentional noncompliance,
suggests that the institutions serves other important purposes. Cf Raustiala
and Slaughter's assertion that
[R]ecent work by IR scholars, often using statistical analyses of
GATT/WTO disputes, indicates a more mixed story about the influence
of GATT enforcement that substantially alters ... the [managerial-
enforcement] debate... Busch and Reinhardt, building on Hudec's
pioneering work, [found a low level of compliance with GATT panel
rulings.] This low level of compliance does not, however, indicate that
the GATT dispute process was ineffective. Rather, the major effect of
the dispute process seemed to precede the issuance of a ruling.
Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 12, at 549 (citations omitted).
278. See Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 11, at 193-99, 200-01, quoted supra
note 276. But cf. Verdier, supra note 1, at 854 ("[Mlost breaches of international
law are intentional," and ... [iut is because of the intentional nature of breaches
that the law of state responsibility deals with facilitating the efficient operation
of unilateral retaliative strategies aimed at preventing opportunistic
defection."). Perhaps, for political or other reasons, the system was designed
with a presumption that disputes would not originate from intentionally
noncompliant actions by parties and that a formal finding of noncompliance
would be necessary to establish notice and awareness on the part of the
noncompliant State. This view comports with the premises of the managerial
theory of compliance. See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
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be the result of a party's lack of intent to comply.279 Of
course, once an adopted panel report established the
existence of a violation, parties could work out a cooperative
solution if a capacity problem existed; thereafter, continued
noncompliance would likely be a problem of intent and thus
properly sanctioned on either a compensatory or even
punitive basis. In the end, it appears that the institution
was not directed primarily at deterring intentional
noncompliance, except on an ongoing basis after the
noncompliance had been identified and adjudicated.
It seems more appropriate to analyze the effectiveness
of the dispute settlement institution with respect to Type II
and Type III compliance strategies, which respectively
concern developing institutional mechanisms for reducing
transaction costs and uncertainties that inhibit cooperation
and for dynamically altering commitments as the regime
evolves. With respect to Type II, the consultations and
dispute settlement process may alleviate uncertainty with
respect to the interpretation and proper application of the
rules and the scope of the Parties' obligations in particular-
ized factual contexts.28 ° To the extent that disputes between
parties did not originate from intentional noncompliance
but rather from an actual dispute over the rules or
obligations, or from a capacity problem, the process would
provide significant benefits to the disputants as well as the
GATT regime as a whole. The fact that the settlement rate
prior to a panel ruling was high and that most panel
reports were eventually adopted by the losing party
provides support for this conclusion.281
With respect to Type III (dynamic readjustment of
commitments), when the offending party did not implement
an adopted panel report, the injured party might be
279. According to Schwartz and Sykes:
[M]any (although not all) of the disputes that arise involve good-faith
clashes over ambiguous terms of the bargain. In these circumstances,
countries are often genuinely uncertain about what they are obliged to
do, and sanctions may have the effect of punishing them for good-faith
behavior. Not only is there little deterrence value to such punishment,
but it may prove somewhat destabilizing to the trading system and
provide further political ammunition to those who would scuttle it on
the basis of sovereignty claims and the like.
Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 11, at 201.
280. Id. (discussing dispute settlement ruling as "constructive gap fillers");
see supra Part II.F.2 (discussing Type II strategy).
281. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 27.
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authorized to readjust its commitments relative to the other
party. Readjustment could take the form of renegotiated
commitments set forth in a settlement package or of
prospective rebalancing based on the remedies made
available to the complainant."' The prospective nature of
such readjustment suggests that it is not responsive to
intentional defection (i.e., a strategic decision by one party
to defect rather than cooperate) and would not operate as a
deterrent to opportunistic strategies.
b. Evolution of the GATT Regime. In addition to setting
forth the basic principles for liberalizing trade through
reciprocal tariff concessions and the dispute settlement
process, the GATT served as a structured negotiating
forum, most importantly, in a series of trade negotiating
rounds.283  Notably, the first six rounds focused on
negotiating tariff reductions. By the seventh round, the
Tokyo Round, the parties recognized that non-tariff barriers
("NTBs") needed to be addressed and that the existing
broad principles set forth in the GATT were insufficient.
In addition to protocols regarding tariff reductions, the
Tokyo Round led to the completion of special, side-
agreements or "codes" that essentially operated as
independent treaties by binding signatories and creating
independent obligations and compliance mechanisms. The
side-agreements addressed a wide range of issue-areas not
directly touched on by the GATT, such as technical barriers
to trade and government procurement.
The creation of side-agreements illustrates the
dynamicism (or reframing and reforming) of cooperation in
a series of iterated games (see Figure 4 supra). After
identifying an interdependency problem and crafting a
cooperative solution through an international agreement,
parties may need to return to the framing stage and
reframe particular aspects of the problem that are not
282. Cf. Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 11, at 186-87 (considering both the
dispute settlement process and Article XXVIII, which establishes procedures for
readjustment of commitments, as institutions designed to facilitate efficient
breaches).
283. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 27, at 227 (describing the rounds).
284. See Milner, International Trade, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, supra note 217, at 449 (discussing the problem of NTBs).
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adequately addressed under the existing arrangement.2 5
Specifically, the inadequacy of the GATT (in terms of
applying, interpreting, and enforcing existing obligations
relating to NTBs) was exposed in part as a result of its
success in reducing tariffs and in part as a result of its
inability to adapt internally.286
[B]y the 1970s, it became clear that tariffs were not likely to be the
main problem for trade liberalization. As tariffs decreased
(especially for industrial goods imported to industrialized
countries), many special sector interests began to seek other ways
to reduce competition from imports, turning to "non-tariff barriers"
(NTBs). These are myriad, and many are the types of things for
which human ingenuity can perpetually develop new devices. Most
such barriers are internal measures and not border measures, and
therefore are often most relevant to the national treatment clause
of GATT Article III.
In this respect, the GATT was essentially forced to address nation-
States' internal economic regulatory measures, or run the risk of
becoming almost totally irrelevant to the need for international
cooperative mechanisms to resolve thousands of international
tensions and problems related to trade, or to keep some movement
toward trade liberalization.28 7
While Article III applies to NTBs on its face, enforcing that
obligation through the dispute settlement mechanism was
difficult. While a common law-like evolution of the GATT
285. Linkage to "non-trade" areas, such as the environment or labor, is a
more complex dynamic that is not considered here. On the linkage issue, see
generally Symposium, The Boundaries of the WTO, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 118
(2002).
286. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 20, at 549-50 (discussing the
problem of "covert protectionism," and arguing that due to the "large-scale
reductions in global tariffs," the problem will be "increasingly important for the
WTO").
287. John H. Jackson, Afterword: The Linkage Problem-Comments on five
Texts, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 118, 121 (2002). See, e.g., John H. Jackson, The Birth of
the GATT-MTN System: A Constitutional Appraisal, 12 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
21 (1980), reprinted in part in JACKSON, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 255, at 38
n.30 ("As tariffs decline, various nontariff measures become relatively more
important in their impact on the restriction or distortion of world trade flows.");
Milner, International Trade, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
supra note 217, at 449 (noting that NTBs "have proliferated, in part countering
the decline in tariffs" and that while "the Uruguay Round slowed or reversed
this,... NTBs still make up an important arsenal of barriers to trade").
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principles, particularly Article III, to address NTBs was
theoretically possible (even though dispute settlement
reports were not formally subject to the doctrine of stare
decisis), such an approach did not prove to be practically
feasible. Evolution through amendment was even less
feasible because an amendment would not be binding on a
particular Party unless that Party accepted the
amendment."'
As Jackson and his colleagues explain, the near
impossibility of amending the GATT was a major "birth
defect:"
[The] delay required by the treaty acceptance process, the shift in
bargaining power involved under the amending procedure in the
context of a large membership and the fact that even when an
amendment is effective it will not apply to countries which do not
accept it, are all reasons why the amending procedure had fallen
into disuse ... caus[ing] a certain rigidity and inability to develop
rules to accommodate the many new developments in
international trade and other economic interdependence
289
subjects.
While designed to supplement the GATT and address
its deficiencies, the side-agreements created a host of other
institutional problems. For example, it was not clear
whether benefits given in the side-agreements were subject
to the MFN provision until the GATT Parties adopted a
decision suggesting that they were. The GATT's uniform
"multilateralization" of the trade liberalization game gave
way, in part, to a balkanized system of side-agreements
(often referred to as "GATT a la carte") with multiple
systems for dispute settlement.29 °
In addition to the growing importance of addressing
NTBs, increased unilateralism on the part of the U.S. as a
means to "enforce" its trade-related rights was an
important factor in getting nations to explicitly reframe the
underlying interdependency problem and reform the
existing set of obligations (primarily through significant
288. See, e.g., JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING, supra note 218, at 9-14; JACKSON ET
AL., supra note 27, at 214-15.
289. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 27, at 214-15.
290. See Patricia Kalla, Note, The GATT Dispute Settlement Procedure in
the 1980s: Where Do We Go from Here?, 5 DICK. J. INT'L L. 82, 92 (1986) (noting
that former GATT practice involved procedures under "six disparate dispute
mechanisms adopted by nine codes at the Tokyo Round").
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expansion) and compliance institutions. 9' Both the negotia-
tion of side-agreements and the increased exercise of
unilateral sanctions destabilized the GATT regime and
prompted States to reform the institutional framework
itself.
c. The WTO Regime. The evolution of the GATT
institutional framework culminated in the Uruguay Round.
At the close of the Uruguay Round, the States had
negotiated a complex package of agreements that resulted
in a comprehensive overhaul of the existing GATT regime. 9 '
States were not given the option of picking and choosing
among agreements but rather were bound to accept or
reject the entire package. 9 ' This decision allowed States to
291. Specifically, as summed up succinctly by Charles Tiefer:
Initially, the United States accepted the GATT as the chief means of
ensuring that these countries reciprocated U.S. openness. However, by
1962, Congress began to reflect a domestic political conviction that
other countries, particularly Japan and members of the European
Economic Community (EEC), had not honored U.S. rights. In response,
it enacted Section 252 of the 1962 Act authorizing retaliation against
other countries' import restrictions of either illegal or "unreasonable"
nature. In the 1974 Act, Congress further followed these domestic
political convictions, exacerbated by a sense of the shortcomings of the
GATT itself and the Kennedy Round agreement. Specifically, Congress
created Section 301, allowing measures to be taken against countries
that maintained unreasonable barriers to U.S. trade.
In 1988, Congress expanded the Section 301 system significantly. In
response to the persistent foreign infringement on intellectual property
rights, the 1988 Act added the "Special 301" provision. It provided for
identification of countries that infringed on intellectual property rights
and imposed unilateral U.S. trade sanctions if those countries did not
mend their ways. U.S. sanctions could take the form of suspension of
trade agreement benefits or an increase in tariffs or non-tariff barriers
against imports from the violating countries. Also, the 1988 Act added
the "Super 301" provision, which allowed the USTR to identify foreign
country practices that blocked U.S. exports and designate them as
priorities. The Super 301 provision [was and] remains the backbone of
unilateral U.S. efforts to force trade liberalization on foreign countries.
Charles Tiefer, SINO 301: How Congress Can Effectively Review Relations With
China After WTO Accession, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 55, 63-64 (2001). See also
Shell, supra note 59, at 845-49.
292. See Mitsuo Matsushita, Competition Law and Policy in the Context of
the WTO System, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1097, 1099-01 (1995) (describing the
"extensive coverage" of the WTO and the "improved dispute settlement process"
as the salient differences between the WTO and the GATT).
293. See Steve Charnovitz, Triangulating the World Trade Organization, 96
AM. J. INT'L. L. 28, 31 (2002) ("Strategic linkage became the leitmotif of the
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engage in a complicated process of negotiations that
reframed, reformed, and integrated games across many
issue-areas. With respect to commitments and compliance,
the WTO package of agreements significantly expanded the
range of commitments undertaken by States and signifi-
cantly deepened them as well.294 The analysis here will
focus not on the range of commitments undertaken via
these agreements but instead on the compliance system.295
i. WTO Compliance Institutions. The WTO regime
involves a comprehensive, integrated compliance system
that employs all three compliance strategies. The dispute
settlement system is the centerpiece of the regime and is
perhaps the most advanced and powerful yet created under
international law. It represents a significant advance in the
international law field, is the "backbone" of the WTO
trading system,296 and has been touted as the model
institution for other developing areas of international law.97
The WTO dispute settlement system builds on the
preexisting GATT dispute settlement system,298 brings
together and formalizes many of the procedures set forth in
various interpretations and declarations 9  and creates a
formal dispute settlement organization called the Dispute
Settlement Body ("DSB"). °° The DSB is formally delegated
authority to administer the detailed rules of adjudication
contained in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Uruguay Round trade negotiations, particularly with regard to the inclusion of
TRIPs. Negotiators sought a 'package deal' of interlocked commitments rather
than a collection of stand-alone agreements.") (footnotes omitted); Petersmann,
supra note 124, at 454.
294. Among many other things, the Members (1) created the World Trade
Organization-a formal international organization; (2) significantly broadened
the scope of the trading system beyond goods to encompass services and
intellectual property as well as previously exempted areas such as agriculture
and textiles; and (3) created a more comprehensive compliance system including
more effective dispute settlement procedures. See Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 155, 33 I.L.M. 1144
[hereinafter WTO Agreement]; see generally RAJ BHALA & KEVIN KENNEDY,
WORLD TRADE LAW: THE GATT: WTO SYSTEM, REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND
U.S. LAw 8-15 (1998); JACKSON ET AL., supra note 27, at 208-245. States that are
parties to the agreements are referred to as "Members." On the international
organization and its mission(s), see Peter M. Gerhart, Slow Transformations:
The WTO as a Distributive Organization, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1045 (2002).
295. It is important to note, however, that the positively prescriptive nature
of some of the obligations (e.g., TRIPs) reach significantly deeper into domestic
regulatory affairs than the GATT.
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Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("Dispute Settlement
Understanding" or "DSU").'O° The DSB orchestrates the
dispute settlement process from beginning to end-it
establishes panels, adopts Panel and Appellate Body
reports, and even monitors and oversees implementation of
such reports. Importantly, the WTO dispute settlement
system prevents forum shopping among procedures set
forth in side-agreements, for example, and acts as the
exclusive adjudicative institution for all agreements under
the WTO umbrella. In some cases, provisions in some of the
Annex I agreements modify the adjudication rules set forth
in the DSU, but the modifications are generally tailored to
the particular area covered (e.g., intellectual property).
Besides integrating and formalizing various procedures
into a comprehensive set of binding rules and creating the
DSB to administer the process,"2 the DSU reflects a
number of important changes to the dispute settlement
296. Dispute settlement is considered the backbone of the multilateral
trading system. See Dispute Settlements in the WTO: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Int'l Trade of the Senate Comm. on Fin., 106th Cong. 2 (2000)
(opening statement of Sen. Charles Grassley, Chairman, Int'l Trade Subcomm.
of the Senate Comm. on Finance); Mike Moore, WTO's Unique System of
Settling Disputes Nears 200 Cases in 2000, Press Release (June 5, 2000), at
http://www.wto.org/english/news- e/pres00_e/pr180_e.htm (last visited Aug. 27,
2003).
297. See supra notes 21-24.
298. See Shell, supra note 59, at 848-53 (describing five ways in which the
WTO dispute settlement system differs from its GATT predecessor).
299. See id.
300. The DSB was established to, inter alia,
... administer these rules and procedures and, except as otherwise
provided in a covered agreement, the consultation and dispute
settlement provisions of the covered agreements. Accordingly, the DSB
shall have the authority to establish panels, adopt panel and Appellate
Body reports, maintain surveillance of implementation of rulings and
recommendations, and authorize suspension of concessions and other
obligations under the covered agreements.
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement Dispute,
Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 2, art. 2, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
301. See generally id.
302. The process itself was greatly improved by a series of reforms,
including the creation of established timeframes for certain actions such that a
default procedural rule would be triggered at the end of the period, thus
minimizing the delays endemic to the GATT dispute settlement process.
Furthermore, the DSB is vested with the authority to establish panels and to
select panel members in the event that the parties cannot agree on the
selection.
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system.3  First, a losing party can no longer block the
adoption of a panel report; instead, a panel report is
automatically adopted unless there is a consensus not to do
so."' A second related reform was the introduction of
appellate procedures and the creation of an Appellate Body
consisting of seven members that are appointed to four-year
terms.0 5 The Appellate Body may consider only issues of
law and legal interpretations decided by the panel.36 As
with panel reports, the Appellate Body report is adopted
automatically, unless there is consensus not to do so.
Together, these modifications significantly de-politicize the
dispute settlement process and give weight to the panel's
and the Appellate Body's interpretation and application of
the rules and determinations with respect to whether a
particular State is complying with its obligations. A third
important change is that the DSB monitors whether a
losing party implements the relevant recommendations and
brings itself into compliance. If the Member fails to do so
within a reasonable period of time, authority to suspend
concessions is automatically granted, absent consensus to
the contrary, and the level of suspension is calculated
pursuant to a specified procedure. 3o7 Finally, it is important
to note that the types of concessions that may be suspended
pursuant to the DSU may include obligations or concessions
under any of the WTO multilateral agreements, unless
there is a provision precluding such suspension. °8 This
development arguably "levels the playing field" because
developing nations that would have had little bargaining
power under the GATT system may suspend obligations
303. See Shell, supra note 59, at 848-53.
304. DSU art. 16. See also JACKSON ET AL., supra note 27, at 264 (noting that
the switch to a "reverse consensus" rule was significant).
305. On the Appellate Body, see JACKSON ET AL., supra note 27, at 264-66.
306. Although the doctrine of stare decisis does not formally apply to panel
reports and Appellate Body reports, see id. at 265, there is a strong argument
that, based on WTO dispute settlement practice, the doctrine applies de facto.
See Raj Bhala, The Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare Decisis in WTO
Adjudication (Part Two of a Trilogy), 9 FLA. ST. U.J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1
(1999); see also Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International
Trade Law (Part One of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 845 (1999); Raj
Bhala, The Power of the Past: Towards De Jure Stare Decisis in WTO
Adjudication (Part Three of a Trilogy), 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 873 (2001).
307. DSU art. 22, para. 6.
308. DSU art. 22, paras. 3, 4.
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that matter to developed countries, such as those set forth
in TRIPs. 309
The clear preference in the DSU is for withdrawal by
the losing party of its offending measure, 1 ' but the sanction
for failing to do so basically remains the same as it was for
the GATT:31' prospective trade measures intended to offset
only the prospective harm imposed on the injured party."2
Neither compensation for past harm nor punitive sanctions
are permitted."
Article 22 of the DSU sets forth various rules and
procedures for compensation or suspension of concessions,
which are "temporary measures available in the event that
the recommendations and rulings are not implemented
within a reasonable period of time." The DSB expressly
states that compensation is voluntary,314 and that:
suspension of concessions or other obligations shall be temporary
and shall only be applied until such time as the measure found to
be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been removed, or the
Member that must implement recommendations or rulings
309. See Andrew S. Bishop, The Second Legal Revolution in International
Trade Law: Ecuador Goes Ape in Banana Trade War With European Union, 12
INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 1, 3 (Fall, 2001/Spring, 2002) (arguing that the WTO March
24, 2000 arbitration ruling granting Ecuador permission to retaliate through
cross-sector retaliation under DSU art. 22, para. 3 by suspending EU
intellectual property rights in Ecuador is "the second revolution in WTO dispute
settlement because it effectively levels the playing field between the weaker
developing WTO members and the stronger, industrial WTO members").
310. See DSU art. 22.
311. See supra Part III.A.2.a.ii. & iii. (analyzing GATT compliance
institutions and strategies).
312. See Report of the Panel, United States - Section 129(c)(1) of the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, WT/DS221/R, paras. 3.85-.95 (July 15, 2002)
(explaining, based on a thorough analysis of the DSU text and panel and
appellate body reports, that the DSU requires only prospective remedies when a
measure is found inconsistent with WTO obligations); Grane, supra note 46, at
755-72 (providing a thorough analysis of the remedies available under GATT
and WTO); JACKSON ET AL., supra note 27, at 311-12 (excerpt from WILLIAM J.
DAVEY, WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (2001)); Pauwelyn, supra note 268, at 337-
38, 340, 346; see also Matthew P. Jaffe, Are International Institutions Doing
Their Job? World Trade Organization, 90 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 412, 424-25
(1996) (noting that: (1) the issue of whether compensation may cover past
harms is controversial; (2) the United States consistently maintained in GATT
practice and during the Uruguay Round negotiations that dispute settlement
remedies must be prospective; and (3) the DSU reflects this position).
313. See infra this section.
314. DSU art. 22, para. 1.
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provides a solution to the nullification or impairment of benefits,S315
or a mutually satisfactory solution is reached.
As the Arbitrators in the EC-Bananas case reasoned,
the "temporary nature [of suspension of concessions or
other obligations] indicates that it is the purpose of
countermeasures to induce compliance." '316 In that case, the
arbitrators assessed the level of proposed suspension of
concessions in relation to the measures taken by the
European Communities ("EC") to comply with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB rather than the
original measures found to be inconsistent with the EC's
WTO obligations. 17 Compensation for past harm caused by
the original measures was not a relevant consideration in
determining whether the proposed countermeasures were
appropriate, and the Arbitrators expressly rejected the
notion that countermeasures of a "punitive nature" could be
authorized pursuant to the DSU.318
Still, Article 22 does state that "[tihe level of the
suspension of concessions or other obligations authorized by
the DSB shall be equivalent to the level of the nullification
or impairment." '319 Based on this provision, one might argue
that, as with the language of GATT Article XXIII, it is not
clear based on that particular provision whether
"equivalency" includes or precludes retroactive effects.
Nonetheless, it is well-settled that the text and purpose of
the DSU is clearly aimed at inducing compliance once a
violation has been established,32 and, in accordance with
that focus, remedies must be determined on a prospective
315. DSU art. 22, para. 8.
316. Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities - Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas - Recourse to Arbitration by the
European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS27/ARB (Apr. 9,
1999) para. 6.3 (emphasis added).
317. Id. at para. 4.3.
318. The Arbitrators noted that:
[While] the purpose of countermeasures is to induce compliance[,] this
does not mean that the DSB [Dispute Settlement Body] should grant
authorization to suspend concessions beyond what is equivalent to the
level of nullification or impairment. In our view there is nothing in [the
relevant provisions of the DSUI that could be read as a justification for
counter-measures of a punitive nature.
Id. at para. 6.3
319. DSU art. 22, para. 4 (emphasis added).
320. See Decision by the Arbitrators, supra note 316, at para. 6.3; see also
Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 11, at 182-83.
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basis.32' Thus, in the EC-Bananas case, for example, the
Arbitrators set the "level of suspension of concessions" to be
authorized
... through a determination of the level of nullification or
impairment as of the date that the reasonable period of time for
implementation of DSB recommendations expired. The level of
nullification or impairment was assessed in light of the relevant
measures or markets as of the expiration of the reasonable period
of time.322
Thus, in deciding what the level of suspension of
concessions (or other obligations) to authorize, the
Arbitrators compare "the existing situation with that which
would have occurred had implementation taken place as of
the expiration of the reasonable period of time." '323
Notably, however, the problem of intentional
noncompliance has recently surfaced during the dispute
settlement process. In the recent Canada-Export Credits
and Loan Guarantees case, for example, the Arbitrator
"asked Canada to clarify whether it actually did not intend
to comply with the DSB recommendations." '324 Based on
321. See Report of the Panel, United States-Section 129(c)(1) of the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, WT/DS221/R, paras. 3.85-.95 (July 15, 2002)
(explaining, based on a thorough analysis of the DSU text, and panel and
appellate body reports, that the DSU requires only prospective remedies when a
measure is found inconsistent with WTO obligations); see also supra notes 265-
69 and accompanying text.
322. Decision by the Arbitrator, Canada-Export Credits and Loan
Guarantees For Regional Aircraft, Recourse to Arbitration by Canada under
Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, WT/DS222/ARB,
para. 3.21 (Feb. 17, 2003) ("Thus, in the EC-Bananas cases, the Arbitrators
considered the level of the nullification or impairment arising from the revised
EC measure, while in the EC-Hormones cases, the Arbitrators considered the
market for beef products existing on the implementation date, which had
shrunk as a result of various health concerns as compared to the market
existing at the outset of the case.") (discussing Decision by the Arbitrators,
EC-Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6-EC), paras. 4.8-.9; EC-Hormones
(Canada) (Article 22.6-EC), para. 37; EC-Hormones (US) (Article 22.6-EC),
para. 38).
323. Id. Thus, in the Canada-Export Credits and Loan Guarantees case,
the Arbitrator calculated the level of countermeasures (the equivalent in Article
4.10 of the SCM Agreement of the "level of suspension of concessions" in Article
22 of the DSU) based on the amount of subsidy per aircraft, the model of
aircraft, and the number of subsidized aircraft not delivered as of May 20, 2002,
which was the expiration date for implementation.
324. Id. at para. 3.106.
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Canada's apparent intention not to comply with the
recommendation, the Arbitrator concluded that "in order to
induce compliance in this case a higher level of
countermeasures than that based on the Canadian
methodology would be necessary and appropriate. 3 2' This
conclusion led the Arbitrator to "adjust the level of
countermeasures by an amount corresponding to 20 percent
of the amount of the subsidy. 3 26 Despite this decision, the
Arbitrator ultimately rejected Brazil's argument for a
"significant level of countermeasures" in order to deter
intentional noncompliance in general (i.e., beyond the
particular subsidized transactions subject to the panel
report). 7 Overall, this ruling appears to reflect a step in the
direction of stricter prospective enforcement of dispute
settlement rulings and away from dynamic readjustment of
commitments to facilitate "efficient breaches.
ii. WTO Compliance Strategies. In the end, WTO
dispute settlement appears to maintain the same
orientation as GATT dispute settlement. It appears to
implement primarily the Type II and Type III strategies in
the same manner as the GATT, discussed above, in the
sense that WTO Members can alleviate uncertainty by
consultations and adjudication and can readjust
commitments dynamically as a result of dispute settle-
ment.3 29 However, these strategies are implemented much
325. Id. at para. 3.107.
326. Id. at para. 3.121. According to the Arbitrator, "we are convinced that it
is a justified adjustment in light of the circumstances of this case and, in
particular, the need to induce compliance with WTO obligations. Without such
an adjustment, we would not be satisfied that an appropriate level of
countermeasures had been established in this case." Id. at para. 3.122.
327. Id. at para. 3.108-.113. As the Arbitrator explained, "the findings of the
Panel do not extend beyond the particular instance where the application of
those programmes was found to be illegal. It is likely that an identical
application of those programmes would, in identical circumstances, lead to an
identical ruling. However, as long as this is not a matter that was before the
Panel and it did not lead to recommendations of the DSB, we are not, as
Arbitrator under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.10 of the SCM
Agreement, allowed to address it." Id. at para. 3.111.
328. See Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 11 (arguing that the DSU is
designed to facilitate efficient breaches).
329. See supra Part III.A.2.a.ii. It is not surprising that States would seek to
improve the Type II function of the dispute settlement process given the
emergence of nontariff barriers as an impediment to sustained cooperation. See
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more effectively and credibly because of the detailed,
integrated framework of rules and the de-politicization of
the process (for example, by reversing the consensus rule,
creating the DSB, and providing for appellate review of
legal determinations). The rule-oriented, adjudicative
process established in the DSU and the creation of an
appellate review process substantially improve the quality,
consistency, predictability, and overall utility of the dispute
settlement process as a means for reducing uncertainty
regarding the scope, interpretation, and applicability of,
and complex interrelationship among, the sets of rules in
the various agreements.
As with GATT dispute settlement, the prospective
orientation of remedies available through WTO dispute
settlement limits the institution's effectiveness as a
deterrent to intentional noncompliance from an ex ante
perspective."' The institution does serve a Type I function
in the sense that once the process has been invoked and
noncompliance has been established, the possibility of
suspended concessions may induce compliance... and may
act as an effective deterrent to intentional noncompliance of
the same kind between the same Members in the future.
Furthermore, as a result of the improvements made in the
evolution from GATT dispute settlement to WTO dispute
settlement, the expected duration of undetected noncompli-
ance may shorten (in part because the institutions are more
efficient, and in part because the scope of the trading rules
and obligations becomes more precise and certain over
time), which reduces the expected benefits of intentional
noncompliance.
Yet, the fundamental limitations of the dispute settle-
ment system, from an enforcement-oriented perspective-
an opportunity to return to compliance without penalty and
the prospective nature of available remedies (explored
above with respect to the GATT regime)-strongly suggest
that the institution is not directed at deterring intentional
noncompliance, and therefore, that the institution does not
implement a collective strategy to alter the expected payoffs
in a manner that makes cooperation more attractive ex ante
supra Part III.A.2.b. (discussing the evolution of the GATT regime and the
emergence of nontariff barriers as an issue).
330. See supra Part III.A.2.a.ii.
331. See supra notes 269-76 and accompanying text.
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than defection. Instead, it appears to implement a collective
strategy to facilitate internal evolution of the existing
(multilateral) game, and thereby avoid collapsing into
sequential games (whether bargaining games or trade wars
on a bilateral or multilateral basis).
In addition to dispute settlement, the Members also
created another Type II compliance institution, the Trade
Policy Review Mechanism (Annex 3).332 As set forth in its
statement of objectives:
The purpose of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism ("TPRM") is to
contribute to improved adherence by all Members to rules,
disciplines and commitments made under the Multilateral Trade
Agreements and, where applicable, the Plurilateral Trade
Agreements, and hence to the smoother functioning of the
multilateral trading system, by achieving greater transparency in,
and understanding of, the trade policies and practices of Members.
Accordingly, the review mechanism enables the regular collective
appreciation and evaluation of the full range of individual
Members' trade policies and practices and their impact on the
functioning of the multilateral trading system. It is not, however,
intended to serve as a basis for the enforcement of specific
obligations under the Agreements or for dispute settlement
procedures, or to impose new policy commitments on Members. 333
The TPRM establishes the Trade Policy Review Body
(referred to herein as the "TPRB") to periodically review the
trade policies and practices of all Members.134 The frequency
of reviews is based on the impact of a particular country on
the trading system.3 ' Each Member is obligated to submit a
report to the TPRB on a regular basis as well. Specifically,
the TPRM provides that:
In order to achieve the fullest possible degree of transparency,
each Member shall report regularly to the TPRB. Full reports
shall describe the trade policies and practices pursued by the
Member or Members concerned, based on an agreed format to be
decided upon by the TPRB.... Between reviews, Members shall
provide brief reports when there are any significant changes in
their trade policies; an annual update of statistical information
332. Trade Policy Review Mechanism, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
Annex 3, at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/finale.htm (last visited
Sept. 7, 2003) [hereinafter TPRM].
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
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will be provided according to the agreed format. Particular account
shall be taken of difficulties presented to least-developed country
Members in compiling their reports. The Secretariat shall make
available technical assistance on request to developing country
Members, and in particular to the least-developed country
Members. Information contained in reports should to the greatest
extent possible be coordinated with notifications made under
provisions of the Multilateral Trade Agreements and, where
applicable, the Plurilateral Trade Agreements.3
3 6
The TPRM is not oriented towards dispute settlement;
rather it serves an important Type II compliance function
in that it collects and makes publicly available information
regarding trade policies of WTO Members, and provides an
important feedback mechanism for evaluating and
understanding the payoff structure.
The WTO has recently begun to focus on the capacity
problems that developing countries may face and has been
developing capacity-building and technical assistance
programs to enable developing countries that lack the
resources to fully participate in the WTO.337 In November
2001, at the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar,
a broad mandate was declared concerning negotiations on,
inter alia, numerous implementation issues, capacity-
building and technical assistance programs, technology
transfer, and special and differential treatment provi-
sions."' The Doha Development Agenda stresses that WTO
trade assistance must be viewed as part of an overall
development and poverty reduction strategy."9 The WTO's
336. Id.
337. See Brown Weiss, Strengthening National Compliance with Trade Law:
Insights from Environment, in NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 56, at 457, 465-66
(discussing initiatives).
338. At the Fourth Ministerial Conference of the WTO on November 14,
2001, WTO members agreed to launch new trade negotiations pursuant to the
Doha Development Agenda, which specifically puts the concerns of developing
countries, such as market access, capacity-building, and development, at the
forefront. See Fourth Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 20,
2001) (memorializing the agreement made between the 142 nations that
attended the talks at Doha), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/min0l_e/mindecl-e.htm (last
visited Sept. 7, 2003); Inaamul Haque, Doha Development Agenda: Recapturing
the Momentum of Multilateralism and Developing Countries, 17 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 1097 (2002).
339. See WTO Secretariat, Coordinated WTO Secretariat Annual Technical
Assistance Plan 2003, WT/COMTD/W/104, at 3 (10 December 2002).
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recent 2003 Technical Assistance/Capacity Building Plan,
for example, focuses on the complementary goals of
technical assistance and capacity building for effective
participation in negotiations, implementation, and trade
integration.34 ° To that end, the WTO Secretariat will be
engaged in the coordination of a number of technical
assistance and capacity building activities (such as
internships, trade policy courses, and sustainable capacity
building), which coherently link national activities with
regional activities.341 Least developed countries, which have
the most urgent and acute trade development needs, will be
given priority focus.342  As a precursor to technical
assistance, diagnostic studies are being prepared to identify
structural weaknesses and constraints impeding the
countries development into the multilateral trading
system. 43  In the near future, capacity-building and
technical assistance institutions will likely become an
important part of the WTO compliance framework.344 The
emergence of these institutions can be explained as a
response to the bubbling threat of destabilization posed by
exogenous events, such as health crises, and by the capacity
problems facing many developing countries.
Applying the dynamic institutional theory developed in
this article to the GATT/WTO regime helps us to focus on
the aspects of State decision-making and behavior that are
affected by compliance institutions and, at the same time,
on the rationale for creating such institutions. While
international trade law has evolved into a relatively strong
version of public international law, the strength of the
340. Id. at 6.
341. Id. at 10-13.
342. Id. at 15.
343. Id.
344. See Gerhart, supra note 294, at 1083-85 (discussing capacity building
issues on the DOHA agenda); see also USAID, United States Government
Initiatives to Build Trade Related Capacity in Developing and Transition
Countries (Oct. 2001) (summarizing the U.S. effort at capacity building in other
countries). The Doha Declaration is also a good example of the Type III strategy
in operation. See Helfer, supra note 14, (manuscript at 4) (noting that in
response to capacity problems, the Declaration grants least developed countries
an extended deadline for providing IP protection for pharmaceuticals) (citing
Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, para. 7, available at
http://docsonline.wto.org (Adopted Nov. 20, 2001 at the WTO Doha Ministerial
Conference, 9-14 Nov. 2001)).
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current WTO regime does not appear to derive from strict
enforcement-oriented institutions aimed at deterring
intentional noncompliance through the threat of sanctions.
This view is contrary to the opinion of "most of the WTO
policy community;" most trade experts believe that the
dispute settlement process is, in fact enforcement-oriented
and backed by hard-edged sanctions. 34 The analysis in this
section has shown that, despite its adjudicative, rule-based
orientation, the WTO dispute settlement institution
appears to be management-oriented and facilitative, rather
than enforcement-oriented, because it primarily imple-
ments Type II and Type III compliance strategies and
implements Type I strategies only on a limited prospective
basis.346 The underlying purpose of the WTO compliance
345. See Steve Charnovitz, The WTO's Problematic "Last Resort" Against
Noncompliance, 57 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT 409, 424-26 (2002) (asserting that the
WTO remedy of suspending concessions or other obligations "operates as a
sanction because most of the WTO policy community perceives it as such" and
then providing a series of quotations from leading policymakers and
commentators). Charnovitz and other trade scholars have recognized the
limitations I highlight and have argued for reforms. See id. at 429-31
(discussing reforms suggested by a few scholars); see also Raustiala &
Slaughter, supra note 12, at 543, 549 (suggesting that GATT and WTO
"sanctions for non-compliance correspond to the victim's losses" and stating that
"[clonsistent with the prescriptions of enforcement theory, the reform of the
GATT dispute resolution process as part of the creation of the WTO
strengthened the enforcement powers of the WTO and the retaliatory powers of
member states in tandem with an increase in depth of cooperation."); but see
also id. at 543 (suggesting that the sanctions system is designed to be weak
because of persistent uncertainty regarding the domestic demands for non-
compliance) (referencing DOWNS & ROCKE, supra note 114).
346. Compare with Raustiala and Slaughter's conclusion that:
[R]ecent work by IR scholars, often using statistical analyses of
GATT/WTO disputes, indicates a more mixed story about the influence
of GATT enforcement that substantially alters the [managerial-
enforcement] debate. Busch and Reinhardt, building on Hudec's
pioneering work, [demonstrate a low level of compliance with GATT
panel ruling.] This low level of compliance does not, however, indicate
that the GATT dispute process was ineffective. Rather, the major effect
of the dispute process seemed to precede the issuance of a ruling.
Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 12, at 543, 549 (emphasis in original)
(referencing Marc Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Testing International Trade Law:
Empirical Studies of GATTI WTO Dispute Settlement, unpublished manuscript
(2000)).
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system is to maintain regime stability, "to keep the system
from breaking down. ''34'
B. International Environmental Law and the Ozone Regime
This section applies the theoretical framework to the
Ozone regime, which addresses a fundamentally different
interdependency problem than discussed above with respect
to the international trade regime. It begins by analyzing the
interdependency problem motivating international
cooperation to reduce the emission of manmade, ozone-
depleting substances ("ODSs"). It then describes the basic
contours of the Ozone regime and analyzes the relevant
compliance strategies and institutions. While the Ozone
regime also appears to be primarily management-oriented
and facilitative, it does not rely heavily on dispute
settlement, but rather, utilizes a host of innovative
compliance institutions to implement all three compliance
strategies.
1. The Underlying Interdependency Problem and the
Need for International Cooperation. Today, the interdepen-
dency problem motivating international cooperation to
reduce the emission of manmade ODSs is well-
understood.348 Briefly, ozone in the stratosphere (the "Ozone
347. As Downs and Rocke suggest, the compensation principle of the GATT
"allows for opportunistic exceptions but acts to keep the system from breaking
down." DowNs & ROCKE, supra note 114, at 134.
348. See, e.g., David L. Downie, The Power to Destroy: Understanding
Stratospheric Ozone Politics as a Common-Pool Resource Problem, in ANARCHY
AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF COMMON POOL
RESOURCES at 97-121 (J. Samuel Barkin & George E. Shambaugh, eds. 1999);
RICHARD ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY (enlarged ed. 1998); Edward A.
Parson, Protecting the Ozone Layer, in INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH (Peter M.
Haas et al. eds., 1993). For recent assessments of the Ozone regime and its
compliance institutions, see for example, ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 10;
IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 12; Jennifer S. Bales,
Transnational Responsibility and Recourse for Ozone Depletion, 19 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 259 (1996); Mark A. Drumbl, Northern Economic Obligation,
Southern Moral Entitlement, and International Environmental Governance, 27
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 363, 363-64 (2002) [hereinafter Drumbl, Northern
Economic Obligation] ("The interdependence of development, environment,
regulation and trade in public and political discourse is more pronounced today
than at the adoption of the Stockholm Declaration in 1972, which many view as
the initiation of the 'modern' era of international environmental law."); Mark A.
Drumbl, Poverty, Wealth, and Obligation in International Environmental Law,
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layer") shields all of us living on Earth from ultraviolet
radiation emitted from the sun.349 There are significant
health risks associated with increased exposure to
ultraviolet radiation. 5 ' When certain manmade chemicals
are emitted and make their way into the stratosphere,
ultraviolet radiation breaks down the chemicals releasing,
among other things, chlorine or bromine atoms, which act
as catalysts in destroying ozone. 1 Chlorofluorocarbons
("CFCs") and other ODSs, such as halons, methyl bromide,
carbon tetrachloride, methyl chloroform, and hydro-
chlorofluorocarbons ("HCFCs"), have been used in
numerous consumer and industrial applications.352
International cooperation is necessary to address the
problem because doing so involves a tradeoff between the
risk of long-term environmental harm and attendant health
effects and the short-term economic costs of developing and
shifting to alternative chemicals.353 The Ozone layer can be
analyzed as either a global public good or common pool
resource, depending on the manner in which the problem is354
framed. On one hand, an intact Ozone layer performs a
service by shielding everyone on Earth from ultraviolet
76 TuL. L. REV. 843, 843-44 (2002) [hereinafter Drumbl, Poverty, Wealth, and
Obligation] ("The primus inter pares nature of the selfish justice motivation
explains why the environmental issue-areas in which the shared compact has
arisen.., tend to be ones in which common concerns of humanity are
threatened or in which externalities are imposed on the developed world and
not issue-areas with local impact upon developing nations alone, regardless of
the severity of that impact"); Setear, Ozone, Iteration, and International Law,
supra note 7; see also Jorgen Wettestad, The Vienna Convention and Montreal
Protocol on Ozone-Layer Depletion, in ENVIRONMENTAL REGIME EFFECTIVENESS:
CONFRONTING EVIDENCE WITH THEORY, 149-70 (Edward L. Miles et al. eds.
2002).
349. Drumbl, Poverty, Wealth, and Obligation, supra note 348, at 863-64
(discussing the composition of ozone and threats posed to the ozone layer by
chlorofluorocarbons and other ozone-depleting chemicals). The Ozone
Secretariat also has a wealth of information about the environmental threats
posed by ozone depletion, available at http://www.unep.org/ozone/faq.shtml (last
visited Sept. 8, 2003).
350. Drumbl, Poverty, Wealth, and Obligation, supra note 348, at 863-64.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. See, e.g., Oran R. Young, The Effectiveness of International Governance
Systems, in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
1 (Oran R. Young et al. eds., 1996).
354. For an excellent discussion, see Downie, supra note 348, at 97-121; see
generally LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE (Robert 0. Keohane &
Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995); HARDIN, supra note 78; OLSON, supra note 99.
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light. Because this service is both nonrivalrously consumed
and nonexcludable, it can be characterized in economic
terms as a classic public good."' On the other hand, when
framed in terms of its capacity to act as a sink for ozone-
depleting chemicals, the Ozone layer remains
nonexcludable while its capacity is rivalrously consumed."'
Under either view, sustaining the Ozone layer may be
analyzed as a dynamic multiplayer game.357
Robust international cooperation is especially necessary
because the Ozone layer may be depleted by ozone-
depleting emissions regardless of where on the Earth the
emissions come from."' This fact is particularly important
because it means that broad international cooperation is
essential to protecting the Ozone layer."5 A State (or group
of States) that opts not to participate, either by not making
commitments, or by not complying with commitments
undertaken, may undermine the efforts of cooperating
States by emitting ODSs in a quantity sufficient to "hasten
depletion of the ozone layer."" This characteristic of the
355. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 219, at 40-41; Oakland, supra note
219, at 486; WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICY 543-44 (3d ed. 1985); John Head, Public Goods and Public Policy, 17
PUB. FIN. 197 (1962); Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public
Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954).
356. See Downie, supra note 348, at 97-121.
357. Both public good and common pool resource problems can be
"translated" in multiplayer supergames, often an N-player, iterated Prisoners'
Dilemma. See Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties, supra note 7, at 178-
79 n.160 (listing sources); see also Wagner, supra note 90, at 377-79, 382.
Wagner suggests that:
[T]he theory of infinitely repeated games.., highlights the fact that
international cooperation for the environment is better represented as
a process than as an outcome. In effect, countries are involved in
'continuous dealings' but in reality this process depends much more on
history than is allowed for in a supergame.
Id. at 404-05.
358. See Drumbl, Poverty, Wealth and Obligation, supra note 348, at 880-81.
359. See Mitchell & Keilbach, supra note 84, at 908-09.
360. Id. at 909. See generally Downie, supra note 348, at 103-04. But cf.
YANG, supra note 10, at 38 (suggesting that for international regulatory
agreements, such as those agreements that regulate ozone depleting
substances, the "marginal injury caused [by the noncompliance ofil any one
party is likely to be small. So small, in fact, that the complying party may
consider it not to be worthwhile to expend resources on the imposition of
punitive actions"). As Yang explains:
[Any one party's failure to control the release of ozone depleting
substances or greenhouse gases into the atmosphere under the
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interdependency problem provides some States with an
opportunity to holdout and demand concessions from
others."1
2. The Ozone regime. The Ozone regime is a popular
case study for international environmental cooperation
because it has been extremely successful in a number of
respects.6 First, and most importantly, participants have
significantly reduced (and in some cases completely banned)
the production and consumption of various ODSs.63 Second,
participants have collaborated on identifying additional
chemicals that pose a risk to the Ozone layer. 64 Third,
newly identified ODSs have been added to the list of
chemicals targeted for "ratcheting" down production and
consumption quotas. 5  Fourth, in response to
institutionalized incentives, countries that were not original
participants have gradually joined the regime."' Of course,
there are additional successes and some shortcomings. The
analysis below focuses primarily on the manner in which
the regime has evolved with respect to substantive
respective multilateral environmental treaties is unlikely to undo all or
even most of the environmental benefits gained from compliance by the
other parties. After all, the harm to such commons resources arises not
from any particular nation's individual contribution, but rather the
cumulative actions of many nations over a long period of time. Thus, if
only one party is in breach, most of the benefits of the treaty are likely
to be preserved.
Id. (footnote omitted). Of course, there is an important distinction between
particular small-scale (or short-term) incidences of noncompliance by one party
and either refusal to participate or long-term noncompliance by certain
important parties, such as China and India. See Downie, supra note 348.
361. See sources cited supra note 360.
362. See, e.g., Parson, supra note 348, at 27 ("The ozone treaty is widely
cited as the most successful example of international environmental cooperation
to date and the best model for progress on such issues as climate change.");
BROWN WEISS ET AL., supra note 134, at 663; BENEDICK, supra note 348, at 1;
Setear, Ozone, Iteration, and International Law, supra note 7, at 194-95.
363. See generally UNEP, Ozone Secretariat, Production and Consumption
of Ozone Depleting Substances Under the Montreal Protocol 1986-2000 (Apr.
2002), available at http://www.unep.org/ozone/15-year-data-report.pdf (last
visited Sept. 7, 2003).
364. See infra Part III B.2.a.
365. See infra Part III B.2.a.
366. See infra Part III B.2.a.
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obligations, principles, commitments, and compliance
institutions.
a. The Evolution of the Ozone regime and its
Compliance Institutions. In 1974, a series of scientific
papers suggested that CFCs could destroy stratospheric
ozone."' In the mid-to-late 1970s, scientific and public
policy debates ensued and various nations, including the
U.S., established domestic controls on the use of CFCs in
aerosol sprays.3 9  However, the European Community,
Japan, the Soviet countries, and various large developing
countries would not do so, in part because of uncertainties
regarding various aspects of the environmental problem.37 °
Accordingly, in the late 1970s, the United Nations
Environment Programme ("UNEP") was charged with
promoting research to develop a better understanding of the
problem and its possible solutions. In 1981, UNEP
established an Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and
Technical Experts to draft a global framework convention, 72
and in 1985, States adopted the Vienna Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer.17' The Vienna Convention
was signed by twenty countries plus the European
367. For an extremely thorough and insightful analysis of the Ozone regime
from the iterative perspective, see Setear, Ozone, Iteration, and International
Law, supra note 7. Setear explores, in significant detail, the institutional
choices made to promote iteration and how the Ozone regime has evolved to
facilitate cooperation.
368. R. Cicerone, R. Stolarski, & S. Walters, Stratospheric Ozone
Destruction by Man-Made Chlorofluoromethanes, 185 SCIENCE 1165-67 (Sept.
27, 1974); Mario Molina & F. Sherwood Rowland, Stratospheric Sink for
Chlorofluoromethanes: Chlorine Atom-catalyzed Destruction of Ozone, 249
NATURE 810-12 (June 28, 1974); Richard Stolarski & Ralph Cicerone,
Stratospheric Chlorine: A Possible Sink for Ozone, 52 CAN. J. CHEM. 1610-15
(1974). For a more detailed history of the regime's evolution and a discussion of
the role of the "ecological 'epistemic community,' a knowledge-based network of
specialists who shared beliefs in cause-and-effect relations, validity tests, and
the underlying principled values and pursued common policy goals," see Haas,
supra note 136.
369. See Edith Brown Weiss, The Five International Treaties: A Living
History, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 10, at 136.
370. Id. at 137-39.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, [hereinafter
Vienna Convention] UNEP Doc. IG.53/5; 26 I.L.M.1529 (1987) (signed March
22, 1985, entered into force September 22, 1988).
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Community, and it entered into force on September 22,
1988.374
Through this "framework" convention,375 parties did not
undertake specific binding controls on their production or
consumption of ODSs; instead they agreed to cooperate on
(1) conducting research and scientific assessment regarding
the problem; (2) information exchange; and (3) adopting
"appropriate measures" to deal with the problem.
Although quite general in nature, these obligations served
as the foundation for significant collaborative efforts to
better understand the problem and evaluate appropriate
cooperative solutions.377 This was a crucial first step toward
international cooperation because it broadly framed the
relevant issues at a time where the underlying problem and
potential solutions were relatively uncertain and States
were understandably hesitant to undertake specific
commitments. In essence, the broad framework convention
allowed parties to coordinate their behavior while
continuing to reframe the problem and potential solutions,
as nonbinding agreements frequently do in international
environmental regimes.
378
Importantly, parties fully expected that their
commitments would evolve over time."' At the time the
374. The Conference of the Parties ("COP") to the Vienna Convention met
every two years until 1993, and now meets every three years. The Meeting of
the Parties ("MOP") to the Montreal Protocol meets every year.
375. See Drumbl, Poverty, Wealth, and Obligation, supra note 348, at 864-65
(discussing the framework convention-protocol approach and how it has worked
in the Ozone regime); see Setear, Ozone, Iteration, and International Law, supra
note 7, at 213-15 (discussing the framework convention-protocol approach and
how it worked in the Ozone regime); see also id., supra note 7, at 214 (noting
that "enthusiasm for the convention-protocol approach depends [on] phenomena
(such as the acquisition over time of scientific knowledge) that straightforward
descriptions of the iterated Prisoners' dilemma do not incorporate.") (footnote
omitted).
376. See generally Vienna Convention arts. 2-7 and annexes 1-2; See also
BROWN WEISS, The Five International Treaties: A Living History, in ENGAGING
COUNTRIES, supra note 10, at 136
377. See BROWN WEISS, The Five International Treaties: A Living History, in
ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 10, at 136.
378. See, e.g., Raustiala, supra note 12, at 426 ("[N]on-binding instruments
provide flexibility in the face of uncertain means and costs.").
379. See generally Vienna Convention arts. 8-10; See also BROWN WEISS,
The Five International Treaties: A Living History, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES,
supra note 10, at 136 ("The Convention contemplates that states will adopt
protocols to implement it.").
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Vienna Convention was being negotiated, the parties
contemplated that a protocol with more specific obligations
would be negotiated on the side. Due to a lack of consensus
on the substance of such a protocol at the time the Vienna
Convention was finally adopted, however, the parties left
the drafting of a protocol to future development. As many
observers have noted, the framework-protocol approach
taken in the Ozone regime was particularly important
because getting as many countries as possible on board was
crucial to any long-term effort to address the environmental
problem. 8 °
During the late-1980s and early-1990s, reduced
uncertainty regarding the problem (particularly its
magnitude) 8' and potential solutions, technological
developments, and better alignment of developed countries'
preferences combined to push States to agree to undertake
significant, quantitative commitments to reduce specific
ODSs. In 1987, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer ("Montreal Protocol" or "Protocol")
was concluded, 82 and in early 1989, it entered into force. 8'
The Montreal Protocol imposes obligations on States to
control the production and consumption of ODSs through
specific measures and timetables.'84 The 1987 version of the
Protocol required that parties (other than developing
countries) (1) freeze their production and consumption of
CFCs at 1986 levels; 85 (2) reduce their production and
consumption of CFCs first by 20% and then by another 30%
by 1999;386 and (3) freeze their consumption of halons at
380. See, e.g., BROWN WEISS, The Five International Treaties: A Living
History, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 10, at 136-37; See also Setear,
Ozone, Iteration, and International Law, supra note 7, at 213-15.
381. Soon after the adoption of the Vienna Convention, the first empirical
findings regarding the Antarctic ozone hole were published. A few years later,
shortly after the adoption of the Montreal Protocol, more extensive empirical
findings strongly indicated that man-made chemicals were responsible for the
observed ozone depletion. See Wettestad, supra note 348, at 157.
382. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
[hereinafter Montreal Protocol], 26 I.L.M.1550 (1987) (signed September 16,
1987, entered into force January 1, 1989).
383. This article focuses on the Vienna Convention and the Montreal
Protocol, the two most important agreements, and does not discuss subsequent
agreements. See Setear, Ozone, Iteration, and International Law, supra note 7
(analyzing series of ozone treaties).
384. See Montreal Protocol.
385. Id. art. 2A at 6.
386. Id.; see BROWN WEISS, The Five International Treaties: A Living
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1986 levels.387 Parties are also required to submit detailed
annual reports containing statistical data on various
controlled substances to the Secretariat for the Protocol in
Nairobi, Kenya. 8 The Secretariat compiles the various
reports and makes them available to parties, other Ozone
regime institutional bodies (such as expert panels), and the
public for review. 89 If compliance problems arise, such as a
failure to report within deadlines or discrepancies in
reports, the Secretariat may bring such problems to the
attention of the Implementation Committee.
The primary substantive commitments are quantitative
in nature, basically capping the amount of a particular
chemical that a particular country can produce and
consume within a given year.390 Like the tariff bindings used
in the GATTIWTO regime, these commitments are simple
legal obligations (not subject to interpretation) and are a
relatively easy obligation to police, provided, of course, that
the information is reported by parties and that such
information is reliable. 9' As with the trading regime,
History, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 10, at 138-144 (describing the
initial commitments and how the commitments were adjusted dynamically over
time through adjustments and amendments).
387. BROWN WEISS, The Five International Treaties: A Living History, in
ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 10, at 138.
388. Montreal Protocol art. 7 (reporting), art. 12 (secretariat).
389. Id. art. 12. See BROWN WEISS, The Five International Treaties: A Living
History, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 10, at 147-48 (discussing
importance of secretariat and these functions); see also Robert 0. Keohane &
Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations,
27 WORLD POL. 39, 52 (1974) ("International secretariats can be viewed both as
catalysts and as potential members of coalitions; their distinctive resources
tend to be information and an aura of international legitimacy.").
390. See, e.g., BROWN WEISS, The Five International Treaties: A Living
History, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 10, at 140-44; See also Setear,
Ozone, Iteration, and International Law, supra note 7, at 211-13.
391. Although in the "early days" of the Ozone regime many countries failed
to submit complete reports and there was concern over the reliability of the
data submitted, there have been signs of improvement. See, e.g., BROWN WEISS,
The Five International Treaties: A Living History, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES,
supra note 10, at 153. According to recent report of the Implementation
Committee:
[With respect to] data, Article 7 of the Montreal Protocol required
Parties to report yearly data within nine months. Over the last three
years about 50 per cent of Parties had reported within the deadline, an
improvement on the previous rate of between 25 and 40 per cent. Over
time, almost all Parties did manage to report data; rates now stood at
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governments, industry and NGOs regularly monitor
compliance with reporting requirements and substantive
obligations.392
Numerous amendments to the 1987 Protocol expanded
its reach in terms of chemicals covered (by adding phase-
out schedules for newly identified ODSs), ratcheted up (in
terms of the phase-out rate) both the targets and timetables
for those chemicals already covered, and added institutional
mechanisms.393 As with the GATT 1947, amendments bind
only ratifying countries,394 and there have been a series of
amendments."' As a result, "the pattern of obligations is
complicated. Some states are still party only to the original
Protocol, others to the Protocol as amended in London, and
others to the Protocol as amended in London and in
Copenhagen."9  In addition to the formal amendment
process, which binds only those countries that ratify a
particular amendment, the parties adopted a dynamic
adjustment process through which parties could adjust
commitments (targets and timetables) for covered chemicals
in a less formal manner that does not require ratification. 97
Through the adjustment process, parties receive notice of
an adjustment, and it becomes binding six months
99 per cent for 1998 data, 96 per cent for 1999, and 91 per cent for
2000.
Report of the Implementation Committee Under the Non-Compliance Procedure
for the Montreal Protocol on the Work of its Twenty-Ninth Meeting, United
Nations Environment Programme, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/29/3, at 3
(November 26, 2002).
392. See, e.g., BROWN WEISS, The Five International Treaties: A Living
History, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 10, at 152 (noting that the
"handful of large companies that produce ozone-depleting substances have an
important financial stake in ensuring that their competitors abide by the treaty,
as well as the resources to monitor compliance, albeit quietly.").
393. See id. at 140-44, Table 5.6 (detailing amendments and adjustments);
see generally Ozone Secretariat, United Nations Environment Program,
Production and Consumption of Ozone Depleting Substances Under the
Montreal Protocol 1986-2000 (April 2002).
394. See Vienna Convention art. 9(4). See also BROWN WEISS, The Five
International Treaties: A Living History, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note
10, at 139 (discussing the formal amendment process); Setear, Ozone, Iteration,
and International Law, supra note 7, at 220 (same).
395. Brown Weiss, The Five International Treaties: A Living History, in
ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 10, at 140-44, Table 5.6.
396. Id. at 139.
397. See id. (discussing the adjustment process); See also Setear, Ozone,
Iteration, and International Law, supra note 7, at 221 (same).
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thereafter.398  By contrast, the amendment procedures
require a two-thirds vote and ratification and thus make
adaptation quite cumbersome, which is particularly
debilitating in a regime dependent on rapid advancements
in science and technology.
Given the nature of the interdependency problem,
maximizing participation is essential to the long-term
success of the Ozone regime and to prevent the entire
process from unraveling. Basically, a single country with
the potential to domestically produce and consume
significant quantities of ODSs presents a risk to the Ozone
Layer, even if rest of the world were to halt production and
consumption entirely.9 China and India in particular may
pose such a risk in the future because of their size and
development trajectory. Accordingly, the regime relies on
numerous flexible compliance mechanisms designed to
encourage and sustain participation, including, for example,
the grandfathering of plants being constructed in
September 1987 into a 1986 baseline (to encourage Soviet
participation), °° as well as various financial and technical
assistance mechanisms discussed below.
The Montreal Protocol provides for special treatment of
developing countries to encourage their initial participa-
tion.4"' Specifically, Article 5 of the Montreal Protocol makes
special allowances for developing countries, including a ten-
year delay for compliance with targets and timetables, a
separate per capita consumption limit, Multilateral Fund
402
access, and promotion of bilateral assistance programs.
398. See Montreal Protocol art. 2 (9).
399. See Downie, supra note 348, at 103-05.
400. See Montreal Protocol art. 2(6). See BROWN WEISS, The Five
International Treaties: A Living History, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note
10, at 139 (explaining the purpose of article 2(6)).
401. Montreal Protocol art. 5. See also BROWN WEISS, The Five International
Treaties: A Living History, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 10, at 145
(explaining that the purpose of Article 5 was "to induce developing countries to
join the Protocol").
402. Notably, parties must be classified as Article 5 countries to be accorded
special treatment, and such classification is not permanent. Rather, an open-
ended working group is empowered to classify and declassify countries for
Article 5 status. To become classified and maintain classification, countries
must submit detailed reports. Thus, the positive incentive of special treatment
is made contingent on compliance with reporting and data submission
requirements. See, e.g., BROWN WEISS, The Five International Treaties: A Living
History, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 10, at 144-45.
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Pursuant to the 1990 London Amendment, an interim $180
million Multilateral Fund was established to attract
developing countries to the regime by funding the
incremental costs incurred by developing countries in
meeting their commitments and technology transfer
activities."3 The fund was to expand to $240 million in the
event that China and India joined the Montreal Protocol,
which occurred in 1991 and 1992, respectively.4 4 These
institutional mechanisms encourage participation by
adjusting countries' payoff structures through positive
incentives and sustain participation similarly.0 5  In
addition, the Protocol prohibits trade in controlled
403. Id. at 145; Mitchell & Keilbach, supra note 84, at 909-910.
404. The Multilateral Fund and its implementing agencies form an
important part of the Ozone regime. See Owen Greene, The System for
Implementation Review in the Ozone regime, in IMPLEMENTATION AND
EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 12, at 101-05. Developing countries must submit
detailed applications to obtain funding for particular projects. The applications
are reviewed by various implementing agencies. Funding Eligibility Guidelines
provide that a project proposing to create a new facility to produce ODS
substitutes may not be funded unless the original ODS production facility is
shutdown. See id. at 103 (providing example). If granted, the projects are
monitored and reviewed to ensure that implementation proceeds as expected.
Id. at 104-05 (describing the evolving implementation review system). As
described in a recent report of the Ozone Secretariat:
The Multilateral Fund provides assistance to [Article 5] Parties for
institutional strengthening, for the preparation of a country
programme to implement the control measures and for ODS phase-out
projects. It has been recognized that many developing countries may be
unable to submit their data until their country programmes have been
prepared. The Sixth Meeting of the Parties permitted temporary
classification of non-reporting developing country Parties as operating
under Article 5 for a period of two years. It also mandated that the
Parties operating under Article 5 must report their data within one
year of the approval of their country programme by the Executive
Committee of the Multilateral Fund. As can be seen from the data,
some developing countries have yet to report their data for some of the
years for the period 1986 - 2000. These countries are being helped by
the Multilateral Fund to prepare their country programmes.
Ozone Secretariat, United Nations Environment Programme, Production and
Consumption of Ozone Depleting Substances Under the Montreal Protocol
1986-2000, at para. 6 (April 2002).
405. Ronald B. Mitchell & Patricia M. Keilbach suggest that "[o]nly [the]
unambiguous codification of side-payments [in the London Amendments]
convinced most developing states to join the regime." See Mitchell & Keilbach,
supra note 84, at 910 (also noting that "[wlithin three years fifty more
developing countries, including all major prospective CFC users, had joined the
regime.").
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substances between a party and any non-party."' This
prohibition also adjusts countries' payoff structures,
creating a strong incentive for non-parties to join and a
strong disincentive for parties to fall into noncompliance.4 "7
These innovative institutional mechanisms were
designed to broaden participation and implement a Type I
strategy, which, generally, has been quite successful. The
ratification rate for the Montreal Protocol has been
remarkable-twenty-nine countries and the European
Community had ratified the Montreal Protocol when it
became effective in 1989, and 184 countries had ratified as
of March 3, 2003.408
It is important to note, however, that participation has
come at a cost.40 9 Developing countries have tested the value
that developed countries give to protecting the Ozone layer
and extracted considerable side-payments in exchange for
promised participation. Existing ODS production capacity
correlates directly with bargaining power because a country
may threaten to utilize such capacity unless concessions are
granted, a classic hold-up problem. This tactic is
particularly successful in cases where the country has a
credibly short time horizon. As developed countries have
406. Montreal Protocol art. 4.
407. See Wagner, supra note 90, at 399 ("Barrett argues that trade
sanctions in the Montreal Protocol... encourage[d] accession of developing
countries. As a matter of fact, participation in this treaty is close to full and
sanctions were never carried out. This is consistent with the game theoretical
logic that credible punishments need not be carried out in equilibrium.
Moreover, it helps explain the remarkable observation that no country has
officially objected to the sanctions although they violate the non-discrimination
principle of the GATT/WTO.") (discussing S. Barrett, The Strategy of Trade
Sanctions in International Environmental Agreements, 19 RESOURCE AND
ENERGY ECONOMICS 345 (1997)); but see Mitchell & Keilbach, supra note 84, at
910 (suggesting that the non-party trade ban had a limited effect on countries
with large internal markets).
408. See Ozone Secretariat, United Nations Environment Programme,
Status of Ratification/Accession/Acceptance/Approval of the Agreements on the
Protection of the Stratospheric Ozone Layer (August 27, 2003), at
http://www.unep.org/ozone/ratif.shtml.
409. As of January 6, 2003, the Multilateral Fund Secretariat, only one of
the agencies that funds ozone-related projects, had approved "more than $1,500
million worth of funding of projects and other activities in over 125 Article 5
countries with grants ranging from $50,000 to multimillion dollar grants to
countries such as China." Report of the Implementation Committee Under the
Non-Compliance Procedure for the Montreal Protocol on the Work of its
Twenty-Ninth Meeting, United Nations Environment Programme, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/29/3, at 3 (November 26, 2002).
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eliminated ODS production capacity, large developing
countries that have maintained or even expanded
production capacity have gained bargaining strength.41 ° As
David Downie has observed, large developing countries,
such as India, substantially expanded their production
capacity in the late 1980s and early 1990s at the same time
as developed countries closed production facilities.411 The
long-term success of the regime ultimately depends on the
sustained participation of large developing countries."2
In 1988, pursuant to Article 6 of the Montreal Protocol,
expert panels-the Scientific Assessment Panel, Environ-
mental Assessment Panel, and Technology and Economic
Assessment Panel-were established to coordinate re-
search. They have since issued a series of important reports
on issues relevant to negotiations and implementation. The
Panels "involve several hundred scientists worldwide...
[and] have played a crucial role in causing parties to ratchet
up targets and timetables, add chemicals to the list of
controlled substances, address problems such as recycling[,
and] ... provided credible risk assessments and evaluations
of control options.""4 3 By engaging experts, the Ozone regime
has significantly reduced the uncertainties and transaction
costs that could have inhibited international cooperation.414
In particular, the Technology and Economic Assess-
ment Panel ("TEAP") has had an important role in facilitat-
ing compliance.4 5 TEAP's detailed reports on technical
410. For a discussion of this dynamic, see Downie, supra note 348, at 104-
05, 108-09.
411. Id.
412. A similar dynamic may be taking place in the WTO regime in the
context of TRIPs. The long-term success of IP harmonization, which is
something the developed nations strongly desire, depends on the participation
and compliance of developing countries. Arguably, developing nations are in a
relatively strong position to hold-out because they have credibly short time
horizons (due to domestic priorities) and also, at least in some cases, lack the
capacity to comply fully. Developing countries may hold-up developed countries
for side-payments in the form of readjusted commitments (extended deadlines,
relaxed standards for compliance, etc.), additional trade concessions, and
financial and technical assistance, among other things.
413. BROWN WEISS, The Five International Treaties: A Living History, in
ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 10, at 146.
414. On the importance of engaging scientific and technical experts in
international regimes, see generally, Special Issue, Power, Knowledge and
International Policy Coordination, 46 INT'L ORG. 1 (1992).
415. For a thorough analysis of TEAP as an important compliance
institution, see GREENE, The System for Implementation Review in the Ozone
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options, controls, and ODS substitutes "have played a
crucial role in causing parties to ratchet up targets and
timetables, add chemicals to the list of controlled
substances, and address problems such as recycling." '416 In
addition, TEAP has established Technical Options
Committees that perform a number of compliance-related
functions including monitoring and reviewing implementa-
tion by particular ODS-using sectors.417 Furthermore, TEAP
administers the "essential-use" procedure whereby a party
may obtain an "essential-use" exemption to allow
production or consumption in special cases but only after a
detailed examination by TEAP of the party's application.41 8
As Owen Greene aptly points out, this procedure performs a
key compliance function in that it tends to focus on
implementation issues that pose the greatest non-
compliance risk; TEAP reviews potential problems and
examines possible "problem-solving responses."1 9  By
requiring applicants to submit extremely detailed
applications and then having TEAP experts thoroughly
review and study the issues raised, potential noncompliance
problems may be averted by "detailed and expert guidance
and assistance on how to implement the phase-out.""42 It is
not surprising that this managerial or facilitative approach
would work well in situations where implementation
problems relate to technical expertise. Although such
situations tend to involve issues that pose the greatest risk
of noncompliance, the risk does not tend to derive from
opportunism but rather from well-intentioned parties that
simply lack the technical capacity to comply. By engaging
technical experts before a compliance problem arises,
parties continue to participate and remain in compliance,
and thereby avoid noncompliance procedures.
The Parties to the Protocol created a specific Non-
Compliance Procedure,421 and established an Implementa-
regime, in IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 12, at 89-136.
416. BROWN WEISS, The Five International Treaties: A Living History, in
ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 10, at 146.
417. Greene, The System for Implementation Review in the Ozone regime, in
IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 12, at 98.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 99.
420. Id.
421. For a thorough analysis of the Montreal Protocol's Non-Compliance
Procedure, see David Victor, The Operation and Effectiveness of the Montreal
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tion Committee as well as various procedures for
monitoring and assessing compliance and dealing with
noncompliance issues. The regime established potent
noncompliance procedures that may be initiated by one
party against another or, as practice has demonstrated, by
a party that does not believe that it will be able to meet its
commitments.4 " Importantly, the Implementation Commit-
tee was intentionally designed to be multilateral and non-
confrontational-and decidedly not judicial. As described by
Kal Raustiala, the Committee "does not act in a judicial
mode; discussions are not couched as legal arguments.
Rather, the Committee relies on facilitation and whatever
political pressure emerges from open, transparent
discussion of compliance difficulties. It employs what is
essentially an administrative, rather than a judicial,
approach to noncompliance." '423
The Implementation Committee may review reports
submitted by parties ad hoc, and is empowered to make on-
site inspections to assess compliance and to use both
positive and negative incentives to encourage compliance or
bring a party back into compliance. Positive incentives may
take the form of financial or technical assistance, while
negative incentives may include warnings or suspension of
rights or privileges (including, for example, the ability to
trade in controlled substances with other parties).4 4
Protocol's Non-Compliance Procedure, in IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS,
supra note 12, at 135-76.
422. In 1995, Belarus, Bulgaria, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine made
noncompliance submissions regarding themselves that were interpreted as
formal applications under the Procedure. For a discussion, see id.
423. See Raustiala, supra note 12, at 418-19. The reports of the
Implementation Committee illustrate the facilitative, nonadversarial approach.
See, e.g., Report of the Implementation Committee Under the Non-Compliance
Procedure for the Montreal Protocol on the Work of its Twenty-Ninth Meeting,
United Nations Environmental Programme, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom29/3 (November 26, 2002). See generally Reports of the
Implementation Committee under the Non-Compliance Procedure for the
Montreal Protocol, United Nations Environment Programme, at
http://www.unep.org/ozone/impcom/impcom-reports.shtml. For a listing of past
recommendations adopted by the Implementation Committee during the period
1990-2000, see Implementation Committee Under the Non-Compliance
Procedure for the Montreal Protocol, Recommendations of the Implementation
Committee of the Montreal Protocol (1990-2000), United Nations Environment
Programme, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpComflnf. 1 (June 7, 2002).
424. See Ozone Secretariat, United Nations Environment Programme,
Indicative List of Measures That Might be Taken by a Meeting of the Parties in
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Importantly, positive incentives are generally made
contingent on participation of the party seeking assistance
in the form of submission of detailed plans for national
programs and/or annual reports on production and
consumption of ODSs.425 As David Victor demonstrates, the
noncompliance procedures established by the Montreal
Protocol and implemented by the Implementation
Committee blend the management-oriented and
enforcement-oriented approaches to compliance.426
The Ozone regime also envisions the possibility of
dispute settlement. 27 Specifically, Article 11 of the Vienna
Convention suggests that parties should resolve their
disputes through negotiation,28 and if that is not successful,
respect of Non-compliance with the Protocol (Annex V of the Report of the
Fourth Meeting of the Parties), in HANDBOOK FOR THE INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE OZONE LAYER (2003).
425. See Greene, The System for Implementation Review in the Ozone
regime, in IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 12, at 102-06. See
also supra notes 402-04 and accompanying text.
426. Victor, The Montreal Protocol's Non-Compliance Procedure, in
IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 12. The following decision of
the Implementation Committee is representative:
In considering how to deal with the reported cases of potential non-
compliance, the Committee agreed that various groups of Parties
needed to be treated differently. The Committee agreed that Armenia,
the European Community, France, Hungary, Japan, Germany, Italy
and Netherlands should receive letters from the Secretariat, asking
them to explain in writing their situations of potential non-compliance.
The Committee agreed that Bulgaria and Latvia, which had been the
subject of previous decisions of the Parties regarding their non-
compliance with the Montreal Protocol, should receive strongly-worded
letters reminding them that full reporting of data, or a full explanation
in writing for reported discrepancies, constituted part of their
obligations under the Montreal Protocol. The Committee agreed that
Azerbaijan, Lithuania, Russian Federation and Ukraine should be
asked by the Secretariat to explain their situations of potential non-
compliance, in writing and preferably also in person before the
Committee at its next meeting. Since the latter Parties were operating
under agreed phase-out plans set out in previous decisions of the
Parties, the Committee might wish to recommend further decisions,
probably at its next meeting, noting their continued situations of non-
compliance and encouraging them to meet their agreed targets.
See Report of the Implementation Committee Under the Non-Compliance
Procedure for the Montreal Protocol on the Work of its Twenty-Sixth Meeting,
United Nations Enviornment Programme, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/OzL.Pro/ImpCom/26/5, at para. 14 (July 23, 2001)
427. Vienna Convention art. 11.
428. Id., at art. 11 (1).
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through the good offices or mediation of a third party429 or a
conciliation commission. 3 The article also provides that
parties may elect to settle their disputes through
arbitration or through the International Court of Justice.
Those parties may accept the compulsory jurisdiction of one
of these mechanisms at the time of their ratification of the
treaty.43' In the end, however, dispute settlement has not
been invoked by any of the parties. 32 Instead, the non-
compliance procedures noted above have been universally
invoked.
b. Compliance Strategies. The Ozone regime employs all
three compliance strategies. With respect to Type I
strategies, the focus is on positive incentives that are aimed
at modifying the payoff structure to encourage participation
and compliance. A complex system of funding and technical
assistance programs administered through various
organizations works in an integrated but decentralized
fashion to sustain cooperation as the regime evolves. 33 In
addition, the trade restriction prohibiting trade with non-
parties acts as an inducement to join and a deterrent from
withdrawal. While there is some prospect for negative
sanctions through dispute settlement or suspension of
rights by the Implementation Committee, such sanctions
have not yet been applied.
With respect to Type II strategies, there are a number
of institutional mechanisms aimed at reducing uncertainty
regarding the problem itself and identifying additional
ODSs, and aimed at reducing the transaction or adjustment
costs of compliance through facilitative technology transfer
and administrative, legal, and technical assistance.
Notably, in contrast with the GATT/WTO regime, the need
for legalistic mechanisms for interpreting, clarifying, and
429. Id., at art. 11 (2).
430. Id., at art. 11 (5).
431. Id., at art. 11 (3).
432. See Setear, Ozone, Iteration, and International Law, supra note 7, at
279. Many other international environmental agreements have formal dispute
settlement procedures, and "[tihere is a long history in environmental
agreements of ignoring formal dispute resolution provisions." Brown Weiss,
Strengthening National Compliance with Trade Law: Insight from
Environment, in NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 56, at 468.
433. For further analysis of this "system," see, e.g., Greene, The System for
Implementation Review in the Ozone regime, in IMPLEMENTATION AND
EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 12.
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applying rules and obligations has not been an essential
function of the compliance system in the Ozone regime.
This is illustrated by the fact that compliance issues thus
far have been resolved through the Non-Compliance
Procedure and the TEAP process rather than dispute
settlement.
With respect to Type III strategies, the readjustment of
commitments is an integral part of the Ozone regime. First,
the dynamic ratcheting accomplished through adjustment
and amendment as well as the addition of newly identified
ODSs to the regime demonstrates a repeated cycling
through the cooperative process stages and an evolving
game structure. Second, both the Non-Compliance
Procedure and the TEAP process facilitate the
readjustment of commitments as necessary to respond to
capacity-related problems. As illustrated by high rates of
ratification and compliance, the Type I and Type III
strategies employed in the Ozone regime have been quite
successful (so far) in getting and keeping parties on board.
Despite the effectiveness of the Ozone regime thus far
and its well-designed institutional framework, 3 the task of
maintaining participation and compliance may become
more difficult as developing countries are asked to reduce
domestic production and consumption of various ODSs.
Given the nature of the problem and use of positive
incentives as a means to sustain participation, there is
some risk that large developing countries may act
opportunistically by refusing to participate or threatening
to withdraw from the regime in the future. As David
Downie explains, the political objective underlying the
Ozone regime boils down to one of resource allocation; that
is, allocating the use of the Ozone Layer as a sink for ODSs.
Given the nonexcludable nature of the Ozone Layer, the
"exploitable power to destroy" it becomes a significant
source of bargaining power. As he noted, "[i]n recent
years, the relative bargaining strength of the U.S., Japan,
Australia, and Europe appears to have weakened somewhat
434. See, e.g., Raustiala, supra note 12, at 319-20. See also 0. Yoshida, Soft
Enforcement of Treaties: The Montreal Protocol's Noncompliance Procedure and
the Functions of Internal International Institutions, 10 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y 95 (1999).
435. See Downie, supra note 348, at 103-04.
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(as they eliminated CFC productions) while that of large
developing countries has increased (along with their
production capacity)." '436 It remains to be seen whether the
continued flow of positive incentives (e.g., financial
assistance and technology transfer), the threat of sanctions,
or appreciation of the long-term consequences of destroying
the Ozone Layer provide sufficient incentives to large
developing countries (in particular China and India) to
encourage long-term cooperation."' As Downie aptly points
out, the nature of the underlying problem is that of a
common pool resource, which means that initial regime
success does not guarantee continued success because
"[b]argaining dynamics and interests in [the common pool
resource] ... change over time, presenting new obstacles to
cooperation as actors face new incentives and opportunities
to seek distributive gains." '38
CONCLUSION
This article has developed and applied a novel theory
for analyzing international legal commitments, compliance
institutions, and the dynamic process by which
international legal regimes evolve. As international law
evolves to meet the demands of increasingly interdependent
networks of States and citizens, it takes many forms and
performs various functions (beyond monitoring and
enforcement). The analytical framework presented in this
article provides a powerful means for evaluating and
comparing how international law evolves to address
problems that arise in various issue-areas. In particular, it
helps explain the strategic institutional decisions made by
States to address noncompliance risks and increase the
likelihood of stable cooperation in the face of dynamic
change.
International trade law and international environ-
mental law reflect two different evolutions of both interna-
tional law and attendant institutional arrangements.
International trade law has evolved into a strong version of
436. Id. at 105.
437. Of course, even if China, for example, fully intends to take on
significant commitments and to comply with its commitments, the "exploitable
power to destroy" may nonetheless be leveraged strategically to obtain
concessions from developed countries.
438. Downie, supra note 348, at 105.
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public international law,439 in large part because of the
institutions employed by States to resolve disputes and
maintain the stability of the regime as it evolves. While the
WTO DSU is seen widely as an enforcement-oriented
institution that deters intentional noncompliance through
the threat of sanctions (i.e., by adjusting the expected payoff
structure), this view overestimates the strength of the
remedy made available by the DSU-prospectively
compensatory trade measures-which has little deterrent
effect standing alone." ° The more important function served
by the dispute settlement institution is to maintain regime
stability. As a management-oriented institution, the DSU
effectively resolves disputes where noncompliance is not the
result of strategic opportunism but rather is the result of (1)
an actual dispute over the rules or obligations and how they
apply in a specific context, or (2) a capacity problem. With
respect to the former cause of unintentional noncompliance,
the DSU has thus far proven effective. With respect to the
latter cause, dispute settlement first establishes the
existence of noncompliance and then provides the parties
with an opportunity to renegotiate. To better address
capacity problems, the WTO has recently begun to focus on
the specific problems that developing countries may face
and has been developing capacity-building and technical
assistance programs to enable developing countries that
lack the resources to fully participate in the WTO.
International environmental law reflects a shift away
from the hierarchical structure of international law towards
more complex, multi-layered legal frameworks that blur the
lines between public international law, private interna-
439. The commitments undertaken by members of the GATT/WTO and
other trade agreements are binding legal obligations between States. See, e.g.,
Steve Charnovitz, Economic and Social Actors in the World Trade Organization,
7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 260 (2001) ("The WTO agreements are a code of
obligations and rights for member governments. None of these obligations apply
directly to individual actors.") (footnote omitted). There are, of course,
exceptions, such as the investor-State provisions in NAFTA Chapter 11, which
permit private party challenges to State action through arbitration. See, e.g.,
Chris Tollefsan, Games Without Frontiers: Investor Claims and Citizen
Submissions Under the NAFTA Regime, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 141 (2002).
440. Of course, the threat of reputational harm and unilateral sanctions
may be a sufficient deterrent in some cases. See supra notes 271-276 and
accompanying text.
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tional law, and domestic law.44' To the extent that States
undertake binding commitments in international
environmental agreements,442 the obligations tend to be
positively prescriptive, requiring regulatory action on the
part of States that gives rise to subsidiary legal
relationships between States and their citizens and among
private actors themselves. While some suggest that a broad-
reaching WTO-like compliance system might improve
compliance with international environmental commitments,
such a system has not arisen. Instead, States (and other
interested entities) often rely on complex, multi-faceted,
compliance systems that utilize, for example, positive
incentives to both induce and facilitate compliance as well
as institutions that dynamically adjust commitments over
time.
The compliance system of the Ozone regime is
illustrative. The flexible legal regime has permitted the
commitments undertaken by States to be adjusted and
expanded to new ODSs in accord with scientific and
technological progress. Due to the nature of the underlying
interdependency problem, maximizing participation is
essential to the long-term success of the Ozone regime and
to preventing the entire process from unraveling. As a
result, parties rely on positive incentives, such as financial
assistance, and negative incentives, such as the threat of a
trade ban in controlled substances, to adjust the payoff
structure and induce participation and continued
compliance. For similar reasons, the focus of the compliance
institutions in the Ozone regime is management-oriented
and facilitative. Unlike the GATT/WTO regime, however,
dispute settlement has not been utilized in the Ozone
regime; instead, the Non-Compliance Procedure and the
TEAP process substitute a nonadversarial approach to
dealing with noncompliance problems.
The theory and framework developed in this article
should be applied to other issue-areas. For example, the
441. Cf Brown Weiss, supra note 68, at 351 (suggesting that the lines are
blurring for international law generally).
442. States frequently rely on non-binding instruments rather than binding
legal obligations to advance international environmental (and other) objectives.
See, e.g., Mary Ellen O'Connel, The Role of Soft Law in a Global Order, in
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE, supra note 141, at 100-114; BROWN WEISS,
INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING ACCORDS, supra note 140;
Raustiala, supra note 12, at 425-26.
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author is interested in applying the theory to intellectual
property harmonization and the TRIPs agreement.
Although this article does not directly address compliance
issues associated with TRIPs, the theoretical framework
and its application to the GATT/WTO regime provide a
useful basis for analyzing such issues. A few preliminary
observations are in order. First, the underlying
interdependency problem motivating cooperation in the
area of intellectual property harmonization is quite
different from the problem motivating cooperation on trade
liberalization, and accordingly, the "rules of the game" are
different along a number of fronts; at the most basic level,
GATT/WTO-type obligations are proscriptive, i.e., "thou
shall not," while the important TRIPs obligations are
positively prescriptive, i.e., "thou shall," and in a sense,
more like environmental obligations.443 Second, it is not
clear whether the DSU will even be the most important
compliance institution for the long-term success of TRIPs.444
While the DSU is helpful in the sense that it clarifies
obligations and identifies whether a country's domestic
implementation is in compliance with TRIPs, the primary
compliance issues that are likely to arise in the TRIPs
context, at least with respect to developing countries, will
either be (1) capacity-based: a country lacks the resources,
expertise, legal infrastructure, etc. to comply,445 or (2)
intent-based: a country lacks the incentives to devote
443. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two
Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPs and Dispute Settlement
Together, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 275, 279 (1997) (noting that TRIPs obligations "are
somewhat different" than GATT obligations); Charles S. Levy, Implementing
TRIPs-A Test of Political Will, 31 LAw & POLY INT'L Bus. 789, 792 (2000)
("TRIPs is essentially the only WTO agreement that requires the adoption of an
entire body of law; other agreements, in contrast, merely provide negative
prohibitions .... Implementing affirmative requirements, however, is
necessarily more difficult than implementing negative prohibitions because it
requires members to overcome political inertia to get laws passed, and to
implement what may be largely new concepts into a legal tradition that has no
established way to accommodate them."); Dunoff, supra note 22, at 1004.
444. See Raustiala, supra note 12, at 434 (noting that a managerial
approach may be more effective in resolving conflicts than an approach based
purely on the enforcement of compliance through the DSU because violations of
TRIPs have to be clear, if not flagrant, to be cognizable by the DSU); Reichman,
supra note 195, at 445.
445. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement Procedures of the
TRIPs Agreement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 335, 344 (1997); Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld,
supra note 443, at 325-26.
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domestic resources towards compliance because compliance
with TRIPs is a relatively low priority or is viewed with
reluctance.446 The DSU is not well-suited to address either
of these problems. Perhaps more importantly, there may be
a strategic opportunity for developing countries to force
renegotiation of concessions."' To the extent that this
assessment of likely compliance issues is accurate, the
TRIPs Council, which is charged with "monitor[ing] the
operation of [TRIPs] ,448 and capacity-building institutions
are likely to be equally if not more important than the DSU
in securing meaningful compliance over the long-term.9
446. See Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 443, at 325-26.; See also Peter K.
Yu, The Harmonization Game: What Basketball Can Teach About Intellectual
Property and International Trade, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 218, 230-31(2003)
(noting that many developing countries are "reluctant" to "Westernize (or
Northernize)" their intellectual property law); J.H. Reichman & David Lange,
Bargaining Around the TRIPs Agreement: The Case for Ongoing Public-Private
Initiatives to Facilitation Worldwide Intellectual Property Transactions, 9 DUKE
J. COMP. & INT'L L. 11, 13 & n.17 (1998) (questioning the "widespread belief
that, once the transitional deadlines begin to expire, the developing countries
will succumb to an evolving high-protectionist agenda" for intellectual property
lawmaking).
447. See supra note 412 (discussing the potential for hold-out by developing
countries in the TRIPs context). Alan 0. Sykes, TRIPs, Pharmaceuticals,
Developing Countries, and the Doha "Solution," 3 CHI J INTL L 47, 48 (2002)
("Developing nations subsequently united in an effort to relax (or at least
'clarify') the scope of intellectual property protection required for
pharmaceuticals under [TRIPs]."); Charles S. Levy, Implementing TRIPs-A
Test of Political Will, 31 LAW & POLY INT'L Bus. 789, 791 (2000) (discussing risk
of backsliding); cf discussion of Ozone regime dynamics supra Part III.B.
448. See TPRM, supra note 332, at art. 68.
449. See Raustiala, supra note 12; cf J.H. Reichman, Enforcing the
Enforcement Procedures of the TRIPs Agreement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 335, 344-45
(1997) (finding the DSU potentially troublesome because of its confrontational
approach and concluding that successful administration of TRIPs will depend
on "the mediatory role that the Council for TRIPs ought to play"); see also
Reichman, supra note 195, at 445.

